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There is growing attention to the role of family firms in the global economy. In Indonesia, 
the family firm model is dominant, enhancing people’s lives through job creation, such as 
in Lasem’s traditional batik industry which is very labour intensive. The batik firms 
demonstrate the ability to sustain a business through generations, particularly those owned 
and managed by ethnic Chinese families. Surprisingly, quite a few have survived past the 
third generation, while previous research in a Western context proved only fourteen 
percent of family businesses survive to the third generation. 
 
Previous studies on business sustainability are mainly concerned with the macro-economic 
level. This study investigates family firm sustainability in a more comprehensive way 
considering the growth and survival process over periods of time by incorporating a 
mixed-embeddedness approach. This allows an analysis at different levels: the micro-level 
(the family and the firm), the meso-level (the market dynamics), and the macro-level 
(political and economic climate). In addition, the research compares two ethnic groups that 
play key roles in the traditional batik industry in Lasem: the ethnic Chinese, as the pioneers 
of batik Lasem and the ethnic Javanese who are newcomers. Ethnographic research was 
conducted in the Lasem area using a life-business history approach. 
 
This study offers several key findings. Firstly, at the micro level, the embeddedness of the 
owner-managers in their contexts (ethnic family background) provides a unique resource 
availability such as, knowledge, social capital, and financial capital. Further, knowledge 
possession (colouring formula in particular), the flexibility in responding to changing 
circumstances, succession, and emotional attachment to the firm and the family are 
important in determining business sustainability. Secondly, market dynamics such as 
fashion trends, technology development and competitive environment impact differently 
on the business sustainability of the two groups. Thirdly, at the macro level, politics and 
the economic climate can potentially encourage or threaten business sustainability. 
 
This study demonstrates that an appropriate strategy in response to the changing 
circumstances at the micro, meso and macro levels is crucial in determining business 
sustainability. The latter is closely related to a combination of mixed-embeddedness and 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
 
1. 1 Background 
Family firms are major contributors to a country’s development in the global economy. 
Consequently, family businesses have received significant scholarly attention over the last 
couple of decades. This growing attention is related to the claim that family firms are the 
dominant business model in both developed and developing countries (Poutziouris, 2011; 
Aquaah, 2011). They significantly contribute to economic development (Cromie and 
O’Sullivan, 1999; Harper, 2003, Hisrich, et al., 2005; Venesaar and Loomets, 2006; Urban 
and Naidoo, 2012), and social welfare (Davis and Stern, 1988; Lighthelm, 2011), which in 
the long run could enhance health and education (Bertaux and Crable, 2007), particularly 
in developing countries (Rokhim et al., 2017). Research by Winoto and Graito (in 
Tirdasari and Dhewanto, 2012) shows that the family firm is dominant in the Indonesian 
economy and contributes to the country’s economic development by creating job 
opportunities that enhance people’s quality of life (Morris et al., 1996). However, it is also 
shown by previous research in Western contexts that only fourteen percent of family 
businesses survive to the third generation (Leach and Bogod, 1999).  
 
Considering the substantial and dominant role of the family firm in economic development 
and in preserving traditional batik, this research investigates family firm sustainability in 
the batik industry of Lasem. Lasem, a small Indonesian town located in Central Java, is 
well-known for its traditional batik industry (Elliot, 2013; Rahayu and alrianingrum, 
2014). Currently, there are two ethnic groups which play a role in the industry, ethnic 
Chinese1 family firms that have been active in this area for decades and initiated the Lasem 
batik industry, and the more recent businesses set up by local Javanese owners. Apart from 
their economic relevance, family firms in Lasem play a prominent role in ensuring the 
existence of traditional batik as an Indonesian cultural heritage product. Batik is a cloth 
that is traditionally made using a manual wax-resistant dyeing technique. Batik is used to 
make traditional as well as contemporary dress styles for both men and women.  
                                                
1 ‘Ethnic Chinese’ is used to describe an Indonesian citizen who perceives or identifies him or herself as 
Chinese Indonesian (identifying with both Chinese and Indonesian heritage). The term ‘ethnic Chinese’ or 





The long history of batik produced by family firms in Lasem, makes it a highly relevant 
location to investigate how family firms sustain their business over time. Such family firm 
sustainability is still a debated topic in family firm studies (Miller and Miller, 2003; 
William and Jones, 2010; Westhead et al., 2002). What is lacking in such research is 
detailed studies of the ups and downs of family firms over time addressing the manners in 
which they keep the business going. The batik firms of Lasem offer a unique opportunity 
to do so while adding an extra dimension which allows for the comparison between longer 
established firms and more recently established firms across two different ethnic groups. 
This calls for an approach that takes into consideration the possibility that firms might be 
embedded differently in the local context and might be affected differently by the changes 
in wider society. Therefore, this study has adopted a mixed-embeddedness approach 
(Kloosterman, 2010). 
 
The mixed-embeddedness, approach will thus be used to provide in-depth details on how 
family businesses cope during periods of change, both in terms of growth and in terms of 
staying in business. The research asks questions such as: What are the differences and 
similarities in how these two business groups run their business and cope with periods of 
change; how do the established companies manage to survive across the generations; what 
changes affect the survival of the more recent businesses; and, are there specific ethnic 
dimensions that play a role in how businesses cope? The purpose of this study is to 
contribute to the body of research on family business sustainability by looking at different 
levels of embeddedness: the micro, meso and macro level. 
 
In this thesis, I take the position that ethnicity is not “primordial, essential, and 
unchanging”, but rather situational while acknowledging that as a collective identity, 
ethnicity can be “an important and early dimension of self-identification” (Jenkins, 2004, 
p. 65). There is some us-them element involved in ethnicity in that it refers to groups who 
see themselves as “culturally distinctive” from other groups with whom they might have 
interaction (Eriksen, 2002, p.12). Following Koning and Verver (2012) I contend that in 
practice, ethnicity can be perceived to play a role in the socio-economic organization of 
firms (see also Ram, et al., 2008), however in the Indonesian context ethnicity is also 
reproduced through social and state discourse and policy.  
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To address the overall research aim I have used a life-business history approach within an 
overall ethnographic study. As a female Chinese Indonesian researcher who is born and 
raised in Java and who also speaks to local language, Javanese, next to the national 
Indonesian language, I am familiar with both ethnic groups, their histories and some of 
their divergent cultural notions and social practices. Language and being able to observe 
life as lived and understood by the groups being studied (Van Maanen, 2011) are key 
qualities of ethnographic research and my dual positionality was thus in some cases an 
advantage. Furthermore, the making of batik, particularly traditional batik, is still very 
much a female expertise and offered me easy access to the industry and the people 
involved. My positionality is discussed in more detail in chapter 3. 
 
The remainder of this chapter will provide a brief overview of the theoretical perspectives 
on family firm sustainability, the specific aims of the study, the manner in which the 
research has been conducted (methodology) and finally an overview of the chapters to 
follow. 
 
1.2 The Literature 
Important work on family firm sustainability has been accomplished by Stafford et al., 
(1999), introducing a sustainability business model on the family firm that suggests the 
sustainability of the family firm arises from a conjunction of family success, business 
success and the appropriate responses to disruption. Their study shows the importance of 
an appropriate response to disruption in order to sustain the business by using a positivistic 
systems approach. A considerable amount of literature has been published on business 
sustainability. These studies relate business sustainability to the firm’s ability to sustain the 
business through difficult situations or named disruptions (Astrachan, 2010; Heynes et al., 
2011; Winnard et al., 2014; Glover and Reay, 2015; Golicic et al., 2016). This indicates the 
importance of a survival strategy in order to remain sustainable. In the past decade, a 
number of researchers have sought to determine business development indicators, such as 
sales and acquisition of resources (Urban and Naidoo, 2012); liquidity, profitability and 
growth (Vu et al., 2017); and business performance success (Olson et al., 2003) to assure 
business sustainability.  
 
This research indicates the need to understand business sustainability as an entire process 
of business activity in terms of encouraging the business to grow by exploiting the 
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opportunities and surviving by giving an appropriate response to a difficult situation. 
However, sustainability is a result of a complex and dynamic process that needs the 
adaptive capacity achieved from strategic reliance (Winnard et al., 2014). Consequently, a 
comprehensive study in business sustainability incorporating the mixed embeddedness is 
necessary. No previous study has investigated family business sustainability more 
comprehensively than this study that looks at the nature of family business sustainability 
and how the response to changing circumstances ensures business sustainability by 
incorporating the mixed embeddedness approach. Also, this study is unique as it looks at 
two ethnic groups that operate in the same area and industry.  
 
As previously stated, this study incorporates the mixed-embeddedness perspective 
introduced by Kloosterman (2010) as this perspective views business not as a socio-
economic vacuum, but as embedded in time, place and specific context. The firm is 
embedded in its cultural, historical and institutional context (Gelderen et al., 2012; Koning 
and Verver, 2012). This enables an analysis of family business sustainability in a more 
comprehensive manner. 
 
1.3 Aim and Objectives 
Based on the discussion above, this research aims to come to an in-depth understanding of 
the nature of sustainability in terms of growth and survival in family firms in the traditional 
batik industry in Indonesia by exploring the factors that affect business sustainability and 
how family firms adjust to changing circumstances. In order to achieve this aim, this study 
employs a mixed-embeddedness perspective in analyzing the changes of the circumstances 
at different levels and in different contexts: the micro level (the family and the firm), meso 
level (the market and institutional environment) and macro level (economic and political 
climate). This adds a new perspective to existing approaches in family firm sustainability 
research and will result in a more holistic conceptual framework for the study of family 
firm sustainability. Furthermore, this study looks at the ups and downs of the family firm 
over time to understand how they keep the business operating.  In addition, this study looks 
at business sustainability in two different ethnic groups, namely Chinese Indonesians and 
Javanese. 
 
To achieve the aim, the objectives of this study are determined as follows:   
1. To critically review and analyze literature and theories on family firm 
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sustainability. 
2. To develop an in-depth understanding of which factors affect business 
sustainability using the example of the traditional batik industry in Lasem, 
Indonesia. 
3. To develop an in-depth understanding of how family firms respond to changing 
circumstances in order to sustain the business, in particular, through the example of 
the traditional batik industry in Lasem, Indonesia.  
4. To develop theoretical thinking and research on family firm sustainability. 
5. To offer advice on how Indonesian family firms might prepare and respond to 
changing circumstances in order to support their business sustainability.  
 
1.4 The Research Approach 
In order to address the aim and objectives above, this research employed an ethnographic 
study following an interpretive approach in order to capture the specific complexity and 
dynamics unique to family firm sustainability in this particular Indonesian setting. As 
shown by Nordqvist et al. (2009), the interpretive approach (on which this ethnographic 
study builds) is particularly suited to obtain an in-depth understanding of complex, tacit 
phenomena and processes related to the dynamics of ownership, management and 
development in a family firm.  
 
Ethnography is the exploration of social and cultural meaning of a given group and 
involves trying to get as close as possible to the real-life world of those studied (Brewer 
2000; Creswell, 2007; Van Maanen, 2011). This entails a combination of observation, in-
depth interviewing in the form of life-business histories, and researching documents such 
as local documents on economic performance, policy papers related to government 
incentives to small businesses, and newspaper articles on business and economic 
developments in Indonesia. The life-business history approach is unique to the field and 
explores the business owners’ life history in conjunction with the historical development of 
businesses (Koning and Dahles, 2009) to identify and investigate the responses of small 
family businesses to changing circumstances. The interviewees are invited to recall the 
developments in the batik industry from as far back as they remember. This requires 
engagement with the owner-managers over time to explore their experiences both in life 
and business. The main feature of business history is the compilation of individual stories 
and cases (Colli, 2011). In addition, spatial exploration is conducted to get a 
comprehensive picture of the participant’s storytelling. This is the strategy to make local 
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sense, and helps to understand aspects of relationship processes and social categories that 
include the use of space, for instance, parts of a building, sites of production or places in a 
neighbourhood (Waal, 2009).  
 
Lasem subdistrict, Rembang regency, Central Java is one of the core centres of the 
traditional batik industry in Indonesia. Based on the interview with the head of Lasem 
Batik Cooperative reports, there are 40 firms with either Chinese Indonesian or Javanese 
ownership. This research encompasses eight Chinese Indonesian family firms and nine 
Javanese family firms. The traditional batik industry in this area used to be dominated by 
Chinese Indonesian family firms but these are in decline, while the Javanese firms are 
expanding in number. In this study, the willingness to tell the story is more important than 
the number of participants.  
  
The selection of research participants is based on their business activity and their 
willingness to share their business and life stories at length to source rich and in-depth 
data, which aligns with the aim of getting a better understanding of the nature of business 
sustainability and how they have responded to changing circumstances over time.  
 
1.5 The Overview of the Study 
The overall structure of the study takes the form of eight chapters, including this 
introductory chapter. Chapter two begins by laying out the theoretical dimensions of the 
research and looks at how the literature presents the framework of this study. This chapter 
begins by discussing the literature on family businesses and family business sustainability 
as the main theoretical entity of this study. The discussion continues on the mixed 
embeddedness perspective which is used to get a comprehensive well-grounded framework 
on family business sustainability by analyzing sustainability in multiple settings and 
contexts by looking at the micro, meso and macro levels. Then, to explore a deeper 
understanding on each level, the study seeks to understand what factors cause the family 
firm to be sustainable and the response of the family firm to changing circumstances.  
 
The third chapter is concerned with the methodology used in this study. It starts with an 
explanation of the research paradigm that consists of the ontological relativism, 
ethnographic method and life-business history approach. It then provides an explanation 
about the research subject and the location of the research. Later, it describes gaining 
access to the field, the data collection process, profile of the participants and data analysis. 
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Lastly, it addresses reflexivity and my role as a researcher.  
 
The fourth chapter provides the context of the research. It expounds the historical context 
of batik family firms in Lasem, Indonesia in order to give an overview of the ups and 
downs of the firms over periods of time. The dynamic circumstances of where and how the 
family firms are embedded is also discussed. This chapter explains how the geographical 
location and the circumstances that affect the dynamics of the traditional batik industry in 
Lasem, contribute to the uniqueness of Lasem batik.  
 
The fifth chapter presents the findings of the research, focusing on participants from the 
Chinese Indonesian owner-managers’ group. It includes a description of Chinese 
Indonesian family firm characteristics, business inheritance experience, the changes to 
public policy, fashion trends and technological innovation; the competitive environment, 
and family life disruption.  
 
In the sixth chapter, the findings of the research focusing on participants from the Javanese 
owner-managers’ group are presented. It consists of a description of business 
characteristics, external support, knowledge transfer, limited financial capital, economic 
crisis, technological innovation and competitive environment.  
 
Chapter seven, the analysis chapter discusses the research findings. It begins with an 
overview of the background of conducting this study. Next, it provides the discussion on 
the findings about the nature of sustainability in family firms in the traditional batik 
industry by exploring how they adjust to changing circumstances over time.  It engages a 
mixed embeddedness perspective that allows examination at the micro, meso and macro 
levels which impact on business sustainability. 
 
The final chapter is the conclusion, drawing upon the entire thesis, bringing together the 
various theoretical and empirical strands.  
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2.1 Introduction  
As addressed in the previous chapter, the focus of this study is on the business 
sustainability of family firms active in the Indonesian batik industry. This study addresses 
the question of how these family firms have remained sustainable and dynamic over time. 
More effort is needed in addressing the complexity of business sustainability of family 
firms since, to date, there has been no comprehensive study on business sustainability that 
takes both a long-term view as well as investigating the different levels from which 
sustainability can be challenged. So far, studies of business sustainability have investigated 
the ability to sustain the firm through a particular difficult situation (Astrachan, 2010; 
Heynes et al., 2011; Winnard et al., 2014; Glover and Reay, 2015; Golicic et al., 2016) or 
examined sustainability from a growth perspective (Olson et al., 2003; Urban and Naidoo, 
2012; Vu et al., 2017). This study seeks to explore how family firms remain sustainable 
over longer periods of time. This will be achieved by incorporating a mixed embeddedness 
perspective (Kloosterman, 2010) in order to comprehend the dynamics of business 
sustainability at the micro, meso and macro levels. Most studies to date do not cover all 
three levels and it is argued that these are needed to get a more in-depth understanding of 
what factors impact family business sustainability and how family firms adapt to changing 
circumstances. 
 
This chapter provides literature foundations that form the framework of this study. It starts 
by discussing the meaning of family business and sustainability in business. Next, the 
discussion will continue using the mixed embeddedness perspective which embraces the 
dynamics of business sustainability at different levels of social interaction by examining 
how family firms are embedded to their circumstances and how this impacts on their 
strategy to be sustainable in a dynamic environment. The conclusion focuses on the 
emerging key learning.  
 
2.2 Family Business 
Numerous studies have revealed the important role of the family business in the economic 
 9 
development of countries (Cromie and O’Sullivan, 1999; Harper, 2003, Hisrich, et al., 
2005; Venesaar and Loomets, 2006; Urban and Naidoo, 2012). Viable small family 
businesses contribute to socio-economic stability and political infrastructure development 
(Matlay, 2002). Further, the entrepreneurial activity conducted by the owner-manager 
helps in dealing with poverty (Acheampong, 2018).  Consequently, there has been an 
increasing interest in studying family businesses.  
 
Some authors claim that family firms are the dominant business model, either in developed 
or developing countries (Poutziouris, 2011; Aquaah, 2011), which significantly contributes 
to economic development and social welfare (Davis and Stern, 1988; Lighthelm, 2011). 
The dominance of family businesses in the Indonesian economy in various fields of 
industry and organisation was studied extensively by Winoto and Graito (in Tirdasari and 
Dhewanto, 2012). They claimed that 95.83% of entrepreneurs operated family businesses, 
based on the economic census survey on the number of family businesses in Indonesia in 
1996 conducted by the Central Agency on Statistics. This research does not aim to 
contribute to these debates, but to ground the relevance of studying small family firms.  
 
In developed countries, small businesses are commonly unsustainable in the long-term due 
to limited business management practices (Heynes, 2011). They are less profitable and 
cannot compete with big business (William and Jones, 2010). Similarly, Astrachan (2010) 
suggests that small businesses are more vulnerable and less able to survive. This view is 
supported by Aras and Crowther (2010) who conclude that profit is essential for business 
survival, whereas business sustainability implies something dynamic and means there is a 
continuity.  In contrast to other authors, Glover and Reay (2015) argue, based on their 
comparative study of small family firms in the UK, that even though the economic returns 
of small family businesses are minimal, the business could be sustainable. Those studies 
highlight the need to investigate how small family firms, particularly with all the barriers, 
could be sustainable through generations. For that reason, this research will focus on small 
family firms, especially in a developing country (Indonesia) since it will add a new 
dimension to this field. The following will explain in advance what is meant by a family 
firm.  
 
To date there is no general agreement on the precise definition of a family firm (Chua et 
al., 1999; Westhead et al. 2002). Many researchers brought their own definition, based on 
family ownership, family involvement, generational issues and the research purposes 
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(Chua et al., 1999; Astrachan et al. 2002; Chrisman et al., 2003, Memili et al., 2011). One 
study by Westhead et al. (2002) identified four criteria to define a family firm. Firstly, 
when a single dominant family member owns more than 50 per cent of the shares in a 
business. Secondly, when the family members of an emotional kinship group perceive their 
firm as being a family business. Thirdly, when a firm is managed by family members 
within a single dominant family group. Fourthly, when a firm has experienced an 
intergenerational ownership transition to a second or later generation of family members 
from within a single dominant family group who own the business.  However, this 
identification seems more relevant for larger manufacturing businesses, which usually need 
capital accumulation from family members to start up or develop the business. 
 
According to Chua et al. (1999), family business is determined by the involvement of 
family members in the business activity. It is based on the review of over 250 papers in 
family business literature. They classified family business based on three combinations of 
ownership and management patterns, such as family owned and family managed, family 
owned but not family managed and family managed but not family owned. Further, family 
business was identified as a business owned and managed by the family (Olson et al., 
2003). Moreover, in small family businesses usually the manager is also the owner (Burns, 
2007).  
 
It is thus clear that offering a general definition of a family firm is contested with scholars 
focusing on different combinations of core characteristics. So, it can be argued that it is 
relevant to offer a definition that captures some of the core elements of family firms in 
general (the owner / manager dimension) but that at the same time allows for the 
uniqueness of the context under study. Therefore, this research identifies family business 
as a business that is owned and managed by family members taking into consideration the 
ethnic group context of the families concerned. Adding the ethnic group setting to the 
definition is important as this study aims to come to a better understanding of the ways in 
which each of the ethnic groups managed firm sustainability; it is based on the idea that 
members of ethnic groups might consider each other as ‘culturally distinctive’ (Eriksen, 
1995), something that throughout Indonesia’s history has proven to be the case (see 
Coppel, 2002). It also allows for family patterns that are not similar to the overly Western 
interpretations of family firms (see Verver and Koning, 2018). Allowing for flexible 
definitions that are culturally sensitive might offer ways forward in the issue of finding a 
general definition of a family firm. 
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This study examines family firms, since family businesses portray business sustainability 
having passed through generations (Miller and Miller, 2003; William and Jones, 2010; 
Westhead et al., 2002). The family firm demonstrates the continuity of resource 
reallocation to address the changing needs of the business in response to changing 
environments (Glover and Reay, 2015) proving that a family firm maintains business 
continuity through generations (Katila, 2002).  This study includes firms that have been in 
business for several generations as well as those who are recent starters. This can offer 
some interesting insights into family form dynamics at different stages of their 
development.   
 
2.3 Family Business Sustainability  
Most business sustainability studies are more concerned with the macro-economic level 
which focuses on a specific area, such as environment and its social interaction in regard to 
business sustainability (Galo and Vilaseca, 1996; Hogevold and Svensson, 2012; Wells, 
2016; Roume and Louche 2016; Dyllick and Muff, 2016; Ferro et al., 2017). These studies 
examine business sustainability from a broader concept with emphasis on the 
environmental and societal effects, which is rooted in the triple-bottom line concept that 
has three elements of performance including economic, social and environmental (Ratiu 
and Anderson, 2015 and Sun et al., 2018). The macro-economic lens of business 
sustainability looks at firms and their responsible behaviour socially and environmentally, 
that also might earn financial gain in the process (Gimenez et al., 2012). It examines the 
sustainable nature of business practices which focus on the physical environment where 
the firms operate, company stakeholders in the market place and society (Ferro et al., 
2017).  
 
This research does not propose to study sustainability at the macro-economic level despite 
the lack of research on sustainability at the micro-economic level, which examines how 
firms could be sustainable over periods of time. In addition, previous studies of 
sustainability at the micro economic level often neglect the environmental effects 
(Astrachan, 2010), such as the general condition of the business, potential competitors, 
industry growth and economic cycles over time, the political climate and technological 
development. Therefore, this research investigates how the firm affects and is affected by 
environmental effects.  
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There are diverse opinions on the meaning of the sustainability concept (Ferro et al. 2017). 
Sustainability is a controversial topic because it means different things to different people 
(Aras and Crowther, 2010). It depends on how the question of sustainability is approached 
(Ratiu and Anderson, 2015). Business sustainability is about a plethora of simultaneous 
efforts in which such actors, resources and activities take place (Hogevold and Svensson, 
2012). The level of analysis also determines interpretation of a sustainability concept. 
According to a definition provided by the Cambridge Business English Dictionary (2011), 
sustainability is the ability to continue over a period of time.  
 
To begin with, a micro-economic perspective explains sustainability as long-term survival 
and the ability to repeat success in the future, regardless of market conditions, which 
requires adaptive behaviour to respond to the changes in the market (Golicic et al., 2017).  
Sustainability within the family firm may differ since each family has unique features that 
affect the business performance and vice versa (Dyer and Dyer, 2009).  The family, with 
its own dynamics, is a basic fundamental entity in creating and sustaining behaviours that 
affect business sustainability (Zachary, 2011). The first sustainable family business model 
was initially published in 1999 by Stafford et al. Using a system approach, their business 
model suggests that family firm sustainability is a result of the confluence with family 
success, business success and the appropriate responses to disruption. It perceived the 
overlapping system between the family and the business. Consequently, responses to 
disruption within a family or business entity impact on the sustainability of the family 
business. Later, Olson et al. (2003) employed the sustainability family business model to 
identify families’ strategies to increase the success of both the business and the family. 
They conclude that the family affects the business significantly: family tension has a 
negative influence on business performance; employing family members who live together 
has a positive influence on business success; and families with high integrity use family 
income to overcome the business cash flow problem. One study by Brewton (2010) 
suggests the importance of family firm resilience since family firm sustainability depends 
on how family firms adapt to change.  In another study, Vuuren and Botha (2010) and 
Urban and Naidoo (2012) identified the correlations between operational skills and 
business performance that impacts on business sustainability. They found significant 
positive correlations between several operational skills and business sustainability. So far, 
however, studies in business sustainability, particularly in family firms, have been 
dominated by a positivistic research approach (Stafford, 1999; Olson et al., 2003; Brewton 
et al., 2010; Heynes et al, 2011), which neglects the process of meaning by those enacting 
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family businesses in specific contexts. Therefore, this study discusses some important 
insights into family business sustainability using a more contextual approach by exploring 
how family firms cope with changing circumstances to sustain their business.  
 
Family business sustainability is the result of the ability of the family firm to balance 
growth, expansion, family ownership and control (Colli, 2011). Some studies relate family 
business sustainability to the firm’s ability to sustain the business through difficult 
situations or named disruptions (Astrachan, 2010; Heynes et al., 2011; Winnard et al., 
2014; Glover and Reay, 2015; Golicic et al., 2016). These studies present survival 
strategies implemented by the firm and how these apply to business sustainability. 
Meanwhile, other studies depict family business sustainability from a growth perspective 
(Olson et al., 2003; Urban and Naidoo, 2012; Vu et al., 2017). These indicate that family 
business sustainability is measured by a firm’s growth indicators, such as sales and 
acquisition of resources (Urban and Naidoo, 2012); liquidity, profitability and growth (Vu 
et al., 2017); the success of business performance (Olson et al., 2003). These studies 
represent business sustainability partially related to the need to survive or the need to 
exploit the opportunity to grow the business; whereas the firm should be able to survive in 
difficult conditions and take advantage of opportunities to develop the business in order to 
remain sustainable.  
 
Based on that research gap, the investigation into business sustainability in a more 
comprehensive way, by looking at both the growth and survival process, could not be 
neglected,. Throughout this thesis, the term  ‘business sustainability’ will be used to refer 
to the ability of the firms to continue their business over a period of time through growth 
and survival.  The idea arose from the sense that every single firm has experience in facing 
opportunities that could improve a firm’s growth and, alternatively, face unpleasant 
conditions that could threaten the business’s sustainability. Therefore, it is important to 
understand how the owner-manager conducts strategy to exploit opportunities and how the 
owner-manager applies survival strategy in order to maintain business sustainability. This 
study investigates family business sustainability by incorporating a mixed embeddedness 
perspective, which allows exploration of a firm’s development by taking into account the 
unique contextual constellations. This will be addressed in more detail below.   
 
2.4 The Embeddedness of Family Business 
In recent years, there has been an increasing amount of literature on the embeddedness 
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notion (Thornton, 1999; Hite, 2003; Jack and Anderson, 2002; Koning and Dahles, 2009; 
Budhiyanto, 2009; Lam, 2011; Koning and Verver, 2012; Jurik et al, 2016; Mari et al., 
2016; Velvin et al., 2016; Aggestam et al., 2017; Lamprinakis, 2018). Initially, the concept 
of embeddedness was introduced by Polanyi in 1944 (Polanyi, 2001) who suggested the 
idea of economy is not autonomous. He argued that the economy is always embedded in 
the society. In other words, the economy is being embedded in social relations between 
actors and the social relations are embedded in the economic system and vice versa. It 
shows there are interplays between the economy and social relations and where reciprocity 
rules such as trust and confidence grow in the long-range relationship. It allows resources 
distribution through non-economic motives. Further, Granovetter ascertained 
embeddedness in terms of interpersonal relations and networks in the interaction between 
the actors (Granovetter and Swedberg, 2018). In contrast to Polanyi, Granovetter offers a 
less structural and more relational understanding of embeddedness. He assumes that the 
actors’ behaviour is closely embedded in networks of interpersonal relationships. This 
relationship role generates trust and discourages irresponsibility. He emphasised the 
embeddedness notion in the interaction of both interpersonal relations and networks.  
 
Granovetter defined two types of embeddedness, namely, relational embeddedness which 
refers to the economic actors that involve personal interaction one to another; and 
structural embeddedness that refers to the broader network where the actors have a more 
impersonal relationship (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998; Kloosterman, 2010). Relational 
embeddedness acknowledges that the ties embedded within a social relationship influence 
the economic actions of the firm (Hite, 2003). The network ties could generate either a 
positive influence by creating opportunity, or a negative influence by creating constraint to 
the business activity. Further, strong-personal ties within a social relationship could reduce 
uncertainty for actors, as well as access to assistance and availability of resources (Jack 
and Anderson, 2002). One of the components of social relationship in relation to 
embeddedness is social capital (Hite, 2003). Social capital manifests in the interaction of 
dyadic social relationships through obligation, such as expectation, asymmetry (including 
giving) and norms, and resource accessibility. Social capital is also manifested at a broader 
level, such as brokering whereby dyadic partners introduce one another to new third parties 
and structural embeddedness. Dyadic mutual partners are thereby connected to one 
another. This suggests that social capital is a resource that develops from the interaction 
between actors who are embedded in their network ties.  
 
 15 
Some studies have recognised the embeddedness of the firm over time in its proper context 
such as social, cultural, historical and institutional. This is deemed important to be 
explored in order to gain a better understanding of small family firms (Gelderen et, al., 
2012; Koning and Verver, 2012) from the perspective of the family firm as a social 
construct, which is embedded in socio-economic, political and cultural contexts (Koning 
and Dahles, 2009).  The embeddedness concept implies that all economic actions are seen 
as socially ‘embedded’ (Granovetter 1985; Jack and Anderson, 2002; Granovetter and 
Swedberg, 2018). In other words, embeddedness is identified as the nature, depth and 
extent of an individual’s ties into the environment (McKeever et al., 2014). They conclude 
that where and how the owner-managers and the family firms are embedded affects their 
economic actions. In addition, being embedded in the social structure might create 
opportunity to improve the firm’s performance (Jack and Anderson, 2002).  
 
Later, Kloosterman (2010) introduced a mixed embeddedness approach as a 
comprehensive framework for analyzing entrepreneurship. He employed a mixed 
embeddedness framework to determine the changes and their impact on migrant 
entrepreneurship, but it is also applied to business start-ups more generally. Mixed 
embeddedness framework presents a comprehensive analytical framework by combining 
the micro-level of an individual entrepreneur and his or her resources, with the meso-level 
of the local opportunity structure and links the latter, in a loose way, to the macro 
institutional framework (Kloosterman, 2010:27-28). His study heavily emphasizes the 
external environments, particularly at the meso-level of local structure and macro 
institutional framework, that impact on the opportunity structure. 
 
Consequently, to achieve a more comprehensive well-grounded framework on family 
business sustainability, this study incorporates the mixed embeddedness concept that 
employs an interactionist approach introduced by Kloosterman (2010). It allows analyzing 
the family firm’s sustainability in multiple settings and contexts, since business is not in a 
socio-economic vacuum, but in the actual time and place in a specific context. 
Additionally, sustainability process arises in the complex dynamic setting, which needs the 
adaptive capacity that comes from strategic resilience (Winnard et al., 2014). Mixed 
embeddedness approach suggests a comprehensive analytical framework linking the 
micro-level of individuals with a meso-level of local opportunity structure and at a macro 
institutional level. This approach analyzes the family firm embedded at the micro-level of 
the individual owner-manager and his or her resources by considering the intermingling of 
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the family and the business (Stafford et al, 1999; Westhead, et al., 2002; Olson et al., 2003; 
Astrachan, 2010; Sorenson, 2014) in the meso-level of the opportunity structure (the 
market dynamics) and in the wider context of the macro-level (economy and political 
climate). This study proposes the mixed embeddedness approach and its sensitivity to 
context as an analytical lens since it might offer a better way of studying family firm 
sustainability, particularly in a multi-ethnic and developing country context such as 
Indonesia. It offers an alternative and, hopefully, more comprehensive approach to family 
firm sustainability than the systems’ approach that now dominates the field.  
 
Along with the growth of attention to study family firms and mixed embeddedness as a 
comprehensive framework for analyzing entrepreneurship, this study of business 
sustainability in the family firm has heavily concentrated on the micro-level, since the 
family firm has unique features where the family and the firm are intertwined.  The overlap 
within family and firm makes the micro-level highly intricate. The contribution of this 
study is in the operationalization of this micro-level, particularly for family research, 
where mixed embeddedness is usually applied to ethnic entrepreneurship research. This 
operationalization of the micro-level mingles family and firm focus on the various capitals 
(family social capital, human capital and financial capital), family firm management and 
the culture of two different ethnic groups. This will be explained in the next sub section. 
Meanwhile, the meso-level (opportunity structure) and macro-level (economic and 
political climate) are incorporated as contextual dimensions, since the opportunity is a 
product of socio-economic and institutional forces (Kloosterman, 2010), which are 
addressed in the specific context of Indonesia in more detail in chapter 4.  
 
2.5 Family Social Capital 
Some research in family businesses found that family social capital is the main resource 
for the sustainability of a family firm (Hoffman et al., 2006; Danes et al., 2009; Blomback 
and Botero, 2013; Zellweger, 2017). Family social capital accounts for family firm gross 
revenue especially in the small family firms (Danes et al., 2009). It has significantly 
affected the family firm’s success. Further, other authors also found that family social 
capital helps in sustaining the family firm by securing a sustained competitive advantage 
(Hoffman et al., 2006). Moreover, research in Poland shows that family social capital 
provides family involvement in the firm’s management, which significantly relates to a 
firm’s financial performance (Kowalewski et al., 2010). It helps family firms to be 
sustainable in more volatile and fragile settings (Astrachan, 2010).   
 17 
 
Family social capital is a moral infrastructure that arises in family relationships (Hoffman 
et al., 2006) in how a family believes in themselves and how family members should relate 
to one another (Sorenson and Bierman, 2009). It structurally consists of network ties 
between family members providing limited information to the family members (Hoffman 
et al., 2006). Strong family ties facilitate family resource flows to the family firm (Brewton 
et al., 2010) to facilitate access to other business resources (Kowalewski et al., 2010), 
achieve efficiency (Sorenson and Bierman, 2009) and reduce transaction cost (Memili et 
al., 2011). Strong ties raise trust and shared understanding, which encourage a close 
relationship within a limited network, while weak ties encourage a less close relationship 
that promotes access to information and resources from the wider network (Kapasi and 
Galloway, 2016).   
 
Another dimension of family social capital is relational components including family 
values and norms; obligation and expectation; reputation and identity (Hoffman et al., 
2006; Sorenson and Bierman, 2009). Family values form the basis of a family firm’s 
culture (Aronoff, 2004). The strong business culture and unique values that distinguish one 
family firm from others form an irreplaceable competitive advantage. Moreover, the 
culture of the family firm is formed by the owner’s values (Efferin and Hartono, 2015).  
 
In addition, a norm is a value system that is shared by family, where a family norm is a 
standard of accepted behaviour for family members in the family firm (Sorenson and 
Bierman, 2009). The stronger of family members holding family values and norms, the 
stronger the family ties. This raises the level of obligation and expectation where trust and 
reciprocity are developed. Collective trust between family members encourages working 
together to achieve efficiency, which is a requisite in business start-up. It enhances 
conformity and reduces transaction cost (Memili et al., 2011). This means family 
relationships become an asset in a family firm (Sorenson and Bierman, 2009). 
Additionally, the identities that exist in the family help to strengthen family group values 
and norms, encourage the collective process and create opportunity for the exchange of 
information and knowledge (Hoffman et al., 2006).  
 
Another component of family social capital that is immaterial capital is reputation which 
could guarantee family firm survival and family honour (Colli, 2011) Family members’ 
reputation facilitates personal loans or gifts or sharing financial resources that assist a 
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family firm through a difficult situation or in order to take an opportunity (Sorenson and 
Bierman, 2009). Another advantage of reputation to business sustainability is the well-
known name which secures a family firm’s good position in the market place (Aras and 
Crowther, 2010) and prestige (Glover and Reay, 2015). Moreover, corporate reputation is 
crucial in obtaining competitive advantage to achieve financial and social success.  
 
Besides being embedded in the family, the family firm is also embedded in the family 
firm’s business environment. In broader terms, social capital is about solidarity and 
confidence that is embedded in social relationships between family, friends and others that 
facilitate knowledge sharing and business momentum (Felicio et al., 2014). Social capital 
as a resource in the family firm is also built up outside the family circle, for instance, in the 
relationships with customers, suppliers, government and employees. Social capital is 
engaging in relationships between people and formal institutions (Danes et al., 2009). It 
helps family firms to survive in a hostile environment by providing additional resources 
and bridging connections to government regulators in order to get privilege (Dyer and 
Mortensen, 2005). It is essential especially in getting access to other forms of capital, 
allowing better service to customers, managing good relationships with employees and 
building a high level of goodwill (Kowalewski et al., 2010). 
 
In family firms, social capital, human capital and financial capital are closely tied in with 
the family system (Olson et al., 2003). It has been argued that the integration of these 
capitals generates the capacity for resilience (Danes et al., 2009). Consequently, family 
social capital thus might facilitate access to other capitals, such as financial and human 
capital. The following two sections will discuss literature on human capital and financial 
capital. 
 
2.6 Human Capital 
Previous studies found that human capital is a fundamental factor for the firm’s 
performance that contributes to business sustainability (Lafuente and Rabetino, 2011; 
Felicio et al., 2014). This becomes a source of sustained competitive advantage since it is 
rare, socially complex and hard to imitate (Puig et al., 2011). Human capital creates 
barriers to competitors, especially when there is an asymmetric information and causal 
ambiguity (Reed and Defillipi, 1990). The higher the barrier to imitate, determines the 
sustained competitive advantage, which contributes to business sustainability.  
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Human capital could generate remarkable performance, even when there is low financial 
capital (Lafuente and Rabetino, 2011). Other authors found that human capital alone is not 
enough to ensure business success, nevertheless (Felicio et al., 2014) human capital is 
contextual depending on the type of business and the circumstances where the firm is 
embedded. There are several characteristics of human capital, such as skills, abilities, 
attitudes, values (Danes et al., 2009), education, experience and knowledge (Chang et al., 
2009; Puig et al., 2011; Felicio et al., 2014). Some research studies suggest that high 
education has a positive impact on a firm’s performance (William and Jones, 2010; Felicio 
et al., 2014; Kapasi and Galloway, 2016).  
 
The availability of human capital from family members could promote family social 
capital that supports the business either directly by getting involved in the family firm, or 
indirectly by providing knowledge, experience and financial capital (Sorenson and 
Bierman, 2009). It is given as the manifestation of attention from family members, which 
presents sharing family norms, values and knowledge as a unique feature of a family firm 
(Chua et al., 1999; Poutziouris et al., 2015). 
 
The involvement of family members in a family firm is distinct based on the 
entrepreneurial process phase, since every phase encounters different activities and 
decisions (Klyver, 2007). The family involvement is high in the emergent phase, when the 
entrepreneur needs more emotional support and financial resources (Budhiyanto, 2009).  
The family provides either paid or unpaid workers (Budhiyanto, 2009; Chang et al., 2009; 
Danes et al., 2009; Sorenson and Bierman, 2009). Moreover, the intricacies of the business 
in the initial years initiate the necessity of family members’ commitment in supporting the 
business (Kowalewski et al., 2010). The involvement of family members during periods of 
resource paucity has impact on the firm’s survival (Lee et al., 2016). Furthermore, it also 
promotes business sustainability through family assets to secure loans (Danes et al., 2009).  
 
The involvement of family members in a family firm is motivated by several reasons, such 
as family being the main source of trust (Tan and Fock, 2001; Danes et al., 2009) 
especially in the early stages (Tan and Fock, 2001; Olson et al., 2003). The element of trust 
incorporates the nuclear family to the extended family (Santiago, 2011). However, the later 
stages often have family members that drain business profits (Olson et al., 2003). In the 
ethnic Chinese family firms in Southeast Asia, trust is often related to the concept of filial 
piety – the idea that children have to support ageing parents and that they are to continue 
 20 
the family line - which is the basis of a family relationship (Redding, 1990). In Javanese 
culture, social harmony (Wolff, 1997; Efferin and Hartono, 2015; Wiryomartono, 2016) 
and respect for a social hierarchy (Geertz, 1956) underpin the cooperative actions between 
family members.  Trust in a family firm thus reflects the willingness of family members to 
fulfil expectation, share confidence and support one another (Lumpkin et al., 2008). The 
other motive in engaging family members is to get help in running the business especially 
in the early years (Klyver, 2007; Budhiyanto, 2009; Lee et al., 2016; Revilla et al., 2016).  
 
Knowledge is an important attribute in the family firms (Sorenson and Bierman, 2009; 
Zachary et al., 2013); it plays an important role in every phase of the business life cycle 
and contributes to business success (Moores, 2009). In the initial years of business start-up, 
accumulation of knowledge helps in developing a firm’s competencies (Hormiga and 
Almeida, 2016). Meanwhile, at the time for succession, knowledge transfer between 
generations is important in transferring  the business from predecessor to successor (Hatak 
and Roessl, 2015). Further, prior knowledge supports developing a reputation that can 
offer a significant contribution to business performance (Hormiga and Almeida, 2016). 
Having greater knowledge than competitors leads the firm to become a market-leader 
(Geus, 2011), since the knowledge contributes to a competitive advantage (Hoffman et al., 
2006). It supports a firm’s strategy creation that is important for business sustainability 
(Olson et al., 2003; Hoffman et al., 2006; Dawson, 2012), since, in cases of disruption, 
having the right knowledge can help circumvent or cope with such disruptions (Stafford et 
al., 1999; Astrachan, 2010). 
 
Knowledge is acquired by learning processes as well as through sharing experiences 
between individuals (Hatak and Roessl, 2015). The learning process can consist of trial and 
error processes, experiments, improvisation and vicarious learning (Roume and Louche, 
2016).  It can be enhanced by positive social relationships (Sorenson and Bierman, 2009) 
and high levels of emotional involvement between family members (Roume and Louche, 
2016). There are two sources of learning: direct learning and indirect learning. Direct 
learning comes from inside the organisation through a manager’s or owner’s experiences. 
While indirect learning extends from outside the organisation. Both could occur at the 
same time or in sequence.  
 
There are two types of knowledge, explicit knowledge and tacit knowledge. Explicit 
knowledge is characterized as ‘conscious knowledge’, which consists of fact, concepts and 
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framework that could be stored with, and retrieved from, individuals (Dawson, 2012). It 
could be acquired by abstractness and communication. This knowledge could be 
transferred through formal education (Katila, 2002). Meanwhile, tacit knowledge is ‘an 
automatic knowledge’, that is, implicitly knowing. It is slow, costly, uncertain and not 
easily transferred. Tacit knowledge, or ‘experience-based knowledge’, is a high demanding 
resource to share, which is important for a family firm’s survival and development, 
especially for the next generations (Woodfield and Husted, 2017). It is acquired through 
application and experience, by observing and practicing (Dawson, 2012) to acquire skill-
based competencies through learning and doing (Reed and Defillipi, 1990; Katila, 2002).  
 
In the case of succession, tacit knowledge is achieved through apprenticeship or coaching 
(Woodfield and Husted, 2017), where a family firm becomes a business incubator for the 
potential successor. A business incubator provides a nurturing environment for transferring 
knowledge that supports business skill and networking development for the successor, 
which is an important contributor to business success (Meru and Struwig, 2015).  
 
The predecessor develops tacit knowledge through trial and error or learning by doing, and 
job experience (Dawson, 2012). Nevertheless, the successor establishes explicit knowledge 
through formal education, articulated knowledge through their work and tacit knowledge 
learned by observing the predecessor and shared experiences (Woodfield and Husted, 
2017). The knowledge is useful for promoting intuition, creative foresight and pragmatic 
decision-making.  
 
Tacit knowledge encourages barriers against competitors imitating, especially in a static 
competitive environment (Dawson, 2012). It helps a family firm to maintain their 
competitive advantage. Competitive advantage is established when a firm has a distinctive 
core competency (Hoffman et al., 2006). When the resource is limited, inimitable and 
difficult to substitute or non-substitutable, it creates barriers to other new firms and 
existing firms to access the resources. However, in a more dynamic environment, it 
becomes more challenging for a family firm to keep a sustainable competitive advantage 
(Dawson, 2012). As a consequence, family firms have to adapt and be flexible to change.  
 
2.7 Financial Capital 
Financial capital comprises both monetary and physical assets held by a family member, 
either individually owned or together, that is vital for the business’s sustainability 
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(Chrisman, 2003; Danes et al., 2009; Vu et al., 2017). Further, profit is crucial for business 
survival and maintaining business activity (Aras and Crowther, 2010). Firms with high 
financial performance are usually better able to survive in the long term (Astrachan, 2010). 
Additionally, in initial years, financial capital might be obtained from family members 
who provide seed money or help to obtain external funding (Chang et al., 2009). Research 
in the batik centre in Yogyakarta found that family members, especially husbands and 
parents, provide financial support in order to start up the business (Budhiyanto, 2009).  
 
During an economic downturn, the family firm can use family savings, liquidating some 
family assets to create capital for the business, or employ unpaid, or less paid, family 
labour (Olson et al., 2003). Those are the efforts to keep the family firm running and 
sustainable. 
 
2.8 Business Succession 
Succession in the family firm is the most critical issue that determines the longevity of the 
firm (William and Jones 2010; Sharma and Dave, 2013) and becomes a standard problem 
in family firms (Moores, 2009). In 1983, Beckhard and Dyer published a paper in which 
they described the dilemmas that face the first and second generations in managing 
continuity in a family business. Succession planning is important in ensuring business 
sustainability (Sharma and Dave, 2013).  
 
Family firm succession means managing the ownership transition process from a 
predecessor to the next generation (Sharma and Dave, 2013) or transferring leadership 
from the incumbent to the successor (Mussolino and Calabro, 2014). Managing succession 
and having the ability to adapt to the changing external contingencies is essential for 
family firm sustainability (Mandelbaum, 1995). There are several forces that influence 
family business succession, for instance, the general business environment, the firm’s stage 
of development, the organisation’s culture (its norms and traditions), the family’s culture, 
the family’s influence on the founder and the founder’s or owner’s personal motivations 
and values (Beckhard and Dyer, 1983).  
 
A lot of consideration related to cultural traditions influences the decision in selecting 
appropriate successors, such as inheritance tradition, social norms and religious doctrine 
(Gersick et al., 1997). In fact, family business is made up of two overlapping systems, 
notably, the family system and the business system, which have their own norms, 
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membership rules, value structures and organisation structures.  
 
There are two factors which determine the success of succession in a family firm. Firstly, 
the importance of the potential successor’s condition and situation; for instance, the 
potential successor’s desirability and the potential successor’s perception of business 
feasibility (Getz and Petersen, 2004). If the potential successor is only interested in 
financial return and finds that the prospect of interchanging their asset with another asset 
has a more comparable return, then there is no reason for sustaining the business (Aronoff, 
2004). Therefore, the success of succession is heavily dependent on the successor’s desire 
to continue the business (Iglesias, 2015). Secondly, the absence of succession planning 
allowing succession to happen by default might threaten business sustainability (Tan and 
Fock, 2001). A further exploration about succession will be discussed based on ethnic 
backgrounds. 
 
Furthermore, there are non-economic factors which encourage potential successors to take 
over the firm. A study by Katila (2002) on family farming businesses in Finland found that 
the willingness of a potential successor to take over the business is not merely about 
money, but also honour. The successor has internalized the value of family firm continuity 
so that continuing the family firm is a duty, which will promote emotions of guilt and 
shame if not fulfilled. This implies that a potential successor is not only concerned about 
the economic implication, but also social, moral and emotional implication of the business 
decision to take over the family firm. A successor learns values and norms from 
identification with, and the imitation process from, his or her predecessor, thus the 
emotions of love, guilt and shame also grow with it. It implies that emotional involvement 
in the firm encourages family firm sustainability.  
 
Furthermore, nowadays, family firms are not merely expected to have profit taking as the 
primary goal; rather they perceive that to exist and thrive in the long term indicates 
business success (Geus, 2011). In fact, some firms with low business performance might 
survive in the long run because of the owner-manager’s concern about personal sunk cost 
(already made investment), personal opportunity, previous business success, environmental 
complexity, dynamism, munificence, owner’s intrinsic motivation and family influence 
(Astrachan, 2010). In reality, the commitment to sustain the business is also related to life 
choice, which encourages owner-managers to discern the obstacles in the business as 
destiny (Glover and Reay, 2015). In the same way, keep the business going is perceived as 
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prestige, as a consequence of sustaining the family name on the business, which ensures 
business sustain.  
 
2.9 Family Firm Management 
The management system in a family firm organisation cannot neglect the role of the family 
that simultaneously accommodates the survival and growth of the family firm (Davis and 
Stern, 1988).  Further, family values affect the business sustainability of family firms, 
since the firm is embedded in the family and vice versa (Aronoff, 2004). Therefore, the 
family orientation in a family firm is important in influencing business strategy, 
overcoming obstacles and promoting business success. There are two types of orientations 
based on the nature of the family firm, namely, a business first orientation and a family 
first orientation (Reid et al., 1999).  
 
Business first orientation is based on the view that the family serves the business. It 
emphasizes the importance of business growth as a value in running the business (Reid et 
al., 1999; Iglesias, 2015).  Business first orientation prioritizes innovation, change, growth 
and profit over financial goals (Zellweger, 2017). In addition, loans are usually taken for 
business development purposes (Iglesias, 2015). Therefore, family firms with a business 
first orientation are found to have a longer-term survival because of their concern to 
develop the business (Gudmunson and Danes, 2013). However, business first orientation 
might potentially threaten business sustainability when the firm is no longer profitable. 
Thus, to succeed in continuing a family firm through generations, it is important to make 
the family firm profitable and lucrative, for potential successors in particular (Iglesias, 
2015). 
 
On the other hand, family first orientation is based on the value that the business tends to 
serve the family (Reid, et al., 1999). It is typically prioritizes family needs (Iglesias, 2015), 
where family members have the right over the business (Arnoff and Ward, 2011). Further, 
profits are transferred from the business to the family (Iglesias, 2015). Thus, family firms 
which are engaged in a family first orientation result in lower profits and smaller business 
size. However, family first orientation seems to encourage the business to keep going, 
especially in difficult situations. This orientation considers socio-emotional wealth to be 
the main driver in sustaining the business, such as prioritizing the family’s emotional 
attachment to the business and nurturing the firm (Zellweger, 2017), and enhancing 
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reputation and status in the local business community in order to maintain stability and 
continuation of ownership (Westhead et al., 2002).  These non-financial objectives have a 
long-term orientation, which focuses on the continuity of the family dynasty (Newbert and 
Craig, 2017), where family members are eager to sell their assets to save the business in a 
difficult situation (Iglesias, 2015). It usually operates in the firm under sets of deep moral 
and spiritual values and more long-term orientation of wealth creation to sustain the firm 
(Jaffe and Lane, 2004). This also promotes firm inheritance to the next generation that is 
usually motivated by obligation or guilt (Lumpkin et al., 2008). Nonetheless, family first 
can have a negative effect on business sustainability, because of the emphasis on the 
family over the priority to grow the business. Furthermore, the profit transfer to the family 
also inhibits the business flourishing (Reid et al., 1999). These explanations indicate that it 
is important to balance between family orientation and business orientation in order to 
reach both family and business success (Gersick et al., 1997). 
 
In the organisation of family firms, the owner-manager constellation is considered the 
optimal governance mode where the interest of the owners aligns with the managers 
(Zellweger, 2017). It allows immediate decision-making when required. A small family 
firm has this advantage, since the owner is usually the manager as well (Burns, 2007) 
which allows high flexibility in decision-making, especially in a dynamic business 
environment. Further, in small family firms, there is no distinction between organisational 
control and the locus of human resource decision process (Matlay, 2002). The final 
decisions are always with the owner-manager.  
 
Further, the leadership style of the owner-manager affects relations with employees (Sousa 
and Dierendonck, 2017), which will determine the long-term survival of a family firm 
(William and Jones, 2010). There are two leadership styles:  paternalistic leadership and 
servant leadership (Oner, 2012). Paternalistic leadership is the most common, according to 
studies of family firms, (Dyer, 1988) and is found to be an effective leadership style in 
developing countries (Oner, 2012). Paternalism is more frequently used in cultures with 
high collectivism values, which have strong family ties, loyalty and obligations (Mussolino 
and Calabro, 2014). Paternalism is derived from the latin word “pater” which means 
father. The leader is perceived as a father figure, while the subordinates or employees are 
the children.  
 
In addition, paternalistic leadership style is differentiated into three different types based 
 26 
on the behaviour occurrence (Mussolino and Calabro, 2014). Firstly, benevolent 
paternalism means the leader will have more concern about employee welfare and expects 
employee respect and loyalty. The leader coaches, supports and guides through investing 
high trust, mutual support, open communication and acknowledging employees’ 
achievements. This, in turn, creates capabilities and values; encourages emotional 
attachment; and encourages employees’ loyalty. Secondly, authoritarian paternalism 
leadership style represents an absolute authority and control that requires unquestioning 
obedience. The leader perceives that he or she knows the best for the firm. This leadership 
style inhibits delegation and negatively affects commitment and support. Thirdly, moral 
paternalism leadership refers to modelling desired attributes, such as integrity, moral 
values, unselfishness and self-discipline. The leader acts as a role model and leads by 
example. He or she inspires moral values, ethical standards, trust and mutual support 
within the firm (Mussolino and Calabro, 2014). 
 
Servant leadership emphasizes the firm’s need of the help of others by empowering and 
developing (Mayer, 2010; Oner, 2012). The leader encourages employees to meet the 
firm’s goals by promoting employees to reach their potential. Servant leadership 
characteristics are listening, empathy, healing, awareness, stewardship, community 
building, persuasion, and growth of people.  The leadership style is based on the 
motivation to serve, whereby humble service oriented and effective actions are employed 
(Sousa and Dierendonck, 2017) thus affecting the motivation to engage in the organisation. 
Servant leadership style is more effective at an executive level then at the lower level and 
helps in generating engagement to an organisation.  
 
2.10 Cultural Notions and Social Practices in the Family Firm 
The study of family firm sustainability carried out by Danes et al. (2008) describes the 
importance of the cultural context in the entrepreneurial experience. They expanded 
Stafford’s sustainability family business model by incorporating the cultural context, 
which includes both the structure and functions of family in the model. It includes the 
cultural dimension where values, beliefs, norms and practices reside in the interaction 
within the family system and between the family and its community and the impact on how 
the response to disruption could promote or threaten business sustainability. Danes et al. 
argue (2008, p. 232) that “ethnic groups are culture-bearing units and common group 
values are major contributors to a sense of identity and to characteristic ways of 
perceiving, thinking, feeling, and behaving that influence action in everyday life”. They 
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take the position that it is through family interaction, that cultural values and behavioural 
patterns become embedded in the family firm. Hence, in the study of family firms, 
particularly one that tries to understand family firm sustainability from the perspective of 
two different ethnic groups, incorporating the relationship between ethnicity, culture, and 
family norms and practices is important. It is expressed in this study by focusing on what I 
have labelled as ‘cultural notions’ and ‘social practices’. 
 
The culture of the firm can offer insights into how businesses cope and operate during 
change (Jones, 2013) and as such is considered a key dimension of business sustainability 
(Aras and Crowther, 2010). This thesis defines culture (of organizations or small business / 
family firms) following Schein (2012, p. 313) as a pattern of shared basic assumptions, 
invented and discovered or developed by a given group of people, as the group learns to 
cope with both internal and external pressures (issues of adaptation and/or integration). 
There is something dynamic in ‘culture’, in that with ‘new’ generations (specifically so in 
family firms) new ways of doing might be introduced which create conflicts, and as 
Schein’s definition suggests, learning to adapt or integrate. The culture of an organization 
can thus be considered as a framework of interpretation and action for its members (Hall 
and Nordqvist, 2008). The unique feature of family firms lies in the overlap between 
family and business or organization and contains sets of values and norms that co-
determine interactions between family members either between or within the firm (Jones, 
2013; Zachary et al., 2013). The influence of the family member is more extensive 
(Brewton et al., 2010) and the social practices performed by owner-managers are partly 
based on some cultural notions related to his or her background (family, ethnicity and 
religion). At the micro-level, the owner-manager is embedded in the family, where family 
values are considered pertinent to the family business culture that might generate a specific 
competitive advantage (Aronoff, 2004). According to Dyer (1988) it directs owner-
managers in building strategies for decision-making, to act in a way that might facilitate or 
constrain business continuity. 
 
Beyond the family firm (organizational) cultural context (which can have subcultures, as 
highlighted above by referring to the idea of new generations), there is also the wider 
cultural context to reckon with. In this case, the ethnic group context as well as the wider 
Indonesian country context. In the sections that follow, I will address the ethnic group 
context in more detail for the Javanese and ethnic Chinese. As to the Indonesian context, it 
is important to mention that the ethnic Chinese are an ethnic minority (while the Javanese 
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are seen as part of the majority and considered bumi putra or pribumi – sons of the soil or 
land denoting an ‘indigenous’ status as against the ethnic Chinese who are non-pribumi) 
that has been under pressure to assimilate and has been perceived and treated as outsiders 
throughout history (Setijadi, 2017). Although expressions of Chineseness were reinstalled 
after the fall of this Suharto regime (late 1990s) anti-Chinese rhetoric and violent attacks 
against Chinese Indonesians are a lingering feature of ethnicity in Indonesia (Heryanto, 
1998; Susanto, 2011). 
 
2.10.1 Ethnic Chinese Cultural Notions and Social Practices  
Historically Chinese Indonesians have been confronted with practices of exclusion related 
to nation state building policies and practices (Tan, 2001). In the Indonesian case being 
ethnic Chinese, or Chinese Indonesian, has for long been a contested identity, particularly 
between 1965 and 1998 when the New Order regime of former president Suharto ruled the 
country and implemented an Assimilation Programme (Program Pembauran). This 
included regulations that denied ethnic Chinese groups their Chinese heritage (see Susanto, 
2011). After the fall of Suharto (1998) amendments to anti-Chinese regulations were made 
and later Chinese cultural traditions have been re-installed. This history however, has left 
its mark until today on Chinese Indonesians, their position in society as well as on their 
business acumen. 
 
As to the 'Chinese Way' of doing business, Koning (2007) has argued that the business 
practices considered central to ‘the Chinese way of doing business’ are the use of personal 
networks, trust, and trustworthiness. Her research among Chinese Indonesians in 
Yogyakarta pointed out that a commonly used term for trust or trustworthiness in business 
practice is sin yong and many of the business networks are personal (guanxi) and intra-
ethnic. Even though these are second or more generations Chinese Indonesians and most 
would not have any direct links to China mainland at all, these concepts are still used to 
express business relations. The value of personal networks that are intra-ethnically based is 
quite possibly related to the fact that under the circumstances of an oppressive system, 
such as the assimilation policy and the manipulation of ethnic identities by nation 
policies, staying within one’s own community is a “safe” and “proven” way (Koning, 
2013). Maybe the migration history and coping with an intimidating environment is still a 
very prominent collective memory (Ooi, 2007).  
 
As to cultural notions and social practices among Chinese Indonesians, the literature is 
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offering mixed messages on the relevancy of aspects of Confucian teachings (Wolff, 1997; 
Tan, 2008). Since many Chinese Indonesians are brought up with the migration histories of 
their families (the stories of grandfathers and grandmothers traveling from China to 
Indonesia, often in very poor circumstances) and with generations who remember the times 
before the assimilation politics, it is important to address some of this ‘China’ heritage. 
 
Interpersonal relationships and network are often mentioned as a key aspect in Chinese and 
ethnic Chinese business processes. This ‘guanxi’ refers to interpersonal relationships that 
are seen as crucial for facilitating smooth business transactions (Kiong and Kee, 1998). 
There can be different guanxi relationships that are relevant for different aspects of doing 
business. Verver and Koning (2018) for instance discovered five different kinship relations 
among ethnic Chinese businesses in Cambodia, with various levels of trust and reciprocity 
for each relationship that were applied on different aspect of running a business; from 
nuclear family, to extended family, far relatives, dialect group and other ethnic Chinese 
groups. Guanxi can be used to perform a favour or service and these relational networks, 
contain mutual obligations, assurances and understandings and this makes guanxi more 
than a friendship or simple personal relationship. It pertains to giving favours and making 
gifts to others in a relationship but often with specific levels of reciprocity involved (see 
Verver and Koning, 2018). It is argued that guanxi is important in ethnic Chinese 
businesses across Asia as it offers fast decision-making, access to sensitive or crucial 
information, and facilitates business partners or suppliers or distributors (Bjerke, 2000). In 
an at times hostile environment, such networks based on trust and reciprocity are quite 
important. Research among ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs in Indonesia for instance found 
that guanxi is crucial in providing sensitive and important information for business 
management in gold trading (Budhiyanto, 2004).   
 
The Chinese kinship system is patriarchal which suggests gender inequality (Wolff, 1997); 
women for instance cannot inherit property. After marriage, generally a woman will live 
with her husband’s family, subject to directions from her mother in law and expected to 
perform almost all the household work.  However, from historical times onwards there 
have been marriages between Chinese and local Indonesians which in some instances has 
led to a shift from a more patriarchal family system to a more bilateral family system and 
thus offering more room to women (Wolff, 1997).   
 
It is stated that there are some ‘Confucian’ ethics that survive in ethnic Chinese 
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communities outside of China as a foundation for interpersonal and/or family relationships, 
such as xin yong which is the ability to keep one’s word respect for seniority, reciprocity 
and mutual commitment, parents expecting love, reverence, obedience and respect from 
children; while children expect love, wisdom and benevolence from parents (Tan and 
Fock, 2001). At an individual level, there are values such as dedication to excellence, 
moral over legal solutions, reliability, trustworthiness and loyalty, and hard work and 
discipline (Bjerke, 2000; see also Kiong and Kee, 2004). Overseas Chinese owner-
managers are considered to think that the business is something to be inherited by their 
children and that business success means increased social status for the family, recognition 
from the community, and accumulation of monetary and material wealth (Bjerke, 2000).  
 
A distinctive feature of Chinese family firms according to Tan and Fock (2001) working 
on ethnic Chinese firms in Singapore, is familism. Such familism encompasses nepotism, 
authoritarianism, frugality and hard work, reputation and trustworthiness, and distrust of 
non-family members (Tan and Fock, 2001). It is argued that trust and strong family ties 
enhance conformity and cooperative behaviour that reduce transaction cost and agency 
problems (Memili et al., 2011). Distrust of non-family members can manifested itself in 
certain management practices, such as family control and ownership, conservative 
management policies, reluctance to engage outside professional management (Tan and 
Fock, 2001). It is a specific feature of Chinese family firms where the owner-manager 
relays past experience as a platform of learning while governing the firm (Tan and Fock, 
2001). External learning rarely happens, only when the heirs go to school. This practice 
hampers business growth that, in turn, might threaten business sustainability (Tan and 
Fock, 2001). Distrust of non-family members also inhibits expansion of the firm, thus it 
fails to create a big family firm (Dyer and Mortensen, 2005). 
 
In many overseas Chinese firms, management and employee engagement is family 
oriented (Wolff, 1997); the firm functions as a family and authority is centralized. 
Leadership styles are often judged as paternalistic, emphasizing the benevolent use of 
power and autocratic features (Bjerke, 2000). According to research by Tan and Fock 
(2001) a Chinese owner-manager sees employee welfare primarily as a management 
function; some of this is in line with arguments by Bjerke (20020) who argues that 
leadership does not involve the worker in decision-making and that there is a high degree 
of control over workers, 
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It is argued that overseas Chinese owner-managers are good at financial management 
(Bjerke, 2000). They manage business survival with a small profit margin as long as the 
business has high sales turnover. They value frugality and thriftiness, paying close 
attention to cash in daily business trading because they often rely on their own funds to 
finance the business. Chinese owner-managers with low capital investments employ 
strategies such as: accepting low margins; boosting high volumes to penetrate the market 
and get profit stability assurance; exploiting networking to reduce transaction costs; relying 
on cash transactions and controlling the inventory accurately; rely on word-of-mouth 
marketing strategies (Budhiyanto, 2004) and utilize the family home for their business 
activity (Widodo, 2009). 
 
Succession in an ethnic Chinese family firm takes place when the owner-manager dies or 
retires (Tan and Fock, 2001). When there is no succession planning and succession thus 
happens by default, the business may falter and business sustainability might be 
threatened. At times, filial piety might ensure succession, since filial piety can stipulate that 
the eldest son has to step into the business whether he wants to or not. There is however, 
no guarantee of success as the successor (of a younger generation) might change the family 
firm dramatically when taking over (Tan and Fock, 2001).  
 
2.10.2 Javanese Cultural Notions and Social Practices  
Research on Javanese culture highlights that the basic principles of Javanese behaviour in 
daily interaction are to be thoughtful, caring, polite (Efferin and Hartono, 2015), respect 
others, togetherness, and harmony (Susetyo et al., 2014; Wiryomartono, 2016). The most 
important norms in Javanese society are considered to be social peace and harmony, 
namely rukun which underpins relationships between people, within the family and 
community (Wolf, 1992; Efferin and Hartono, 2015). Rukun expresses that apparent 
divisive opinions and feelings are not appreciated (Efferin and Hartono, 2015); the ability 
to put oneself in the proper context in the social system (Wiryomartono, 2016); willingness 
to compromise with others (Mulder, 2005). At a personal level, Javanese are said to control 
themselves to behave properly according to karma, not only based on respect and mutual 
understanding, but also based on a hierarchical ordering system of being (Wiryomartono, 
2016). This encourages togetherness or collective action in Javanese society (Susetyo et 
al., 2014, Fatmawati, 2014) through unselfish behaviour (Efferin and Hartono, 2015). 
Social harmony is suggested to produce ewuh pakewuh (hesitation), which is a 
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manifestation of shyness and feeling of discomfort, or when an individual feels worried 
that her or his behaviour, or words, would make others uncomfortable (Fatmawati, 2014). 
Therefore, open conflict is avoided in Javanese culture as appropriate conduct (Efferin and 
Hartono, 2015).  Furthermore, habitual living in a group encourages togetherness and 
helping each other is a necessity in Javanese society (Endraswara, 2015). As a 
consequence, success in the Javanese view is achieved by balancing between a material 
and spiritual focus.  
 
It has been argued that kinship groups are central to the Javanese institution (Ihromi, 
2005). The predominant kinship system in Java is bilateral structured kinship (Mulder, 
2005).  The basic unit of a Javanese family is nuclear; however, after marriage the family 
becomes extended (Wolf, 1992). A bilateral kinship system allows gender equality where 
men and women are complementary and able to contribute significantly to the household 
(Astuti, 2005). Further, equality between men and women encourages flexibility in the 
kinship system (Wolf, 1992). Bilateral Javanese kinship in Central Java means that an 
individual is considered as a descendent of both sides, either father or mother (Ihromi, 
2005) even though in practice, certain individuals might choose to affiliate more closely 
with one kin group, either father’s or mother’s side. Egalitarianism is also predominant in 
the Javanese kinship system, where a man and a woman have equal rights and 
opportunities (Wolf, 1992). Consequently, a high percentage of adult women participate in 
of the workforce (Ihromi, 2005). However, nowadays, the Javanese social structure is 
becoming more patriarchal in societies where Muslim religious law has been adopted.  
 
In the Javanese social structure, age, gender, marital status and education are important in 
determining one’s social status (Pruetipibultham, 2012). The oldest man or father in the 
family has power and authority (Ihromi, 2005; Pruetipibultham, 2012). Father as a reliable 
patron has to be honoured and followed; every whim and wish is a command (Mulder, 
2005). It creates norms that the man is expected, as a breadwinner, to work outside the 
house; meanwhile, the woman is to stay at home, perform domestic tasks, and take care of 
children (Ihromi, 2005). Further, a woman is expected to be a good mother and good wife 
(Astuti, 2005).  However, in daily life the situation is that many Javanese women are 
breadwinners for their family (Brenner, 1995); one third of adult Indonesian women are 
working women (Ihromi, 2005).  Moreover, in rural areas with small incomes, Javanese 
women have always participated actively in supporting the family financially (Wolf, 
1992). A woman’s income is used to support daily living expenses, while a man’s income 
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tends to more sporadic and less reliable. Therefore, women tend to be the core decision 
makers in the family. They are often in control of practical matters and money but it does 
not automatically mean that she has power. A woman is more likely to be socialized or 
educated to be submissive to men; devoted to her parents and husband; afraid of new 
experiences and new people; obedient and acquiescent; feel shame and to be shy even 
though she is independent and economically autonomous (Wolf, 1992; Astuti, 2005).  
 
As shown above, respect for social hierarchy is considered significant in Javanese culture 
(Geertz, 1956) and this has an impact on relationships between leaders and subordinates; 
the idea is that a leader has to care and empathize with subordinates while subordinates 
have to obey and follow (Mulder, 2005). In Javanese organisations this translates into 
bapakism, where the (male) leader demands respect, obedience and loyalty from the 
employees (Tsamenyi et al., 2008). This is contiguous with other Javanese values such as 
rukun (Wolf, 1992) and ewuh pakewuh (Fatmawati, 2014) that affect power and authority 
in the firm. Rukun means social peace and harmony (Efferin and Hartono, 2015) that direct 
personal relationships between the leader and employees that generate ewuh pakewuh 
value (Tsamenyi et al., 2008). Ewuh pakewuh is shyness, hesitation, and a feeling of awe 
which arises in social relationships (Fatmawati, 2014). These complex social positioning 
affect the relationship between owner-managers and employees and can create difficulties 
in managing employees because of the family relationship between them (Tsamenyi et al., 
2008). Previous research in Indonesian government agencies found that the existence of 
ewuh pakewuh encourages subordinate dependency where the leader is perceived as the 
decision maker with the right to decide. Meanwhile, subordinates feel incompetent and 
lack ambition to succeed in their career. Therefore, subordinates lack the will to achieve 
and have low creativity (Fatmawati, 2014). 
 
Business succession is a vitally important issue in batik businesses. Research among batik 
businesses in Yogyakarta, found a three-succession tradition in batik firms run by Javanese 
families (Budhiyanto, 2009). Firstly, a predecessor tends to bequeath the batik firm to 
female children and avoids choosing male children because batik production is a special 
(hand) skill dominated by women. When a predecessor has no female children, the batik 
business is bequeathed to the daughter-in-law.  Secondly, the batik business is bequeathed 
to a poor sibling while other siblings may be financially secure. This is a consequence of 
Javanese values, such as rukun (living in a harmony), helping each other and success in life 
is gauged by balancing material success and spiritual success. Thirdly, the batik business is 
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usually bequeathed when the parent dies. The successors continue the business to support 
the family need. Moreover, Javanese owner-managers arrange marriages in order to keep 
the skill and knowledge of the batik business. This system succeeds in sustaining the batik 
business through generations. Arranged marriages create new business networks for both 
families that help in strengthening and developing the family batik firm. This practice is 
the manifestation of Javanese values which advocate that the wealthier person has to 
distribute their wealth to other society members and where family members are prioritized 
(Soemardjan, 2009). For a marketing strategy, Javanese owner-managers in the batik 
industry of Yogyakarta rely on word-of-mouth, namely gethok tular (Budhiyanto, 2009) 
and personal networking. Another marketing strategy is to participate in exhibitions and 
close relationships with the Government can provide opportunities for Javanese owner-
managers to get free access to exhibitions.  
 
2.11 The Adaptation Strategy of Family Firms 
Changing circumstances have influenced firms to adopt strategies of mutual adjustment, 
reciprocation, accommodation and co-option as adaptation processes. Numerous studies 
have attempted to explain that the firm needs social legitimization to survive (Aras and 
Crowther, 2010; Colli, 2011; Luhman and Cunliffe, 2013; Glover and Reay, 2015). In 
order to gain social legitimization, a firm has to adapt to the current environment, such as 
market, economic, political, social and cultural (Suddaby, 2010). Family firms have deep 
embeddedness with their local community, where they obtain resources, do business 
activity and live with the family (Colli, 2011).  
 
Adaptation is the learning process and response to the dynamic environment system that is 
important in building business sustainability (Sun et al., 2018) and coping with a turbulent 
environment (Winnard et al., 2014). The adaptive capacity includes learning ability, 
flexibility to experiment and adopt novelty solutions and the ability to develop generalized 
responses to the challenges. This adaptive capacity determines the resilience2 of the 
business. Consequently, the sustainability of the business is highly dependent on the ability 
of the family firm to adapt to changes in the external environment, in different historical, 
territorial and cultural settings (Colli and Perez, 2014). 
 
Numerous studies have discussed the firm’s adaptation process to external pressures 
(DiMaggio and Powel, 1983; Nordqvist and Melin, 2002; Gao, 2010; Yang and Konrad, 
                                                
2 Resilience is the ability of the business to return to stability after disruptions (Winnard et al., 2014) 
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2011; Stanger et al., 2013). These studies examine the external pressures that impact on 
business sustainability and how the adaptation process keeps the business sustainable. The 
government pressures include government’s policies such as tax regulations and 
government’s bureaucracy that create either negative or positive impacts on the firm 
(Nordqvist and Melin, 2002). One study by Dyer and Mortenson (2005) examined political 
power (macro-level) and found this to be a significant resource in predicting small and 
medium enterprise survival and growth. Kloosterman (2003) highlights the government’s 
policy to give direct or indirect impact to the opportunity structure (this would be at the 
meso-level) where small family firms have to comply with rules and regulations. 
Therefore, a good relationship with the government is important for business survival in 
the hostile environment within the context of a corrupt system (Limnios et al., 2014; 
Glover and Reay, 2015). Nevertheless, the small firms usually become a target of loan 
guarantees or grant programs (Brewton et al., 2010) which help them to survive in difficult 
situations and create opportunities for growing the business.  
 
Strategic planning in running the business is vital especially in highly dynamic 
environtment that has impact on business performance (White, 1984; Drago, 1996 
Perricone et al., 2001; Tatoglu et al., 2008; Klein et al., 2013; Filser et al., 2013; Ghee et 
al., 2015; Bizri, 2016; Daspit et al., 2016). A study by Mills et al. (2009) examined three 
sense-making strategic choices to adapt to environmental pressures. Firstly, alignment 
strategy occurs when the firm is following the well-established and widespread strategy of 
other firms, especially the cutting-edge firm. This strategy correlates with the mimetic 
process (DiMaggio and Powel, 1983; Nordqvist and Melin, 2002; Gao, 2010; Yang and 
Konrad, 2011). A firm’s owner-manager copies the popular strategy to reduce risk (Mills 
et al., 2009). It is the easiest strategy with the highest possibility of success. Secondly, 
avoidance strategy, which is a more difficult sense-making strategy in direct opposition to 
the alignment strategy. A firm’s owner-manager tends to avoid popular trends and 
concentrates on creating unique products and services. The owner-manager retains 
unchanging values and beliefs to hold the firm’s identity. Thirdly, prediction strategy 
refers to implementing a strategy to get ahead of competitors. This is a very difficult sense-
making strategy because of the difficulty in making accurate predictions and, 
consequently, involves huge risk. However, it can position the firm favourably in the 
market through innovation.  This study looks into sense-making strategy choices to gain a 





The embeddedness perspective is deemed important to gain an in-depth understanding of 
the nature of sustainability in terms of growth and survival, since the actors are embedded 
in their social context where they respond to changing circumstances to ensure business 
sustainability. The complexity and dynamics of business sustainability can be analyzed 
comprehensively in multiple settings and contexts from a mixed embeddedness perspective 
which examines how the family firm is embedded at the micro, messo and macro level 
(Kloosterman, 2010). At the micro-level, the intermingling of family and the business is 
well explored (Stafford et al, 1999; Westhead, et al., 2002; Olson et al., 2003; Astrachan, 
2010; Sorenson and Bierman, 2009). Meanwhile, the external environment that affects 
business sustainability at the meso and macro levels. Thus, mixed embeddedness in this 
research proposes a framework to get an in-depth understanding of business sustainability 
at every level. This is represented in Figure 2.1. 
 
Figure 2.1 Mixed-embeddedness in The Family Firm 
 
 
The diagram above represents the family firm embedded in their environment, which 
separates into micro, meso and macro layers.  Without neglecting the meso and macro 
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levels, this study mainly focuses on the micro-level, discussing how the family 
intermingles with the firm. This overlap is a highly intricate level to be explored as the 
unique characteristic of a family firm.  
 
The operationalization of the micro-level focuses on several issues: firstly, the resources 
that have impact on the business sustainability. For instance, family social capital as the 
main source of sustainability for the family firm facilitates access to other resources, such 
as human capital and financial capital. The combination of family social capital, human 
capital and financial capital promotes resilience capacity (Danes et al., 2009). Moreover, in 
difficult economic conditions, family is a source of help to keep the business running by 
using family savings, liquidating some family assets and involving family members as less 
paid, or unpaid, labour (Olson et al., 2003).  Secondly, succession is a critical issue in 
determining business sustainability. There are two actuations of succession success, such 
as the heir’s economic potential (Getz and Petersen, 2004) and the absence of succession 
planning (Tan and Fock, 2001). Thirdly, a family firm governance philosophy has impact 
on generating a business strategy, business success and might create obstacles, which 
threaten business sustainability. Lastly, family and firm culture which impact on the 
gender role in the family firm and the cultural values that affect how the owner-manager 
interprets and responds to the changing environment. The cultural context has been 
considered in this study since the family is a conductor of cultural values that are crucial in 
determining the entrepreneurial process (Danes et al., 2008).  
 
In addition, the meso-level of opportunity structure and macro-level of economic and 
political climate are incorporated as contextual dimensions, in which the family firm 
activity is perceived as conducted in a socio-economic dynamic, not in a vacuum. Some 
pressures generated from several external sources, such as government and cooperative 
associations, competition environment, professional organisations, interest groups, 
customers and public opinion could impact on business sustainability. The details of meso 













In this chapter, I present details of the ethnographic method I used in this study, applying a 
life-business history approach. This chapter is important in order to understand how the 
data have been gathered and interpreted. 
 
I start with the paradigm I used and offer the overall philosophical background, 
philosophical assumptions (ontology, epistemology and methodological assumptions) and 
the methods I used. Further, I offer a justification of the way I conducted my research, 
what I have done and the reasons behind my choices. Moreover, I explain the strategy I 
used to gain access to the field and the process behind the way I approached potential 
participants. In addition, I give a profile of all my participants. I also explain how I 
collected and analyzed my data, and a reflection on the way I conducted my research. 
 
The objective of this research was to gain an in-depth understanding of the nature of 
sustainability (in terms of growth and survival) in traditional batik family firms in 
Indonesia by exploring how they respond to changing circumstances at the micro (the 
family and the firm), meso (the market and institutional environment) and macro (the 
economic and political climate) levels. This will add a new perspective to existing 
approaches in family firm sustainability studies and offer a more holistic conceptual 
framework for the study of family firm sustainability. 
 
3.2 Research Paradigm 
This research explores the experiences of family business owner-managers in responding 
to changing circumstances and thus how they adapted their strategies in order to sustain 
their businesses. It follows the broader interpretivist tradition that sees ‘reality’ (ontology) 
as relative, and socially and locally constructed by individuals and groups, and sees 
knowledge (epistemology) as subjective; knowledge comes from interaction between 
researcher and researched and is always interpreted (Schwandt, 2007; O’Grady, 2014). 
This paradigm helps to understand human behaviour and the complex, dynamic and 
relational qualities of social interactions by highlighting relational processes and the 
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contexts in which they are embedded (Dawson and Hjorth, 2012, Creswell, 2008); 
understanding people from within the world in which they live and work (Creswell, 2007). 
This approach enables a detailed examination of people’s experiences (Hennink et al., 
2011). It also allows researchers to make sense of and interpret their understanding of 
others in the world, and to understand the meaning of human action by analyzing textual 
forms (Carter and Little, 2007). Further, language is considered important in order to 
describe and explain the realities people adhere to in the contexts in which they live 
(Schwandt, 2007). The use of this qualitative research paradigm aims to reflect the daily 
life of individuals, groups, society and organisations (Punch, 1998). Furthermore, as shown 
by Nordqvist et al. (2009) an interpretive approach is particularly suited to get an in-depth 
understanding of complex, tacit phenomena and processes related to the dynamics of 
ownership, management and development in family businesses. 
 
From the interpretivist tradition, this research was conducted in an ethnographic manner in 
order to capture the specific complexity and dynamics unique to family firms in this 
particular Indonesian setting. Ethnography is the exploration of social and cultural 
meaning of a given group and involves trying to get as close as possible to the real-life 
world of those studied (Maanen, 2011; Brewer, 2000; Creswell, 2007). I used ethnography 
– with observation as one of its core tools – to gain an in-depth understanding of owner-
manager behaviour, to offer new insights into the way family firms could be sustainable, 
while paying attention to the cultural and institutional factors that either constrain or enable 
the advent of family firms (Johnstone, 2016).  
 
To get a better understanding of a firm’s sustainability, I used what is called a life-business 
history method. The reason behind this decision was the unique features of family firms 
themselves in patterns of ownership, governance, management, and succession, which 
affect their structures and strategies (Chua et al., 1999). In addition, Reid et al. (1999) 
suggest that the interrelations between the family and the firm within a family firm should 
be recognised. The life-business history method enabled me to engage in this unique field 
by exploring the business owners’ life histories in conjunction with the historical 
development of their businesses (Koning and Dahles, 2009); this can illuminate small 
family firms’ responses to changing circumstances. Following this method, the 
interviewees were invited to recall the developments of their firm in the batik industry 
from as far back as they could remember. This required prolonged engagement (in-depth 
interviewing and observations) with these owner-managers to explore their experiences 
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both in their private lives and in their businesses. Because of the life-business history 
approach, the main research participants were the owner-managers of batik firms as they 
would be the best resource to convey the history of the firm in connection to their own 
lives. I also talked and had conversations with others, see below, but relied on the stories of 
the owner-managers for the core of this thesis for these reasons. The main feature of 
business history is thus the compilation of individual stories and cases (Colli, 2011). 
 
3.3 Research Location  
I chose the batik industry in Lasem because it has a long history of family firms active in 
this industry; some have existed through tough conditions for several generations. This is 
in contrast to family firms in general, which have difficulty in sustaining their businesses 
up to the third generation (Yan and Sorenson, 2006; Leach and Bogod, 1999). Further, 
Lasem is one of the batik centres in Indonesia that still exists and continues to produce 
batik using traditional methods. My previous research found that batik centres in 
Yogyakarta were unable to survive and many batik business owners changed to other types 
of business (Budhiyanto, 2009). Furthermore, almost all batik owner-managers in 
Yogyakarta were Javanese, while in Lasem, the batik industry is largely dominated by 
ethnic Chinese owner-managers who had pioneered the industry. Therefore, it is interesting 
to investigate how Lasem batik owner-managers managed to sustain their businesses in 
changing circumstances. To an important extent, the sustainability of these family firms 
might secure the existence of batik as an Indonesian cultural heritage product, which 
traditionally is made using a wax resistant-dying technique by canting (a pen-like tool). 
 
I used the definition by Olson et al. (2003) to categorize family firms in this research as 
those that are owned and managed by one or more members of a household who are 
related by blood, marriage or adoption. I decided to concentrate on the family firms owned 
and managed by two different ethnic groups who play a significant role in the Lasem batik 
industry, notably Chinese Indonesian and Javanese. These two groups are native 
Indonesian people born and raised, and hold Indonesian citizenship; however, they are 
from different ethnic backgrounds. The Javanese are the largest ethnic group who live on 
the island of Java. On the other hand, Chinese Indonesians are descendants of the Chinese 
diaspora who have been living in Indonesia for many generations. They are well embedded 
into the Indonesian environment and generally identify themselves as Indonesian with 
some Chinese heritage. I will use the terms Chinese Indonesians (or ethnic Chinese, 
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depending on the flow of the text) and Javanese to identify their ethnic background. Thus, I 
refer to the participants as Chinese Indonesian (or ethnic Chinese) owner-managers and 
Javanese owner-managers. 
Figure 3.1 Map of Indonesian Archipelago3 
Figure 3.2 Map of Lasem4 
3Source:https://phinemo.com/hari-pangan-sedunia-2018/peta-indonesia-lengkap-dengan-provinsinya-
1024x635/ 
4 Source: https://rembangkab.go.id/peta/ 
Figure 3.1 has been removed from this 
version of the thesis due to copyright 
restrictions
Figure 3.2 has been removed from this 
version of the thesis due to copyright 
restrictions
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This research was conducted in Lasem sub-district and the surrounding villages in Pancur 
and Sale sub-districts (see the map above). These areas were chosen because most Lasem 
batik business activity is conducted there. The centre of the batik industry is located in 
Lasem, including the villages of Babagan, Gedong Mulyo, Karangturi and Sumber Girang. 
In the past, the batik industry in Lasem was mainly managed by Chinese Indonesian 
owner-managers who lived in Lasem City. However, when the Lasem batik industry 
flourished the business activity spread out to surrounding villages. Women villagers from 
Pohlandak, Selopuro, Karasgede, Jeruk, and Gading were employed in Lasem batik firms.  
The ethnic Chinese batik firms are concentrated in the Chinatown area in the centre of 
Lasem City. This is a remnant of the wijkenstelsel system the Dutch East Indies 
government applied, which grouped the residents of Chinese descent together in a certain 
location which later became known as Chinatown (Setiono, 2007). The Chinatown area in 
Lasem sub-district comprises Sumber Girang, Babagan, Karangturi, and Gedong Mulyo. 
On average, the participants reside in the old ethnic Chinese houses they inherited from 
their ancestors, the architecture of which displays a mixture of Chinese, Indies and 
Javanese styles surrounded by high walls with double layered main gates. They told me 
that these houses had been passed down for generations and have been preserved. 
However, they did not know when their houses were built. Only three participants did not 
live in an old Chinese house. On the other hand, Javanese batik firms are spread through 
the villages near Lasem City, where the batik workers live.  
3.4 Gaining Access 
Gaining access for ethnographic research is crucial and challenging (O’Reilly, 2009). 
Consequently, I made solid preparations in my approach to gain access. I already had some 
background knowledge about what my field research might entail, since I had done 
preliminary research in the field in September 2011 and from January 2012 to May 2012. 
I returned to Lasem to conduct my main research in November 2013. Even though I had 
gained some insight during my preliminary research, I decided to start by only making 
observations in the first week and thus I wandered all over Lasem City and surrounding 
villages. Initially, I explored the site while driving around by car in order to become 
familiar with Lasem and the surrounding areas. I also did this to see what progress or 
development had taken place in Lasem, particularly in the batik industry, since my 
preliminary research. To have a closer look at the situation and the condition in my 
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research sites, and to bond with the field, I chose to ride a motorbike. I already knew from 
my previous research that it was impossible for me to go around on foot or to ride public 
transportation since it was not available in all locations. There was no motorbike rental in 
Lasem but fortunately I managed to borrow the motorbike of my key informant. With my 
bike, I had no trouble taking all kinds of roads and I even managed to navigate narrow 
alleys to explore my research site up close. Besides, my presence would not be too 
conspicuous which was important since it was rare to see cars wandering around in village 
areas. I took a closer look to find out whether the conditions I had encountered during my 
preliminary research had changed or not, for example, the number of batik shops, changes 
in batik showroom displays and the owner-managers’ residences as well as changes in the 
general conditions in Lasem City. I did this to get a better understanding of the area and to 
map the locations of potential participants. I also contacted the participants and my key 
informants from my preliminary research such as Siem Fei Lung, Liang Tio San, Wen 
Soen Lie, Lie Sio Lan, Siem Djun Gwan, Huang Tjaw Hien, Fahri and Rusmanto. I 
contacted them again to further explore their experiences with their batik family firms.  
 
Firstly, I contacted Siem Fei Lung (Chinese Indonesian, aged 38) to see if he was willing 
to be my key informant. I asked him to explain the current situation in Lasem and how the 
batik industry in Lasem had developed. He was a source of many stories about what had 
happened in the Lasem batik industry since the last time I had met him. He was able to do 
so because he knows Lasem very well. Siem Fei Lung had many relatives all over Lasem; 
he was born and had spent most of his lifetime in Lasem, except when he was studying at 
university level. Therefore, many people knew him. He was a dealer in antique furniture 
who was also active in organisations, especially those related to ethnic Chinese education 
in Lasem. I was introduced to Siem Fei Lung by my cousin’s husband who is from Lasem 
and who is also Siem Fei Lung’s cousin. Consequently, these close ties made it easy for 
me to be accepted. Moreover, his father was active in an ethnic Chinese organisation in 
Lasem, especially in the religious organisation of Klenteng (Chinese Temple) and he often 
helped people. This meant that Siem Fei Lung had extended networks in the Lasem 
community. His credibility made it much easier for me to gain access to Chinese 
Indonesian batik owner-managers.  
 
I learned during my preliminary research that approaching Chinese Indonesian owner-
managers was not easy since the ethnic Chinese in Lasem are a very closed group that do 
not interact easily, especially with people they do not know. I was fortunate to have Siem 
 44 
Fei Lung to gain access to Chinese Indonesian owner-managers. Knowing Siem Fei Lung 
really did make a difference when I met the ethnic Chinese participants he introduced me 
to, or had recommended for me to see. They tended to be more open and quickly became 
familiar with me when they learned that Siem Fei Lung had recommended me.  
 
My prolonged field research in Lasem – preliminary research from September 2011to May 
2012 and the research for this thesis from November 2013 to July 2014 - also gave me the 
opportunity to build good relationships with my participants. I visited their houses a few 
times and chatted with them and by doing so easily gained their trust resulting in the 
richness of the information I was able to collect.  
 
Having a key Chinese Indonesian informant contact with ethnic Chinese participants went 
smoothly, therefore I concentrated more on obtaining Javanese participants. In order to get 
access to Javanese owner-managers, I chose to rent a room in a boarding house near the 
Islamic boarding schools Pondok Pesantren5 Kauman and Pondok Pesantren Nailunnajah 
in Karangturi village, Lasem sub-district. I chose to stay there because society in that 
location seemed to be open. The people were often seen in front of their houses talking to 
the people who passed them. In addition, the place was a strategic location to explore 
Lasem and surrounding villages. Also, there were many small coffee and food stalls 
(warung) where the people exchanged information. Javanese owner-managers were 
predominantly Muslims and I thought that this might help me get into their network; the 
ethnic Chinese participants were mainly Christians (I had to be careful due to religious 
tensions that at times flare up in Indonesia).  
 
Initially I felt out of place because everyone looked at me strangely. I was the only Chinese 
Indonesian woman who lived in their area. I decided to continue living in this location in 
the hope of being accepted and so being able to collect information from the local residents 
who were all Javanese. In addition, the area was quite densely populated with small, 
narrow alleys that were only accessible on foot or by motorbike. Each day I bought my 
breakfast at the food stalls around my boarding house in the hope of gathering information 
about the batik businesses managed by Javanese owner-managers. I made friends with my 
neighbours and slowly they opened up to me. Based on their information, I contacted 
Javanese owner-managers who later became participants in my research. Once established, 
I did not have any noteworthy difficulties in my attempts to approach them. Some were 
                                                
5 A pondok pesantren is an Islamic educational institution founded by Islamic religious leaders where male 
and female students live in dormitories during their studies. 
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initially shy, but relaxed once we started talking and after they got to know me. I stayed in 
the Pondok Pesantren area during my time in Lasem so they became familiar with me and 
willing to be my participants, sharing their experiences. It convinced them that I am an 
open-minded woman who accepts difference. 
 
However, my decision to live in the Pondok Pesantren area had some consequences for my 
relationship with my ethnic Chinese participants. They thought I was weird. Some of them 
suggested that I should find another place to live. Therefore, I decided to approach my 
Javanese participants first. Then, I moved to the church manse in Gedong Mulyo village 
after one of my participants strongly advised me to live there. After I moved, some of my 
Chinese Indonesian participants became more comfortable with me and I was more 
accepted. 
 
To blend in, I followed what Atkinson and Hammersley (2007) recommended which was 
to look like a participant in order to become well accepted. Therefore, during my 
fieldwork, I wore casual clothes and chose to wear flip-flops. I enjoyed representing 
myself this way and I was much more comfortable in Lasem’s very hot climate. 
 
The actual selection of research participants was a process. Obviously, I did not continue 
with potential participants who were not willing to participate. Further, I eliminated 
participants who did not meet my criteria, such as one potential participant who did not 
produce batik herself (only reselling). However, she provided useful information which 
helped me to get a larger picture of the batik business in Lasem and its dynamics.  
 
The selection process of potential Chinese Indonesian and Javanese participants meant that 
I paid them a visit and asked them whether or not they were willing to act as my 
participants. When they agreed, I commenced my interviews with them. This is part of the 
ethical conduct in doing ethnography research. I made this decision by taking into account 
that the level of competitiveness among batik industries in Lasem was quite high. I could 
not expect that one participating owner-manager would recommend another (snow ball 
technique) since they compete with each other. Therefore, I decided to make a list of 
potential participants and to contact them directly myself. In advance, I mapped out who 
the batik owner-managers were and where they were located. I targeted the older family 
firms first. I collected the information from my key informants and from people I met in 
the field. The fierce competition in the Lasem batik industry led some participants to ask 
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me questions about their competitors; however, I never shared even the slightest 
information about their competitors to maintain the stability of social relationship of my 
participants and eliminate any negative impact of my ethnographic research.  
 
I was able to understand my participants since I am an Indonesian. I know how to interpret 
my participants’ conduct during my conversations with them and I had no difficulty in 
communicating with them since I speak both Indonesian (the national language) and 
Javanese (the local language in Central and East Java) fluently. Most people in Lasem use 
Javanese as their daily language and they are more relaxed and can more easily express 
their feelings when they use Javanese.  
 
The main obstacle in my conversations – aimed at collecting life and business histories – 
was what people could remember, especially about the dates or times of events that 
happened in the past. Various elderly participants found it hard to remember. Therefore, I 
offered them clues about past events, for example, when talking about the financial crisis 
of 1998, which saw an enormous increase in the exchange rate of the dollar and a rise in 
the prices of basic commodities. The participants’ ages did have an impact on the details of 
their stories. Participants tended to remember funny, happy and sad stories such as one 
participant who was already 87 years old. Fortunately, he had quite a few media clippings 
and I asked for a copy of these clippings to enable me to read more about his life 
experiences. Besides clippings, there were also video interviews made by a TV station. 
This also helped me to understand the stories told by a participant about his predecessor 
who had already passed away.  
 
Putting together the life-business histories was challenging; the average participant 
managed to relate stories until two or maybe three generations back, because they still had 
a living memory about that time. Obviously, they preferred to tell me about the extent of 
their own experiences. This means that the life-business histories are based on memory and 
do not necessarily represent a ‘factual’ history.  
 
3.5 The Data Collection Process 
I conducted my field research by staying in the field for a period of time. In order to 
maintain freshness and not to ‘go native’ too much as described by O’Reilly (2009), 
occasionally I withdrew from my field research. I did not find this hard because my field 
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research sites were close to where I lived. This geographical proximity also made it easy 
for me to return to my field research sites during the writing process to collect additional 
data. I usually remained in the field six days a week continuously. However, I was flexible 
with the time I spent in Lasem and I went back home when I felt I had a lot of information 
and when I needed a break to reflect and come up with further questions and themes to be 
explored more in-depth.  
 
I collected my data through in-depth interviews by letting my participants relate their 
experiences. To obtain detailed information, I ensured that the participants felt comfortable 
when they were talking to me. Usually, I started the conversations by asking them to tell 
me about their everyday life before moving to topics I felt were important in the research. 
In order to help me remember the information that participants gifted, I recorded the 
interviews with the participants’ consent. I did not dictate a specific length of time for each 
‘interview’. I tried to make the interview moments as natural as possible and let the 
research participant take the lead. When he or she looked as if they were still enjoying the 
conversation, I would continue taking the opportunity to explore their experiences in as 
much detail as possible. However, when I saw that they looked somewhat uncomfortable 
or unsettled, I would offer to finish the conversation and would make another appointment. 
Due to the life-business history approach I could spend anywhere from one to three hours 
with a participant for one interview session, mostly when he or she had free time. Most of 
the interview sessions would be conducted more than once; dependent on the willingness 
of the participant to be interviewed. Sometimes, I only visited the participant without 
conducting an interview, for instance if I saw they were busy, even though we already had 
an appointment. I would then only observe the situation and what he or she was doing.  
 
While interviewing, I also paid attention to the participants’ gestures, which expressed 
their feelings and states of mind, such as anxiety, anger, joy and sorrow. During and after 
the interview sessions, I made notes in my fieldwork diary for every interesting piece of 
information. I made little notes to help me remember things such as the participants’ 
names, where they lived, and the years events took place and other relevant details. I also 
made spatial explorations to form a comprehensive picture of the settings where the 
participants stories took place, for instance parts of a building, production sites or places in 
their neighbourhood (Waal, 2009). I documented this information in the form of field notes 
and pictures, for instance, floor plans of a showroom, production sites and the areas where 
my participants lived. Due to privacy agreements, I have not enclosed these here. 
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Besides interviewing participants, I paid attention to activities and everything else that I 
deemed interesting, which might enrich my understanding in relation to my research. For 
example, there was a banner of a competitor’s business attached on the wall of a food stall 
located next to the participant’s showroom, which it transpired indicated fierce 
competition. The pictures constituted physical ‘data’ and formed the media that helped me 
to remember and to relive the field while I was analyzing my data and writing up a chapter. 
I also engaged in informal conversations with people I met at the research site, such as 
batik workers, shopkeepers, food stall owners, other family members, customers and 
villagers to enrich and further contextualise the information, particularly relevant for my 
own meaning-making. However, as mentioned above, the batik business owner-managers 
were my main participants since they are the person in charge and give direction to the 
business.  
 
Before collecting data, I made some interview guidelines and a list of topics I wanted my 
participants to share (see appendix 3 Interview questions). Initially, I planned to make an 
appointment with participants before conducting the actual interview. In fact, they chose to 
do interviews straight away on the spot.  I occasionally had to wait when they were busy 
receiving guests or when their outsourced staff handed over their batik products. While I 
was waiting, I spent my time observing what went on. I had to resort to another approach 
with participants who were themselves engaged in the production processes, particularly 
Javanese participants. I chose to conduct my interviews during the day so that I could 
directly observe their business activities. I did not make appointments in the evening since 
it was their time to rest. Moreover, people in rural areas usually do not receive guests in the 
evening. 
 
I used observation as one of my techniques for collecting data in this study. The 
information that could be obtained in this way included the ways participants ran their 
businesses and the interaction patterns between the participants and their employees, as 
well as the involvement of family members and the way customers were treated. Through 
my observations, I was also able to make triangulations of the information as reported by 
my participants. For example, when a participant told me about his wife’s role in his batik 
business, I indeed saw that his wife was busy selecting, counting and arranging the batik 
fabrics before they were dyed.  
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I did not conduct my observations at regular times because that is unacceptable in rural 
communities. The people might feel that they were being investigated which might lead to 
the dangerous situation that they did not trust me, which ultimately would have a negative 
impact on my participants’ openness to tell me about their experiences. Therefore, I 
preferred to conduct my observations while I was having my conversations with them in 
order not to make them get the feeling that they were being watched. Particularly as our 
conversations were usually interrupted by activities the participants had to do, such as 
preparing lunch for batik workers, distributing work to batik workers, and attending to 
customers. It gave me the chance to observe. 
 
I collected my data by visiting my participants, and I usually started with small talk until 
they felt comfortable. Then I conveyed my intention and the purpose of my visit. Once 
they agreed to participate, I started my interview. I began by asking questions and listening 
to their stories. During these conversations, I tried to be welcoming, open-minded and 
friendly so that they were comfortable with me and no longer shy or awkward when 
expressing their emotions. When they told me their life-business histories, they showed 
their positive and negative emotions. Therefore, occasionally I tried to encourage them to 
neutralize their feelings in order to minimalize the psychological impact of the interview. 
Almost all my participants refused to tell me outright about the conflicts that occurred in 
their families. They just said that they had a family conflict, but they did not want to 
explain how exactly these conflicts impacted on their businesses. They believed that family 
conflicts were private matters that were not to be discussed. This applied equally to my 
Chinese Indonesian and Javanese participants. However, I saw from their expressions that 
these conflicts made them feel uncomfortable and I did not push them to tell me about it. I 
decided to explore the conflict through indirect questions and explore more on the effects 
of the conflict rather than the conflict itself. I did not want to lose their trust which could 
potentially interfere with their acceptance of me.   
 
One obstacle I faced was to obtain financial information in order to assess business 
performances, since the family firms tried to evade government inspection and paying 
taxes. Financial data can be important to calculate the dynamics of the participants’ 
business performance more accurately. In addition, long-term financial data could also 
help to support explaining the sustainability of their business. Unfortunately, it was 
impossible to get financial data over a prolonged period of time since the majority of my 
participants did not engage in bookkeeping and/or did not want to share this (this is a 
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common problem in small and medium sized firm research) to see the ups and downs of 
the batik business. I solved these obstacles by exploring other information that could 
describe business performances such as their business conditions and what they did with 
their profits; if they had recently purchased a house or land; if they were about to expand 
their businesses either by opening new branches or by renovating their place; rising or 
decreasing demand (based on participants’ opinion about their business performance); and 
by making spatial observations by looking at the shape of buildings, housing areas, 
furniture, etc. which gave some indications as to their financial position. In other words, 
this study does not intend to measure performances based on financial indicators; but 
rather on the ability of family firms to survive by looking at performance in relation to 
survival and permanence, the ability to give appropriate responses to changing 
circumstances, and the reputation and sustainability of their business. 
 
To bring logic to the data collected from several sources, I undertook a triangulation 
process. Triangulation process is essential for ethnographic validation to verify the 
information in order to assure the quality of the information and to get a comprehensive 
understanding of the actor’s action (Fatterman, 2010; Stake, 2010). I triangulated the 
stories told by the participants naturally in the conversation by posing different questions 
to get consistency with their earlier information. As part of the triangulation process, I also 
collected information from other sources, such as family members, batik workers, food 
stall owners, the community living in the research area, and experts in the batik business in 
Lasem. In addition, Hair et al. (2011) suggest that triangulation could be conducted by 
finding secondary data. For instance, I watched the video interview with the participant 
and the participant’s predecessor, who had since passed away, which had been broadcast 
by the TV station. I also read the participant’s interview in the newspaper, as well as other 
documentary sources. 
 
To broaden my horizon about Lasem and its batik industry, I had an interview with Utomo, 
the leader of the Lasem Communication History Society Forum (Forum Komunikasi 
Masyarakat Sejarah Lasem) located in Gedong Mulyo. Further, I conducted an interview 
with Wang Shen Ren, the chairman of the non-governmental organisation, Indonesian 
Pluralism Institute (IPI), who explained the programmes he ran at KUB Kunthi and who 
offered some general information about the batik business in Lasem. I have built a 
relationship with him since 2011 when I was doing preliminary research about the batik 
business in Lasem. I also collected information from several people I met during my field 
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research, such as Siem Fei Lung’s mother, stall owners, church members, boarding house 
owners and batik workers. These additional conversations helped me to understand the 
stories of the participants and also facilitate the triangulation data process. 
 
3.6 The Profiles of the Participants 
This section provides information about the owner-managers who were committed to be 
my participants. The main criteria I used for choosing the participants was that they had to 
be owner-managers who produced and sold their batik products. I had eight Chinese 
Indonesian and nine Javanese owner-managers who agreed to talk about their experiences. 
I divided my participants’ profiles into two groups based on their ethnicity. Following is 
the Chinese Indonesian owner-managers’ profiles.  
 































87 Male Bunga 
Megah 

















33 Male Zhang Liem 
Tjan 
5th 2013  






33 Female Merah 
Delima 









31 Male Rembulan 3rd 2007  
√ 50 
 
The first participant was Huang Tjaw Hien, an 87-year-old Chinese Indonesian owner-
manager, who had run his batik business, Bunga Megah, since 1967. He is the most senior 
batik owner-manager in Lasem still running a batik firm. I was introduced to Huang Tjaw 
Hien by Wang Shen Ren who had a close relationship with him which enabled me to get 
his rich life-business story. His batik business was located in his parents’ ancestral house in 
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the China-town area of Babagan village, Lasem sub-district. In fact, his wife, named 
Muningsih, looked more active in running the daily business activities with the assistance 
of about fifteen batik workers. 
 
Huang Tjaw Hien was the eighth generation of mainland Chinese descent who came to 
Lasem. As far as he knew, he was the third generation of the Huang clan family who still 
ran a batik firm in Lasem. It might be possible that more than three generations have run 
the business; however, a life-time limitation of knowing no more than the third generation 
restricts the information, especially when there is no written record or pictorial artefact. In 
his time, his father had a successful batik firm that operated under the business name of 
Huang Tjien Tie (his father’s name) Batik. It was common in those days to call a batik 
firm by his or her producer’s name. However, the Huang Tjien Tie batik family firm closed 
in 1942 during the Japanese occupation government period (1942-1945), which imposed 
strict economic rules. The success of the Huang Tjien Tie batik family firm business was 
reflected by the house that is currently inhabited by the Huang Tjaw Hien family. The 
house is very spacious, fused with a batik workshop surrounded by a thick, three-metres 
high fence. Huang Tjaw Hien started his batik family firm in 1967. He used his father’s 
batik firm’s tools and equipment in his start-up business, because he was bequeathed his 
father’s house and batik workshop.  
 
About twenty metres away from the Huang Tjaw Hien family firm, there is the house of 
my second participant, Liem Lie Tiaw, a 31-year-old Chinese Indonesian owner-manager. 
When I had finished my interview with Huang Tjaw Hien, I explored the houses along the 
Babagan IV alley. I found a house with a sign saying Hijau Daun Batik. This firm is owned 
by the fifth generation of the Huang clan family business who is a relative of Huang Tjaw 
Hien (my first participant). Liem Lie Tiaw’s grandfather, named Huang Tek Khoen, is the 
younger brother of Huang Tjaw Hien. Liem Lie Tiaw was very friendly and happy to have 
long talks and share his life and business experience. Thus, it was easy for me to obtain 
valuable information from him. Liem Lie Tiaw took over his father’s batik family firm in 
2012 when his father fell seriously ill and subsequently died. 
 
The third participant, Tjiang Sian Me (71 years old) lives about 200 metres to the south of 
Huang Tjaw Hien’s house. She is the owner of the Rusa Kuning Batik family firm, which 
is popularly known among the people under the name of Bah6 Zhang Batik, under her 
husband’s nickname. Tjiang Sian Me is the fourth generation of the Tjiang clan to run the 
                                                
6 Bah is a word used for ‘man’ among the Chinese community. 
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batik firm. Tjiang Sian Me inherited her parents’ batik firm, Tjiang Wei Djun Batik, in 
1976. Later, Tjiang Sian Me named the business, Rusa Kuning Batik; however, she still 
applied the Tjiang Wei Djun stamp in her products. 
 
When I interviewed Tjiang Sian Me, her son, Zhang Liem Tjan, also sat with us and he 
told me that he had moved to Lasem because he decided to return home to run his parents’ 
business. Therefore, I asked Zhang Liem Tjan to be my participant. He was in the process 
of learning the batik business from Tjiang Sian Me and he chose to stay there with his 
family. Zhang Liem Tjan is the youngest of Tjiang Sian Me’s three children. Initially, after 
graduating from college in 2004, Zhang Liem Tjan worked as an accountant for a company 
in Jakarta. Zhang Liem Tjan had changed work twice in the last 10 years before he finally 
accepted his mother’s offer to learn how to run the batik business and inherit his mother’s 
business.  
 
Fifty metres to the north of Babagan village is the village of Gedong Mulyo where my fifth 
participant lived. He was Siem Djun Gwan, a 31-year-old Chinese Indonesian owner-
manager and a third generation of the Kho clan batik family firm. The first time I met Siem 
Djun Gwan, I was introduced by Siem Fei Lung, one of the key informants in my research. 
Since Siem Fei Lung is Siem Djun Gwan’s cousin, it was easy for me to ask Siem Djun 
Gwan to be my participant. Both parents of Siem Djun Gwan come from a batik family 
firm background. According to Siem Djun Gwan, he was the only one from his father’s 
family who still ran a batik firm. However, from his mother’s family, there was another 
person who inherited a batik business, namely, Kho Tjoe Liong 
 
In 1979, Siem Djun Gwan’s parents started their batik business. At that time, Siem Djun 
Gwan’s grandmother taught his mother named Kho Lan Me how to make batik while she 
learned how to dye from her father, Kho Tjoe Yap, who was widely known in Lasem for 
his dyeing skills. Kho Lan Me started-up her own batik firm, which she later called Naga 
Batik. Kho Lan Me did not inherit her parents’ firm after Kho Tjoe Yap died in 2004 
because it was passed down to Kho Tjoe Liong, Kho Lan Me’s brother who was the only 
male child among Kho Tjoe Yap’s descendants. In 2000, the Naga Batik brand name was 
changed to Rembulan Batik, because a batik firm in Bandung had used the name, Naga 
Batik. To maintain the business positioning in the market after it had changed its name to 
Rembulan Batik, the Naga symbol continued to be used in the new firm’s logo in order to 
retain former customers.  
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The sixth participant in this research lived in Karangturi village, around three hundred 
metres to the south of Babagan village. Siem Fei Lung introduced me to the 33-year-old 
female Chinese Indonesian owner of Merah Delima Batik, named Lie Sio Lan, who was 
the fifth generation of Go San Tien Batik. Lie Sio Lan inherited the Merah Delima Batik 
firm in 2010 after her mother, Go Sien Nie, passed away. The Merah Delima Batik firm 
was one of the batik businesses that survived for five generations, even though it was 
nearly closed in 1990 when Lie Sio Lan’s grandmother decided to live in Jakarta with her 
uncle.  
 
The seventh participant was the owner of Gaman Jaya Batik located in Sumber Girang 
village, five hundred metres to the South of Karangturi village. Initially I came to Gaman 
Jaya batik with Siem Fei Lung who introduced me to Kie Lian Nio, Liang Tio San’s wife. I 
managed to meet Liang Tio San (the owner-manager) after having visited the firm more 
than once. He was often out of town busy with attending exhibitions. Liang Tio San is the 
47- year-old Chinese Indonesian owner-manager, the third generation of the batik business 
of the Liang Xiao Tjun family. However, he did not inherit the business from his parents 
because his parents’ firm had been closed in the 1990s because of financial difficulty. In 
Lasem, Liang Tio San is considered a phenomenal batik owner-manager because of his 
innovations in managing his batik workers by setting up a workshop in the workers’ 
village and providing soft loans to his batik workers to help them financially. Liang Tio 
San is the initiator of the Lasem batik cooperative and became the first chairman from 
2008 to 2013. In 2010, Liang Tio San was awarded the Upakarti7 of Preservation Service 
Award by the sixth Indonesian President, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono.  
 
The eighth participant was the owner of Sinar Megah Batik located in Sumber Girang 
village, around 100 metres from Gaman Jaya Batik. This firm was managed by Wen Soen 
Lie, a 71-year-old Chinese Indonesian owner-manager. She is the only participant whose 
parents were not running a batik business, but were grocery merchants. Wen Soen Lie was 
inspired by her cousin who successfully runs a batik firm. 
 
The next group of participants are the Javanese batik owner-managers. The following is 
the summary of the profiles of the Javanese batik owner-managers. 
 
                                                
7 Upakarti is the award given to a small business owner for his or her dedication in developing and 
encouraging small industry and handicraft.  
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Age Gender Name of 
batik 
business 

















Suprapti 62 Female Tan Go 
Liang 
1st 2007  √ 10 (all 
workshop 
batik workers) 
Fahri 54 Male Rusa 
Makmur 
1st 1987 √  75 
Rukmana 51 Female Rukmana 1st 2005 √  2  
Rusmant
o 
45 Male Raja 1st 2008 √  45 





Sulastri  41 Female Suka 
Rame 
1st 2009 √  30 
Indriyati 40 Female Meranti 
Baru 
2nd 2008 √  12 
Mardiya
na 
39 Female Gajah 
Buana 
1st 2010 √  2 
 
The first Javanese participant was Kasmini, the only participant who no longer ran her 
batik firm as it closed permanently in 1998 during the monetary crisis. Before closure, she 
ran her business in Selopuro village. I met Kasmini when I interviewed her daughter, 
Indriyati. Kasmini told me that she also used to be a batik owner-manager. Therefore, I 
made an appointment to interview her as well to learn about her experience in running a 
batik business and why she was unable to sustain her batik business. 
 
Kasmini is the daughter of a batik worker in Selopuro village. She used to work as an 
outsource batik worker with her mother. Kasmini used to help her mother by finishing 
batik drawings. In 1973, Kasmini tried to make her own batik by buying unbleached 
natural cloth from a Chinese Indonesian owner-manager who had recruited her as an 
outsource worker. In 1987, Kasmini became a member of the joint business group, Melati. 
In 1991, she discontinued her batik business because she lacked capital; meanwhile, the 
Melati joint business group had been dissolved. Unfortunately, her husband had an 
accident and could no longer work. Kasmini was forced to find an income so she returned 
to outsource batik work to support her household’s needs. She was able to accumulate 
small capital to make her own batik product to sell to her previous customers in the 
traditional market in Lasem. However, her batik business was closed permanently in 1998 
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when Indonesia was hit by the economic crisis. For the time being, Kasmini, who is 62 
years old, lives with Indriyati and now she helps her daughter with batik drawing. 
 
Indriyati, Kasmini’s daughter, was the second Javanese participant who lived in Sumber 
Girang village. Sumber Girang village is located next to Selopuro village, and only 
separated by a single street. Her batik business is called Meranti Baru because her mother 
used to be a member of the Melati joint business group. Indriyati added the word Baru 
(meaning ‘New’) to indicate that she belonged to the new generation of Melati batik.  
 
The third Javanese participant was the owner of the Rusa Makmur batik firm located in 
Selopuro village, 150 metres from the Meranti Baru batik firm. Its owner, Fahri, told me 
that he had no job experience before he became a batik owner-manager. However, during 
my triangulation process it transpired that he had once worked for the Chinese Indonesian 
owner-manager of Rembulan Batik. He was in charge of the dyeing process. According to 
Fahri, he started his batik business in 1987. 
 
The fourth participant was the 62-year-old Javanese owner-manager, Suprapti, who 
inherited her batik firm from her partner in Karangturi village. According to local people, 
Suprapti used to be a batik worker in Tan Go Liang’s batik firm, who later became her 
partner. Despite the fact that she was married with her husband and had children in another 
village, Tan Go Liang as a single man took her as his concubine. After Tan Go Liang had 
passed away, Suprapti continued to manage Tan Go Liang’s batik firm as he was childless. 
During my interviews, Suprapti was less open about herself. However, my observations 
and small talk with her batik workers revealed that Suprapti had set up and managed her 
own business activities such as deciding on the batik patterns, dyeing and managing her ten 
batik workers. Suprapti appeared to know how to instruct her batik workers and she knew 
exactly what to do. I also saw that Suprapti did not keep a large stock of batik clothes; 
there were some half-finished pieces lying on the table, which were pre-ordered by her 
loyal reseller. The ancient building where Suprapti conducted her production looked 
unkempt and an air gas cylinder merchant was renting in front of the house. There was no 
signboard in front of her house, therefore, people who do not live in Lasem would not be 
aware that she produced and sold batik clothes. However, according to Suprapti, her batik 
firm was well-known in the Lasem community as Tan Go Liang Batik and this was the 
reason she did not have a signboard. 
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Sulastri was the fifth participant. She was a descendant of a batik worker who lived in 
Babagan village. Her grandmother and her mother used to work for a Chinese Indonesian 
owner-manager in the Rembulan Batik firm. After graduating from senior high school, 
Sulastri followed in the footsteps of her predecessors and she worked as a daily batik 
worker for the Rembulan Batik firm as well. In Babagan village, most Javanese women 
have the skills to make batik, especially those who do not own rice fields.  
 
In 1997, Sulastri married and had children, thus she decided to become an outsource batik 
worker since most of her time was used in taking care of her children. In 2009, Sulastri 
started her own batik business with only 25 unbleached natural clothes, under the business 
name, Suka Rame.  
 
The sixth participant was Jasmari who lived about five hundred metres from Sulastri’s 
house. Besides working as the head of the Krajan sub-village in Babagan village, Jasmari 
also ran a batik firm called Mawar Melati. After graduating from senior high school, he 
worked in Jawa Tengah Bank in Lasem. Unfortunately, he was unsuited to that job, so he 
tried to sell ants’ eggs. However, this lasted for only two years. He stopped selling ants’ 
eggs after one of his wife’s uncles offered him a job on Kalimantan island8 as the head of 
production in his wife’s uncle’s family company. However, in 2001, Jasmari contracted 
malaria and typhoid while he worked on Kalimantan island. Therefore, he decided to 
return to Lasem.  
 
In order to make a living after he recovered, Jasmari sold many things to support 
household expenditure, such as clothes, and snacks such as spring rolls and resoles9 which 
he delivered to various school canteens. In 2006, he became a head of the sub-village. At 
the end of 2010, Jasmari started focusing on his batik business, even though he was not a 
descendant of a batik worker.  He chose the batik business because batik is one of the 
flagship products in Lasem and the expression of a magnificent local culture, and he saw it 
as a big opportunity. Until his present age of 44, Jasmari has maintained his position as the 
head of Krajan sub-village. This position, which has a retirement age of 60 years, helps 
him to access government programmes. 
 
My seventh participant was Rusmanto, a 45-year-old Javanese owner-manager, who lived 
about one kilometre from Lasem’s city centre in Sumber Girang village. He was the former 
                                                
8 Kalimantan island is the biggest island in the Indonesian archipelago. It is also called Borneo island. 
9 Resoles is a kind of traditional snack. 
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head of the Sumber Girang village for the period 1998 to 2007. In 2008, he started to focus 
on making batik when he failed to be re-elected as a village head. However, he did not 
come from a batik worker’s family. Currently, Rusmanto is the chairman of a batik cluster 
organisation. This organisation was originally initiated by Go Sien Nie (Lie Sio Lan’s 
mother). After she passed away in 2010, Rusmanto took over her position. Rusmanto 
initially named his firm Sumber Agung Batik since his house was in the Sumber Agung 
area. When he moved to another house in 2011, he changed the name to Raja Batik 
because he felt that the name Sumber Agung Batik did not represent his batik any longer. 
 
The eighth participant was Rukmana, from Jeruk village about 10 kilometres from Lasem’s 
city centre. The villagers previously worked as batik workers; however, they switched to 
become farmers and housemaids when the batik business declined. Rukmana is a 
descendant of a batik worker’s family. She worked for Luo Nji Tio for eight years until she 
was laid off when the owner closed his business and started a gold shop in the 2000s when 
the economic crisis occurred in Indonesia.  To support her household expenditure, she 
worked as a housemaid until 2004. In 2005, Rukmana started to work in a Chinese 
Indonesian batik firm again, this time at Hijau Daun Batik. However, she only did this for 
a short while, then she accepted an offer from Wang Shen Ren, an activist in the non-
government organisation (NGO), Indonesian Pluralism Institute (IPI). Wang Shen Ren 
encouraged Rukmana to start a joint business group (known as kelompok usaha bersama 
(KUB)) in which Rukmana became the leader. In 2014, Rukmana started her own batik 
firm while she continued being the head of KUB Kunthi because the rest of the group 
depended on her and were unable to run it themselves. She also allowed KUB Kunthi to 
use her land for its production.  
 
The ninth participant was Mardiyana who lived in Gading village. She was a former batik 
worker in the Rembulan Batik firm. She joined KUB Kunthi in 2006. In late 2010, she 
decided to start-up her own batik business and left KUB Kunthi. Besides being a batik 
owner-manager, Mardiyana also actively operated a side job as a batik trainer. 
 
3.7 Data Analysis 
Analyzing data in an ethnographic study starts when data is collected (Ezzy, 2002). It is an 
iterative process, where the idea is built throughout the study (Fatterman, 2010; LaCompte 
and Schensul, 2010),). Simultaneous data collection and analysis enables the inductive 
method to get interpretation from the perspective of participants. This section addresses 
 59 
how I analyzed the data.  
 
The analysis of data in ethnographic research is to get the interpretation of meaning, 
functions, consequences of human actions and constitutional practices and how these are 
implicated in the local or wider context (Attkinson and Hammersley, 2007). This study 
conducted thematic analysis in order to identify themes, making sense of and high-lighting 
the key themes in a rich data qualitative set, and helping to communicate and understand 
the research phenomena (King and Brooks, 2018). Thematic analysis defines themes as 
recurrent and distinctive features of participants’ accounts, particular perceptions and/or 
experiences which are relevant to the research question. It uses code to structure the 
differences in the lives of informants (Ezzy, 2002), in this case the differences between 
ethnic backgrounds in particular. There are no general rules to conducting thematic 
analysis; however, I employed Braun and Clarke’s thematic analysis (King and Brooks, 
2018). Firstly, it begins with familiarizing with the data set. I immersed myself in the data 
set initially by collecting and transcribing it by myself. I started transcribing from the 
beginning of the data collection process. This helped me in making further queries or 
noticing if something was missing from my previous interviews. At this stage I started 
analyzing data. Furthermore, when conducting interviews, I sometimes got insight about 
potential themes that suddenly emerged and I recorded this in my field notes. These themes 
sometimes came up while I was transcribing my interviews. 
 
I transcribed all my interviews myself to have details of the conversations. By listening to 
the recorded interviews, I relived the atmosphere of the conversations that had taken place 
which helped me in making sense by noticing their voice intonation. As argued by 
Banziger and Scherer (2005), voice intonation reflects specific emotions. Transcribing was 
laborious and time-consuming work; but I noted interesting findings that emerged while I 
did the transcription. I repeatedly read and re-read the transcripts to search for meanings 
and patterns. I analyzed the phenomena which occurred between ethnic Chinese and 
Javanese ethnic groups to find similarities, differences, patterns and overlying structures. I 
generated as many themes as possible to minimize the possibility of missing significant 
themes (see appendix 4).  The process of reading and re-reading the material was 
conducted until I felt comfortable with the findings. 
 
This is an iterative process, back and forth between data analysis and literature review until 
satisfied with the final theme (Brewer, 2000). Later, I reviewed the themes, looked at the 
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data that supported or refuted the previous theory. As a last step, these themes were 
grouped into the three categories of micro level, meso level and macro level for each 
ethnic group (see appendix 5 and 6). Those themes then led to the topics of writing in the 
finding chapters: chapter 5 for ethnic Chinese batik owner-managers and chapter 6 for 
Javanese owner-managers. Finally, in chapter 7 I discuss the overall interpretation.  
 
The presentation of the findings consists of direct quotes from interviews as well as 
interview summaries made by me. I have used this combination of presenting the data as it 
allowed me to include a large amount of the rich data that I collected. Particularly the 
interview summaries have been used to be able to relay the stories of participants including 
as much detail as possible. Collecting life-business histories means lengthy and winding 
stories, “full of turns and details” and to bring some form of coherence to the reader it is 
often the researcher who summaries the story into a text of selected segments (Koning and 
Waistell, 2012, p. 69). The direct quotes have been used to offer clear moments of 
participant voice as well as to support of specific points made. 
 
3.8 Research Ethics 
In the ethnographic method, researchers have to engage in the research field in order to get 
an in-depth understanding of the social meaning and activities of people in the study 
(Brewer, 2000). This helps in obtaining insights into local social meaning and to make 
participants feel comfortable (through visibility and socially engaging) in sharing their life 
and business experiences. Once my participants felt comfortable, they became more open 
and it enriched my data.  
 
Observation was done in a non-intrusive manner to ensure the community’s regular 
activities and natural behaviour were not affected by my presence. It was necessary for 
people to not feel they were being watched. I did not take any photographs without consent 
and did not publish photographs in the final thesis. 
 
An ethnographic study could possibly lead to detrimental or psychological impacts on the 
participant (Brewer, 2000; Murphy and Dingwall, 2001). I gave this my critical attention 
when delivering this research study. I conducted several strategies to eliminate or avoid 
negative impacts, such as ensuring voluntary participation had been indicated and 
reiterated upon first contact. I also let participants know that they might withdraw at any 
time without any reason. I guaranteed the anonymity and confidentiality of participants’ 
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names, their batik business name and that all data sets were securely stored by me. I kept 
all the information private and secure. I reminded the participants that they could stop the 
conversation at any time should they feel uncomfortable and/or stressed. I remained 
sensitive to see or pick up on stress signs and stop by changing the topic to avoid 
participants’ stress when recalling difficult times in order to explain their business and life 
experiences. 
 
Initially, I planned to conduct in-depth interviews with business owners (participants) in 
the afternoon when their business activity was not busy or after the store was closed. 
However, almost all of them preferred to be interviewed during the day while they were 
doing business activities. In fact, the Chinese Indonesian owner-managers are not as busy 
compared with Javanese owner-managers since they are not undertaking production 
activities themselves. On the other hand, Javanese owner-managers were eager to converse 
while drawing batik on cloth since it entertained them to have somebody to talk to and 
overcome the boredom of drawing batik. So, I was flexible to suit their time.  
 
3.9 Reflexivity and Positionality 
Reflexivity is the researcher’s awareness of the biases, values and experiences she or he 
brings to a qualitative study (O’Reilly, 2009). Therefore, it is important that researchers 
reflect on their interpretations and write their reports reflexively (Creswell, 2014). It 
requires a reflection on the various identities that a researcher brings to the field and vice 
versa how the field perceives of the identity of the researcher (see Corlett and Marvin, 
2018). A reflexive account by the researcher supports the reader in judging such issues as 
the representation via the writing up, the quality of the data and issues of status, standing 
and authority (Brewer, 2000). Therefore, in this section I will offer my reflections on the 
interactional processes during my fieldwork.  
 
As a general approach, I tried to gain my participants’ acceptance by being open-minded 
and from the very beginning to introduced myself as a lecturer who was doing her doctoral 
programme at Oxford Brookes University in the United Kingdom. I handed out business 
cards which I already had printed before going to my research site. It helped me to be 
welcomed as it offered an additional identity to my female ethnic Chinese identity, namely 
the identity of a researcher or student who could to some extent maybe be seen as an 
interested ‘outsider’ (an academic) to both communities. It also added some status (doing a 
PhD in the UK) and made it ‘more’ interesting to the research population to engage and 
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talk to me. Of course, the reverse side of this could also have meant I was seen as ‘elitist’ 
but education is perceived by both groups as important so in practice I did not encounter a 
distance based on this. 
 
Before going to the research site, I collected information in advance about the communities 
in Lasem. I was told that the ethnic Chinese community is very closed. This was 
discouraging at first, but I felt to have an advantage based on being ethnic Chinese myself. 
I felt, having shared similar experiences (discrimination) and some form of shared kinship 
might enable me to gain access and trust and for them to open up to me and to tell me the 
histories of their businesses. Notwithstanding these perceived associations, I did need a 
gatekeeper to gain access (as explained above). It is an important reminder that shared 
ethnicity does not automatically mean there is trust. With the ethnic Chinese history in 
mind, trust is a feature that can only be attainted on the basis of personal recommendation 
via others (in the ‘network’) who are seen as trustworthy (see Koning, 2007) hence the 
gatekeeper. Once introduced through a trustworthy community member, my engagement 
within the ethnic Chinese community was off to a good start. 
 
As an ethnic Chinese woman going around from one village to another village among 
Javanese owner-managers was a different experience. It was clearly considered unusual 
and made the villagers question what I was supposed to be doing. I was very conspicuous 
among them since no ethnic Chinese people live there. However, the atmosphere became 
more relaxed when I told them who I was and what I was doing (my researcher-student 
identity), leading to an attitude of openness that made me feel accepted. They became even 
more accepting and friendlier after they learned that I was staying in the Pondok Pesantren 
(Islamic boarding school) of the village. For them, it is uncommon for an ethnic Chinese 
woman to spend the night there. Several participants were surprised that I wanted to stay 
there (presuming different religious identities: Christian and Islamic) and it gave them the 
idea that I was an open-minded person and they appreciated what I was doing and they 
accepted me well. 
 
My position as a Chinese Indonesian born and raised in Java, enabled me to understand 
what the participants were talking about since I have a good level of understanding of both 
cultural backgrounds. In my interviews, I spoke Indonesian. However, throughout the 
conversation with the Javanese owner-managers, they mixed Indonesian and Javanese. 
This is because in their daily lives, they use Javanese more often than Indonesian. 
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Therefore, to express something, they tended to use Javanese because it is easier for them 
to express their feelings. It was no problem for me to understand their Javanese since I was 
born and raised in Central Java, which has a similar Javanese culture to the areas of Lasem. 
I am also fluent in Javanese so I had no problem in understanding what they said. They 
were even happier because I could speak Javanese well and they felt very honoured (there 
are different levels in Javanese language that express respect to those with whom one 
communicates).  
 
In addition, my own experience as an owner-manager of a small firm helped me to 
understand the various details of my participants’ stories since I have experienced similar 
things (from setting up a business and finances, to networking, product development, and 
customers relations). Therefore, I could easily mix with them and became more familiar. 
This is important for qualitative research since researchers are key instruments in their own 
studies because they are part of them (O’Reilly, 2009). Good relationships with 
participants have to be fostered to gain their trust and to come to mutual understanding to 
ensure an unhampered research process and the completeness of the collected data. 
 
After the first fieldwork hurdles and after having been able to create forms of rapport with 
both groups which led to many rich stories, I have tried as much as possible to represent 
each of them with equal respect in my writing (see chapter 5 and 6), relating their stories 
within their own contexts. By choosing to present the participants in detail in this chapter, I 
provide the reader with a contextual understanding with which they can subsequently 
judge my representation of them and their businesses in the chapters that follow. 
 
3.10 Conclusion 
This ethnographic study follows an interpretive approach in order to capture the specific 
complexity and dynamics unique to family firms in this particular Indonesian setting. It 
combines observation, in-depth interviewing in the form of life-business histories, and 
documents such as, for instance, local documents on economic performance, policy papers 
related to government incentives to small businesses, and newspaper articles on business 
and economic developments in Indonesia. The life-business history approach applied 
explores the business owners’ life history in conjunction with the historical development of 
the business. In addition, spatial exploration was conducted to get a comprehensive picture 
of the participants’ storytelling. This is the strategy to make local sense, and helps to 
understand aspects of relationships processes and social categories that includes the use of 
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space, for instance, parts of a building, sites of production or places in a neighbourhood 
(Waal, 2009).  
 
Conducting ethnographic research that compares two ethnic groups (Chinese Indonesian 
and Javanese) is unique, exceptional, but challenging. It can be sensitive, especially when 
my ethnic background belongs to one of those ethnic groups. I have to be careful how I 
conduct myself in the field, to get acceptance and obtain rich information.  
 
Evoking participant’s memories is challenging, especially for the elderly participants. 
Moreover, participants’ living memory enables them to relate stories only two or three 
generations back. Therefore, the life-business histories do not necessarily represent a 
‘factual’ history, but are based on memory. 
 
Being ethnic Chinese does not always mean gaining easy acceptance from Chinese 
Indonesian owner-managers. They tend to be closed to outsiders, except buyers. Therefore, 
I relied heavily on my key informant who greatly helped in gaining access to, and 
acceptance from, the ethnic Chinese owner-managers.  However, I applied a different 
strategy in approaching Javanese owner-managers. Living in a boarding house near the 
Islamic boarding schools provided a lot of insight and equipped me to gain acceptance 
from Javanese owner-managers. Blending into the field helped me in getting acceptance 
from all my participants. 
 
Doing research in my home country gave me the advantage of already understanding the 
culture and the native language, and in managing my time. It ensured the richness of the 
collected data.  
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This chapter describes the context of Lasem and its batik industry. It addresses the ups and 
downs of Lasem’s batik industry in order to provide part of the answer to the research 
question how batik family firms have remained sustainable over generations. It is 
important to place the research problem in context (both in terms of other batik research as 
well as the situational and historical context) in order to get a deeper understanding of the 
dynamic circumstances batik family firms in Lasem faced and the impact of the wider 
context on their sustainability.  
 
The study of batik has always attracted researchers and recently quite a number of studies 
have focused on batik and batik production on Java (Meutia and Ismail, 2012; Setyanti et 
al. 2013; Astuty, 2014; Utami and Triyono, 2013; Savirani, 2016; Sugiyarti and Ardyan, 
2017). Innovation and business performance are key research topics, such as the study by 
Setyanti et al. (2013) who examine the impact of innovation on management capabilities 
and knowledge sharing in East Java, while Utami and Triyono (2013) specifically look at 
innovation in marketing batik through the use of Blackberry and Meutia and Ismail (2012) 
investigate business performance in relation to social competence of the entrepreneurs and 
their business networks. More recently, Sugiyarti and Ardyan (2017) studied the effect of 
market-sensing capabilities and product innovation on market entry quality and marketing 
performance. Apart from focusing on innovation and business performance, research has 
also investigated the importance of close relationships with government officials (Savirani, 
2016), and business constraints. Astuty (2014) for instance argues that even though batik 
producers in Pekalongan perform efficiently in terms of production processes, they 
experience constraints in developing competitiveness due to such issues as customer 
behavior, the price of raw materials that are imported, lack of financial support and 
restricted access to banks. Research conducted by Setyorini et al. (2013) also identify 
internal factors that limit the growth of small and medium batik enterprises in Central Java. 
They found issues such as inadequate education and training, insufficient capital, and lack 
of coordination as main constraints. It can be stated that research on batik production in 
Indonesia (Java) has mainly focused on factors that impact on business performance 
 66 
and or on the issues of constraints in developing the business. There is so far as known 
however, no comprehensive investigation into the sustainability of batik family firms in 
Indonesia so this study also makes a contribution to the literature on batik production in 
Indonesia (Java). 
 
As far as location and history as context, it is essential to know the geographical location 
of the Lasem batik industry and understand batik as a commodity. This chapter presents an 
overview before embarking on an explanation of the historical context of the batik Lasem 
industry, and exploring the political and economic circumstances affecting batik family 
firms over a period of time. 
 
Lasem is a small city on the northern coast of Java covering around 18.23 square 
kilometre, with 24,590 people (BPS, 2017).  Lasem is a sub-district in Rembang regency, 
Central Java, around 12 kilometre from Rembang City. Lasem is positioned on the main 
road that connects Semarang (the capital of Central Java Province) and Surabaya (the 
capital of East Java Province). It is a relatively rural area, even though Lasem has a busy 
main road that connects the capital cities of Central Java and East Java. It stretches from 
the coastline to the hills.  
 
Initially, Lasem batik firms were concentrated in Lasem City, particularly in the Pecinan10 
area. Here, ethnic Chinese batik family firms dominate the Lasem batik industry. However, 
nowadays (since the Lasem batik boom in 2009) batik firms are spreading into a few 
villages near Lasem City where the batik workers live. Many batik workers leapfrogged 
into running their own batik business after the aid programme of the government that was 
installed to improve the economic conditions of villagers. Quite a few started their batik 
businesses much earlier than 2009, but there was a sharp increase after 2009. 
Consequently, the batik industry is expanding into surrounding areas of Lasem, such as 
Pancur sub-district. 
 
4.2 The Uniqueness of Lasem Batik  
Batik is one variety of Indonesian cloth. Indonesian batik cloth is traditionally made using 
a manual wax-resistant dyeing technique. There are some classifications of batik products 
by function, such as kain panjang11 or sarung12, a lower garment worn with a kebaya13; 
                                                
10 Pecinan is the specific area where the Chinese families work and live. 
11 Kain panjang is long cloth in a square shape that is worn as a lower garment for either for woman or man, 
and is wrapped into the waist. This is typically Indonesian traditional cloth. 
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kain gendongan14, which is used for carrying a baby; and modern clothes such as dresses, 
skirts and shirts.  
 
Batik is produced in different areas in Indonesia, mainly in Java, such as Yogyakarta, Solo, 
Pekalongan and Lasem. Each batik centre has its own characteristics that uniquely 
distinguish one batik area or product from another. Lasem batik has specific colours and 
patterns that have remained the same over time, which are heavily influenced by ethnic 
Chinese tradition and taste. Lasem batik is famous for the uniqueness of its red colours 
(bang-bangan); however, Lasem batik also has other colour combinations such as, biron 
(blue), bang-biron (red and blue), tiga negeri (red, blue and brown), empat negeri (red, 
blue, brown and violet), es teh (blue and brown). In addition, Lasem batik has unique 
patterns, such as, phoenix, turtle, lotus, liong15, banji and lok chan16, butterfly, and 
chrysanthemum. Each pattern has a different meaning, for instance, phoenix symbolizes 
good virtue or wisdom, liong symbolizes greatness, turtle symbolizes long life, butterfly 
symbolizes love and loyalty, etc.  The colour of Lasem batik also has philosophical 
meaning, such as red represents happiness. This philosophical meaning has been orally 
inherited through generations in Lasem, particularly among batik business owners and 
batik workers. Furthermore, Lasem batik also has other designs influenced by the Lasem 
environment, such as sekar jagad17, latohan18, watu pecah and kricak19.  
  
Interestingly, the Lasem batik industry has continued to produce batik traditionally until 
the present day and is thus unique in that the batik firms have continuously maintained 
traditional production since the beginning and have survived through generations. 
Meanwhile other batik centres are adopting other methods in making batik (either by hand 
or machine printing); some of these batik firms could not survive through periods of crisis. 
Traditional production means producing batik cloth applying several steps that consume a 
lot of time and use certain tools such as canting20 and cap (stamp tool). There are nine 
steps in making batik traditionally. Firstly, ngetel, is a process of preparing calico cloth 
before it is ready for the drawing. Calico cloth is processed by washing and drying 
repeatedly, using castor oil to clean the starch from the cloth. It usually takes three weeks, 
                                                                                                                                              
12 Sarung is tube shaped cloth a lower garment for either for woman or man, which wraps into the waist. 
13 Kebaya is an Indonesian traditional top or shirt, used by a woman. 
14 Kain gendongan is a long cloth in square shape used for carrying a baby on the shoulder. 
15 Liong is a Chinese dragon. 
16 Banji and Lok chan are a specific Chinese patterns. 
17 Sekar jagad means various flowers that grow in Lasem 
18 Latohan is sea grass that grows along the Lasem coastline. 
19 Watu pecah and kricak mean the material for building roads. These represent the bad feeling that 
commemorates the forced labour system of Daendels in building the road from Anyer to Panarukan.  
20 Canting is a pen-like tool to draw wax on the fabric. 
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depending on the weather since it relies on the sun-dried system. This is important for 
maintaining the colours so that they will not easily fade.  Secondly, mola, is a process of 
drawing a main pattern using a canting to duplicate the process. It is interesting to note that 
I found in ethnic Chinese batik firms that the batik worker does not use the pencil initially 
to help them to draw the pattern in the way other batik centres usually do. The batik 
worker in Lasem puts the plain calico cloth over the master cloth21 and copies directly 
using the canting on the calico cloth. An expert batik worker, who is usually an old lady, 
could freely draw the pattern using the canting directly without any master pattern 
underneath. This indicates that batik is an art product where the painter gets the skill 
through learning by doing. I found some young batik workers duplicating the pattern using 
a pencil to make a main pattern before drawing it using a canting. These practices are 
possibly because young batik workers are newcomers who are still learning the trade and 
improving their skills. Thirdly, nglengkreng, is a process of giving more detail on the main 
pattern using canting. This step requires the high expertise of the batik worker, since she 
draws freely without any pattern underneath. For mola and nglengkreng, it requires high 
accuracy, precision and incredible detail. Therefore, this step takes the longest time. 
Fourth, isen-isen is a process of adding detailed ornaments in the pattern using canting. 
Fifth, nerusi is a process of drawing the pattern on the other side of the cloth by copying 
the front pattern. Usually, a young batik worker learns from nerusi to advance her batik 
drawing skill, before she could nglengkreng or mola. Sixth, nembok is a process of 
covering the area that is not to be coloured with wax.  Seventh, ngelir is a process of 
dipping the cloth that is already covered in wax into the colouring container. Eighth, 
nglorot, is a process of rinsing the cloth to clean the wax by boiling it for a few minutes. 
Lastly, is drying the cloth. For the cloth that has more than one colour, the processes of 
nembok, ngelir and nglorot are performed as many times as there are colours. 
 
The traditional batik industry in Lasem consists of batik firms which produce batik clothes 
mainly in family firm settings. Initially, the Lasem batik industry was dominated by the 
Chinese Indonesian ethnic group; however, the Javanese ethnic group is starting to flourish 
since both government and non-government agencies provide aid programmes that 
encourage and facilitate batik workers to start their own batik businesses (see more details 
in the next section).  The Chinese Indonesian ethnic group is still dominant in the Lasem 
batik industry even though some Javanese family firms, as newcomers, are flourishing 
recently. Lasem batik is generally identified as an ethnic Chinese cultural tradition due to 
the patterns and colours of the batik. 
                                                
21 Master cloth has a desired pattern to be traced on the calico cloth. 
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Based on the field research, it is interesting that most batik business owners have never 
used natural dye materials and they have no knowledge in colouring using natural dye 
materials.  According to their knowledge, their predecessors never used natural dyes. Only 
two participants, who were trained by a non-government organisation, could dye using 
natural dye materials. The ethnic Chinese batik firms mainly use naphthol22 as the 
colouring material, very few adapted to indigosol23 after participating in training 
programmes. Chinese Indonesian batik business owners tend to keep to their predecessor’s 
colouring method and are reluctant to adopt new colouring materials and methods. The 
possible reason is that some of them did not get access to colouring training programmes 
conducted by the government, and some of the elderly batik business owners were hesitant 
to try and learn something new. In contrast, Javanese batik firms prefer to use indigosol as 
their colouring material and method since they had been trained by the government. They 
do not have any knowledge of the naphthol colouring process. 
 
4.3 The Dynamics of Traditional Batik Businesses in Lasem   
To clearly understand the ups and downs of the Lasem batik industry, it is necessary to 
explore the dynamics of Lasem as an important centre of the traditional batik industry in 
Indonesia from a historical perspective. The historical perspective integrates the changes in 
politics, the economy and fashion trends that influenced the dynamics of batik businesses 
in Lasem. This presents the macro context of batik businesses in Lasem.   
 
Batik as a fashion product was first used by indigenous people in Java. However, it is still 
unknown exactly when batik was introduced. It is believed that batik was introduced in 
Lasem around the 14th century by Na Li Ni who mainly produced it to meet family 
members’ need for clothes. Na Li Ni was Bi Nang Un’s wife, who was one of the crew of a 
ship belonged to Dhang Puhawang Tzeng Ho from Campa who landed in Java during the 
Majapahit Kingdom era (Liong, 2007; Unjiya, 2014). At the time, Lasem which is located 
on the north coast, was the first landing-place for mainland Chinese coming to Java island 
around the 14th to 15th centuries (Unjiya, 2014). Lasem became the largest immigrant 
destination for traders from mainland China, because the Majapahit Kingdom had a 
bilateral trade relationship with a Chinese Emperor of the Ming Dynasty. Therefore, 
Lasem batik motifs and designs were mainly influenced by Chinese cultural traditions.  
                                                





With demand growing, batik became a household industry. The European travellers 
reported that batik clothes were produced widely in Java in the 16th century (Elliot, 2013). 
Subsequently, increasing batik demand for cotton cloth in Java was unavoidable, since 
cotton cloth is the raw material used to make batik. It was indicated that some European 
merchants, such as the Portuguese and Dutch, exploited this opportunity by bringing 
Indian cotton cloth to Indonesia, while they were looking for spices (Burnett, 2013).  
 
Later, batik made its international debut in the Western world during the 17th century 
through the Dutch East Indies Company, known as VOC24. Batik looked exotic and 
colourful to Westerners, especially batik with oriental patterns and designs (Condra, 2013) 
like Lasem batik clothes. Coincidently, the European fashion trend at that time had been 
influenced by oriental designs and patterns (Scholten, 2000) that opened the market for 
batik cloth.  
 
During the VOC era in Indonesia (1602-1799), cloth was used to segregate the ethnic 
backgrounds of the wearer. During this time, there was an exodus of Chinese refugees to 
Indonesia at the juncture of the Ming and Ching Dynasties (Salmon, 1981). Therefore, 
VOC forced people to wear their own ethnic clothing fashion style to distinguish their 
ethnic background (Hall, 2018). Actually, the Chinese in Indonesia were not allowed to 
wear either Western clothes or indigenous clothes.  However, some Chinese tried to 
assimilate into the local environment in order to gain acceptance. Looking similar to the 
indigenous community was considered respectful of the local culture and created inclusion 
in the community. Therefore, some of the Chinese women wore the batik sarung 
indigenous fashion style. Meanwhile, the men wore batik as trousers. They kept their 
ethnic identity by applying oriental motifs and patterns on the batik cloth.  This 
demonstrates that the designs on the cloth express the identity of the individuals (Nordholt, 
1997). Moreover, the quality of batik cloth also represents the social status of the wearer. 
Thus, the quality of the batik used for local batik consumption was subject to a hierarchy 
of distinction (Hall, 2018). 
 
The demand for batik cloth was growing both in the local market and the Western world. 
In 1820, the export of Java’s batik increased in value over previous years (Hall, 2018). 
Local consumption increased further when batik cloth was adopted more by commoners 
                                                
24 VOC (Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie) is the first multinational company from the Netherland which 
monopolized trading in Asia.  
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and was not merely exclusive to the Javanese elite (Sekimoto, 2003). Furthermore, in 
1872, The Dutch colonial government enforced a social stratification policy in the 
community. They regulated that every resident was to wear ethnic clothing in public areas, 
except Indo-Belanda25, Chinese Peranakan26, and indigenous people27  (Elliot, 2013; 
Lukman et al., 2013). The women from specific ethnic groups had to wear batik kebaya 
and sarung as daily clothes. However, some Dutch women also wore batik kebaya and 
sarung since they were considered more comfortable to wear in humid and hot tropical 
weather (Smend et al., 2013). In order to differentiate their social status against other 
ethnic groups, Dutch women used luxurious fabric materials for their batik kebaya and 
sarung. This Dutch colonial policy affected the fashion trend and increased the demand for 
batik. As a consequence, new technology in making batik was introduced in Java, such as 
the brass hand stamp, known as batik cap, to reduce production time (Hall, 2018). 
Consequently, batik could be produced quicker to meet high demand. The lucrative batik 
business encouraged some Western artists to try to imitate batik by various printing 
methods in 1890; however, this could not compete with Java’s batik (Condra, 2013).  
 
From 1890 to 1915, European fashion trends were influenced by animal and floral designs 
such as butterflies, peacocks, and flowers that were similar to oriental patterns and designs 
(Barry, 1985). Consequently, demand for batik pesisir28 was increasing. Therefore, the 
Dutch colonial period around the 19th century became the heyday for traditional batik in 
Indonesia, particularly in Lasem.   
 
The Chinese diaspora linked Java’s batik productivity to a wider regional and international 
market.  At that time, Chinese ethnic groups were privileged as retailers and as direct 
exporters-importers (Hellwig, 2007).  They were given privilege from the Dutch colonial 
government to import raw material and export batik cloth, since Lasem, as a port town, 
was vital as the centre of textile, manufacture and collection points for the textile industry 
(Hall, 2018). The Chinese diaspora in Indonesia had played an important role in supporting 
the revival of local textile production especially on Java, which replaced purchased or 
undecorated Indian cloth. They acted as middlemen, importing inexpensive, plain and 
bleached calico clothes from the Netherlands for producing batik clothes (Condra, 2013), 
                                                
25 Indo-Belanda refers to descent from a mixed marriage between a European man or woman with a non-
European man or woman. 
26 Chinese Peranakan is descent from a mixed marriage between a Chinese man or woman with an 
indigenous man or woman. 
27 Indigenous people on Java island are Javanese.  
28 Batik pesisir is batik produced on the north coast of Java that has specific oriental motifs, patterns, colours 
and designs (Ishwara et al, 2011); commonly produced in Chinese batik family firms. It is generally 
produced in Lasem and Pekalongan. 
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and produced and marketed batik cloth locally in Java and the East Asian market (Hall, 
2018). Chinese business owners imported raw material such as white cotton cloth from the 
Netherlands and Britain (Sekimoto, 2003). 
 
The development of batik in the middle of the 19th century under Dutch colonial rule was 
carried on by the Chinese diaspora using the ‘putting out’ system to local households in 
order to meet the high demand for batik (Hall, 2018). They collected unfinished batik cloth 
from local households, Javanese in particular, and dyed this in their workshop to turn it 
into fine batik cloth. The ‘putting out’ system still occurs today in the Lasem batik 
industry. The production of batik cloth on the north coast of Java, particularly Lasem, was 
growing rapidly in line with advancement in transportation, such as railways and 
steamships (Ishwara, 2011). Since this time, the Lasem batik industry has been in the 
hands of ethnic Chinese family businesses, helped by Javanese batik workers (Elliott, 
2013; Rahayu and Alriningrum, 2014). This explains how the Chinese have dominated the 
Lasem batik industry.  
 
At the end of 19th century, batik cloth was used to commemorate special events, such as 
wedding ceremonies and Chinese New Year celebrations (Smend and Harper, 2011).  The 
function of batik cloth fused into the personal life of Lasem society, for instance, besides 
clothing, batik was used when carrying a baby, getting married, giving presents, 
worshipping God, decorating the house and even the funeral ceremony. Batik was used in 
every stage of somebody’s life, from birth to death. Therefore, batik is considered as a 
precious good that has different meaning for different occasions. These functions of batik 
cloth in the local community encourage the development of batik businesses.  
 
In 1910, the Dutch colonial government regulated for Chinese Peranakan29, which was act 
concerning Dutch nationality (wet op het Nederansch onderdaanschap) to provide equality 
between rich Chinese Peranakan women and Dutch women (Lukman et al., 2013).  A 
Chinese Peranakan could dress similar to Dutch women who wore batik in the Dutch 
kebaya style30. Later, Chinese Peranakan modified the kebaya to be more colourful in 
order to suit their fashion taste. This kebaya was matched with batik pesisir with rich 
oriental motifs and patterns worn as the lower garment. This fashion style was well known 
as kebaya encim. Further, this fashion style was adopted by the Chinese Peranakan 
                                                
29 Chinese peranakan is the term used to categorize Chinese descendants of a mixed marriage between a 
Chinese man and an indigenous woman who was born and lived in Indonesia (Lukman et al., 2013).  
30 Dutch kebaya style is white cotton decorated with oriental ornamentation worn as a top. 
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diaspora widely, not only in Java, but also other East Asian counties such as Singapore and 
Malaysia. This fashion style became the identity of Chinese Peranakan in that era, 
representing their ethnic identity and social status. It opened a new market for batik pesisir 
in the East Asian clothing market, particularly in Lasem. Demand for Lasem batik was 
increasing exponentially. It became the golden age (around 19th century) of the Lasem 
batik industry, because the batik was exported throughout the Indonesian archipelago, 
Europe (Smend et al., 2013) and East Asian markets (Hall, 2018). Lasem batik took 
advantage of the kebaya encim fashion trend with its oriental motifs and designs, rich with 
Chinese cultural philosophy.  
 
The growing market was in line with the invention of chemical dyes that replaced natural 
dyes in the early 20th century. Naphthol colouring dye was discovered in 1911 by the 
German Griesheim Electron Company (Mahapatra, 2016) and disseminated worldwide 
since the beginning of World War I in 1914 (Sekimoto, 2003). This chemical dye enabled 
quicker processing and was more durable compared to natural dyes. It enabled batik 
production to be completed faster and Chinese Indonesian family firms in Lasem have 
been using naphthol until the present time. However, they have changed from the German 
brand to Indian and Japanese brands which are cheaper today. In the Dutch colonial era, 
the industry relied heavily on imported raw materials, such as chemical dyes (Dijk, 2007) 
and raw cloth which was cheaper than local cloth (Hall, 2018).  
 
The high demand for batik encouraged the improvement of production methods in 
manufacturing batik. Besides utilization of the brass hand stamp that produced batik cap, 
printing technology was introduced to print batik motifs on textiles. These two methods 
reduced production time compared to batik tulis that used a pen-like tool. Batik tulis, batik 
cap and batik printing were different in both price and quality. Nevertheless, batik printing 
was not competitive enough in the local industry during the Dutch colonial era (Sekimoto, 
2003). One possible explanation is that batik clothing was perceived as an ethnic product 
where the quality represents the ethnic and social status of the wearer.  The Dutch Colonial 
government stratification policy that segregated people into their ethnic and social status 
groups also generated substantial effects on the growing batik industry, especially for the 
Lasem batik industry. At the time, Chinese Indonesian business owners in Lasem adopted 




The rising demand for batik in the Dutch Colonial era was followed by the increasing 
number of batik business in Lasem. At that time, the ethnic Chinese received some 
privileges from the Dutch East Indies government. Therefore, most of the Chinese 
Indonesian in Lasem ran family batik businesses. The prosperity of the Lasem batik 
industry during the Dutch colonial period is represented in ethnic Chinese batik firms’ 
house architecture in the Pecinan31 area in Lasem, which represents the success of the 
owner in conducting his batik business. The design is for a big house with tall and thick 
walls surrounding the area with only one small-layered door in the front and a bell ring on 
it. The thick and tall walls are to protect their business activity from their competitors, so 
that they could not copy their techniques (Elliot, 2013). The batik firm is in the same house 
area where the family is living. The workshop is usually at the back of the house. The main 
house is in the centre of the complex where the worship table is placed. This is where the 
family members worship their ancestors in accordance with their traditional beliefs.  
 
Unfortunately, all batik business firms in Indonesia, including Lasem, were closed when 
Japan occupied Indonesia from 1942 to 1945. This was disastrous for the batik industry in 
Indonesia (Brenner, 1998). All imports and exports were stopped, while Japan 
concentrated on war (Kwartanada, 2002). The raw materials for batik such as cloth, dyes 
and paraffin or wax were unavailable (Brenner, 1998). This was the result of the Dutch 
East Indies government practice of bumi hangus (scorched earth) policy where they were 
ordered to leave nothing for the Japanese invaders. Hyperinflation was unavoidable, the 
situation was devastating, the economy was stagnant, and Japanese soldiers often raped the 
girls and plundered the place. The Japanese tightly controlled the society and the 
conditions were tense (Isnaeni and Apid, 2008), consequently, ethnic Chinese batik 
business owners chose to close their firms during the war period. They concentrated on 
saving family life. Some people wore gunnysack for clothing due to the lack of clothing 
during the Japanese occupation.  
 
In general, the batik industry in Indonesia revived several years after Indonesia became 
independent (1945), around the 1950s in the Soekarno era. The demand was boosted by 
people buying new clothes after the difficult war situation from 1940.  Unfortunately, the 
Lasem batik industry, dominated by ethnic Chinese business owners, was severely 
impacted by several government policies during the Soekarno era (1945-1966).  President 
Soekarno had a policy to promote economic recovery especially for indigenous people by 
                                                
31 Pecinan is a Chinatown complex where Chinese immigrants lived. This was a result of the wijkenstelsel 
policy that localized societies based on their ethnic backgrounds.  
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providing subsidies. Sadly, Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent were considered to be 
non-indigenous or ‘outsiders’. Lasem batik firms did not get the opportunity to access 
Government subsidies for batik raw materials through the fortress programme. This 
programme was launched (1950s) by Soekarno under nationalization ideology that tried to 
elevate indigenous people to become masters of their nation. He heavily subsidized 
clothing, as it was one of the basic needs. The government appointed GKBI (Gabungan 
Koperasi Batik Indonesia, the Joint Indonesian Batik Cooperatives) that monopolized the 
allocation of batik’s raw materials that used to be in the hands of the Chinese merchants. 
Only indigenous people could access cheap raw materials which were sold below market 
price through membership in the GKBI (Sekimoto, 2003). This period was known as the 
cloth allotment era. Many indigenous people took advantage of this programme to rebuild 
their business and start-up new batik firms. Suddenly, lots of people (indigenous citizens32) 
who were not from batik family firms also joined GKBI for the opportunity to get the low 
cloth price. At this time, the number of batik firms in Java doubled to become 10,000 firms 
(Brenner, 1998). However, it seemed that in Lasem the Javanese mainly stayed active as 
batik workers (only after the third Five Year Development Plan of the late 1970s in the 
Suharto era - aimed at increasing job opportunities in labour-intensive industries - did 
Javanese batik workers in Lasem start to have their own businesses). 
 
Indeed, the fortress programme succeeded in encouraging the batik industry in general in 
Indonesia, especially in Yogyakarta where most of the batik business owners were 
indigenous Javanese (Budhiyanto 2009). Conversely, the fortress programme directly 
impacted the ethnic Chinese Lasem batik firms by weakening their competitive advantage 
because their Chinese Indonesian owners could not access the GKBI. Surprisingly, Lasem 
batik businesses survived and were sustained throughout the generations until the present 
day. One possible explanation is that the ethnic Chinese firms use specific patterns, designs 
and colours that could not be copied by their (Javanese) competitors. They have succeeded 
in guarding their business secret and their product still satisfies the local market. (I will 
return to this argument later on in the thesis.) Another explanation could be that Lasem 
batik is regarded as a living tradition that may become marginalized, but still survives 
(Sekimoto, 2003) because it has created a niche market. Lasem batik cloth is perceived as a 
prestige product for local people thus created local market demand. In addition, the 
Chinese Indonesian batik business owner her or his self perceives the family batik firm as a 
legacy from his/her predecessor and therefore must be sustained.  
 
                                                
32 Mainly ethnic Javanese. 
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In supporting nationalization ideology, the Soekarno regime implemented a corporate 
nationalization programme through Presidential Decree No 10 in 1959, which prohibited 
foreigners, especially ethnic Chinese, from conducting trade in rural areas (Suryadinata, 
1976). Those who already owned businesses had to transfer them to indigenous 
Indonesians before 1 June 1960 or relocate them to towns or cities at regency level. This 
severely affected batik businesses in Lasem. Some of them moved to other cities or left 
Indonesia. Those who remained tried to survive by operating their batik business secretly. 
They did not open a store and made batik only to order. Other ethnic Chinese batik 
business owners married a local woman or took their batik worker as their wife to keep the 
batik business going. The culmination of racial mistreatment followed the Communist 30 
September Movement (GESTAPU) uprising in 1965 when ethnic Chinese in Indonesia 
were considered to be Communist followers and had to be purged. The Chinese Indonesian 
batik business owners in Lasem stopped their business because of the political situation. At 
the same time, high inflation hindered demand for batik in general.  The situation 
worsened in 1966 when ethnic Chinese in several cities in Indonesia such as Aceh and 
Yogyakarta who did not have Indonesian nationality, were expelled (Nurcahyo, 2016). The 
ethnic Chinese were subjected to discrimination practices in almost all areas of Indonesia 
at this time; they lived in fear.  
 
When the Soekarno regime fell, the GKBI no longer had the monopoly in importing, 
producing and distributing raw batik materials (Brenner, 1998). Consequently, the price of 
raw batik materials rose sharply on the open market. Importing or producing printed batik 
was no longer banned. The batik industry declined rapidly when the protection policy 
ended. Large numbers of batik firms collapsed immediately in centres such as Solo 
(Brenner, 1998) and Yogyakarta (Budhiyanto, 2009). Without government subsidies, they 
could not survive. Although many batik firms closed, many Lasem batik family firms run 
by Chinese Indonesian owner-managers remained. They were used to not rely on 
Government subsidies because they never got access to it (whereas other firms collapsed as 
they had no alternative resources or specialized knowledge to rely on). 
 
Then, it was the start of the New Order regime of President Soeharto (1966-1998) after 
Soeharto took over the power from Soekarno to rule the country. The new president, who 
became well known as an authoritarian president, intended to accelerate the assimilation of 
Indonesian citizens of foreign descent, especially ethnic Chinese, into the Indonesian 
nation (Suryadinata, 1976). Ethnic Chinese had to change their Chinese names into an 
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Indonesian name. This was welcomed by some ethnic Chinese who hoped that changing 
their Chinese names to an Indonesian name would make their lives in Indonesia easier. The 
government prohibited Chinese schools and enforced children to register into government 
or national private schools. However, the assimilation program encouraged discrimination 
practices that were unfair for ethnic Chinese in Indonesia. The ethnic Chinese were not 
allowed to become either civil servants or join the armed forces, thus becoming a trader 
was an option. Therefore, most of the ethnic Chinese in Lasem continued running their 
batik business. Another government assimilation program restricted ethnic Chinese 
publishers who produced news in Chinese characters through notification by letter from 
the Information Minister of Indonesia No. 2/SE/ Di. Further, Chinese traditions were not 
allowed to be conducted in public areas. Under Presidential Instruction No 14 in 1967 
about religion, belief and Chinese cultural tradition, the government limited the practice of 
rituals and traditions of Chinese culture to occur only in the family. The Konghucu33 was 
not accepted as a religion, whereas it was believed by most ethnic Chinese in Indonesia. As 
a consequence, the ethnic Chinese had to choose other religions which were permitted by 
the government, such as Islam, Christianity, Hinduism or Buddhism. The Soeharto regime 
terminated the dual nationality treaty Law No. 62 in 1958 issued under the Soekarno 
regime. Thus, every Chinese in Indonesia who already declared having dual nationality 
and having the desire to become an Indonesian citizenship had to have SKBRI34. All these 
discriminatory treatments influenced how the ethnic Chinese lived and ran their business 
(Dieleman et. al., 2011; Susanto, 2011). At face value, they tended to adjust to the 
regulations and accept the treatment as fate.  
 
In 1970, batik printing was commercially produced in Java (Sekimoto, 2003). Initially, 
batik printing did not threaten the traditional batik industry, since the quality of batik 
printing was poor. However, technology developed and started to produce good quality 
batik printing. By 1980, batik printing started to threaten batik tulis or cap. Many batik 
firms in Solo and Yogyakarta closed (Brenner, 1998; Budhiyanto, 2009) because 90% 
market share of batik product was dominated by batik printing (Sekimoto, 2003). 
Nevertheless, a few ethnic Chinese batik firms in Lasem managed to survive, although 
some changed to another business type, such as a gold shop, transportation business and 
grocery shop. The Lasem batik industry benefitted from its rural area location where the 
                                                
33 Konghucu is an ethnic Chinese belief in their cultural life.  
34 SKBRI (Surat Keterangan Bukti Kewarganegaraan Indonesia) is a certificate of Indonesian citizenship. 
This certificate was only for ethnic Chinese living in Indonesia who renounced their Indonesian citizenship. 
It sometimes resulted in discrimination because some bureaucracies required it to permit certain services, 
such as obtaining a passport or getting married. 
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society was relatively reluctant to modernize. Here society tended to keep their social 
norms and traditions more tightly compared to urban areas. Batik printing was not 
considered as batik, rather just a textile with a batik design. Thus, demand for Lasem batik 
continued in spite of lower demand. They could still maintain their business by supplying 
to the local market. 
 
At the same time, fashion trends for women’s clothes in Indonesia began to change to 
Western or Modern fashion styles, or Muslim styles that rarely use batik as material for 
clothing as a result of modernization (Brenner, 1998). American ready to wear clothing 
was flooding Indonesian markets (Scholten, 2000). The young generation was more open 
and adopting fashion trends more quickly. They perceived that modern clothes were easier 
to wear and fashionable. They wore batik and kebaya on special occasions only. 
Meanwhile, older women prefer to wear batik and kebaya daily. However, Lasem society 
still regards batik as their precious clothes, representing their social status, which creates 
local demand. This proves that Lasem batik has a niche market. 
 
With a stable demand for batik from Lasem, combined with soft loans facilities from the 
New Order government, pioneers of Javanese batik entrepreneurs emerged in nearby 
villages.   This programme sought to encourage indigenous entrepreneurship (Siddique and 
Suryadinata, 1981). Under Presidential Decree No 7 of 1979, Soeharto offered soft loans 
and flexible credit, such as Kredit Investasi Kecil (small investment credit) and Kredit 
Modal Permanent (permanent capital credit) for start up businesses. The programmes were 
intended only for Javanese and it succeeded in encouraging Javanese batik workers in 
Lasem to become self-employed. However, some of the Javanese batik firms in Lasem 
were not able to survive the Asian economic crisis which started in 1997 and lasted until 
1999, followed by the collapse of the New Order era.  
 
Due to the difficulties during the New Order era combined with changing fashion styles 
the number of batik firms owned and managed by ethnic Chinese families in Lasem fell 
from some 140 firms in the 1950s to 15 firms in 200635. The batik market was no longer 
lucrative since batik was considered old fashioned. Continued discrimination, however, 
inspired a willingness among some operators to persevere and become creative and sustain 
their business by creating coping strategies. This is evidenced by the fact that several 
                                                
35 Based on the interview with the head of Institute Pluralisme Indonesia who had conducted research in 
Lasem.  
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ethnic Chinese batik family firms that exist today are fifth generation. More details will 
follow in the findings chapters. 
 
In late 2013, the number of batik firms had risen to 40 firms36 as the demand for batik rose 
significantly. The increasing number of batik firms mainly were Javanese family firm. The 
government and non-government programmes providing impetus to the growth of batik 
businesses. This occurred initially with the legitimation of batik as an Indonesian 
intangible cultural heritage of humanity by UNESCO on 2 October 200937, since then 
commemorated as the annual National Batik Day. Later on, under Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono’s (SBY) regime (2004-2014) the government was aggressive in regulating to 
develop the batik industry in Indonesia.  
 
The SBY government promoted batik as an authentic Indonesian cultural product and a 
symbol of pride. People were encouraged to wear batik cloth daily. Consequently, batik 
was adapted to the current fashion style in the form of dresses, skirts, blouses, shirts and 
jackets. Batik is acknowledged by some fashion designers who use batik cloth in their 
fashion range. When batik is applied in modern designs, it becomes popular as a new 
fashion, not only when paired with kebaya.  
 
SBY’s government launched several regulations to encourage people to wear batik.    At 
the national level, the government issued Ministry of Domestic Affairs Regulation No. 53 
of 2009 which requires all civil servants throughout Indonesia to wear batik as uniforms 
for at least one workday in a week. In addition, the local Government of Rembang’s 
regency requires their civil servants to wear Lasem batik in particular. As the result, this 
increased the demand for Lasem batik.  
 
At the same time, some grants and soft loans provided by government encouraged the 
further development of the Lasem batik industry. As a consequence, newcomers emerged 
either from those who had family batik business background or batik worker family 
background. Even people who did not have any experience participated in start-up batik 
businesses. Government and non-government organisations (NGOs) attracted these 
newcomers with their aid programmes. At this time, Chinese Indonesian business owners 
had access to the programmes through the Lasem batik cooperative that was established in 
                                                
36 Based on the interview with the head of the Lasem batik cooperative. It consists of 14 Chinese family 




2008.  (Interim governments of Abdurrahman Wahid (1999-2001) and Megawati 
Sukarnoputri (2001-2004) did much to ban discriminatory laws and treatment of the ethnic 
Chinese population).   
 
The growing demand, followed by an increasing number of batik firms, resulted in tight 
competition among batik firms in Lasem. Initially batik labour received low wages 
(especially when batik demand was low), however with increasing demand for traditional 
batik, the request for labour increased and with this also the wages. To create traditional 
batik cloth skilled labour is needed (expertise and diligence) which is labour intensive. So 
with increased demand this expertise became a scarce resource. In short, batik business 
owner-managers struggled to source skilled labour in a competitive market. They 
competed by paying higher wages, offering privileges and special treatment to batik 
workers. Furthermore, batik family firms also had to compete in the market to get 
customers. A pricing war was inevitable as batik firms battled to give the lowest price. 
Every effort was made to provide low prices. This will be examined further in chapter 5 
and chapter 6.  
  
4.4 Conclusion 
The ups and downs of batik family firms in Lasem are examined through an historical 
perspective to answer the research question of how batik family firms have been able to 
remain sustainable over generations. This study suggests that the fashion trend (at the meso 
level), and politics and the economy (at the macro levels) impact on batik business 
sustainability; where the dynamic in fashion trends is the result of economic and political 
forces. 
 
Indonesian clothes are influenced by the current fashion trend in batik. When batik clothes 
are in fashion, the demand increases and vice versa. Further, the function of batik clothes 
has changed through time along with fashion trends, social influences and government 
policies. This all impacts on the fluctuation of demand for batik clothes. Therefore, the 
dynamics of batik businesses in Lasem is determined by changes in fashion trends, politics 
and the economy. 
 
Initially batik was introduced around the 14th century in Lasem to meet household needs 
for clothing. During the 16th century it became a household industry and was introduced 
internationally to the Western world during the 17th century through the Dutch East Indies 
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Company (VOC). Then, in the 19th century demand was increased in both the local market 
and the Western world. This became a golden era for batik family firms in Lasem. When 
Japan occupied Indonesia from 1942 to 1945, Lasem batik family firms collapsed. All of 
them closed because the raw materials for batik (cloth, dyes and wax) were unavailable in 
the chaotic wartime conditions.  
 
From the beginning, the Lasem batik industry has been dominated by ethnic Chinese 
family firms. Javanese family firms emerged under the independent Indonesian 
governments (New Order regime and SBY regime). Therefore, the existence of traditional 
batik firms in Lasem is mainly determined by the ability of Chinese Indonesian owner-
managers to sustain their businesses. In spite of persecution and discrimination under 
several regimes, they succeeded in sustaining their batik family firms over generations. 
Various government policies threatened their business.  Firstly, under Soekarno’s Old 
Order (1945-1956), the fortress program provided subsidies and privileges to indigenous 
batik business owners only, through cooperative batik firms (GKBI); Presidential Decree 
No 10 in 1959 prohibited foreigners, especially ethnic Chinese, from conducting trade in 
rural areas; the horrifying purge of the Indonesian Communist party in 1965 when ethnic 
Chinese in Indonesia were considered to be Communist followers; followed by the fall of 
the Old Order regime. The collapse of the Old Order regime meant that GKBI no longer 
had the monopoly in importing, producing and distributing batik raw materials. 
 
Secondly, the New Order regime of President Suharto (1966-1998) oversaw the 
assimilation of Indonesian citizens of foreign descent, especially ethnic Chinese, into the 
Indonesian nation. Several discriminatory policies and presidential decrees restricted the 
ethnic Chinese: changed their Chinese name into an Indonesian name; not allowed to 
become civil servants or join the armed forces, thus becoming a trader was an option; 
restricted Chinese publishing in Chinese characters; Chinese traditions were not allowed to 
be conducted in public areas; the rituals and traditions of Chinese culture were only 
allowed in the family; prohibited Chinese schools and directed students to register in 
government or national private schools; every ethnic Chinese in Indonesia had to have 
SKBRI; and the Konghucu,  a belief generally held by mainly Chinese was not accepted as 
a religion. Lasem batik, which is predominantly influenced by Chinese tradition and 
culture, was affected by these restrictions. Demand for their batik was stagnant and they 
became more closed in doing their business. Although struggling under these 
discriminatory conditions, ethnic Chinese owner-managers still kept their businesses 
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going.   
 
From 1970, printed batik flooded the market in Indonesia. Notwithstanding the cheap price 
of printed batik, Lasem family firms still exist with traditional batik. The Lasem batik 
industry had the advantage of a rural area location where the community was reluctant to 
modernize. Lasem people did not perceive printed batik as batik; rather, it was only textile 
with a batik design. Demand for Lasem batik still remained. Furthermore, western fashion 
style did not influence their preferences in wearing clothes. They kept their traditional 
clothes and Lasem batik represented their social status.  
 
The Lasem batik industry revived after UNESCO legitimized batik as an Indonesian 
intangible cultural heritage of humanity in 2009, under the SBY regime. Since then, the 
government has conducted some programmes that actively encourage batik businesses, 
either in creating demand or supporting programmes. Javanese family firms began to 
emerge. 
 
In conclusion, the policies of the various government regimes substantially impact on 
business sustainability, whether encouraging or threatening business sustainability. The 
ethnic issue is also important, since the policies discriminated against one particular ethnic 
group, ethnic Chinese in this case, which challenged this group to be more resilient. The 
ability to apply an appropriate response to the discriminatory government treatments, and 
willingness to fulfil family obligations to the business, determine how ethnic Chinese 
owner-managers succeed in sustaining their business. On the other hand, Javanese owner-
managers appear to benefit from Indonesian government regimes that encourage their 






Chapter 5 The Sustainability of Chinese Indonesian Family Firms in the 




As shown in the previous chapter, Chinese Indonesian family businesses have produced 
Lasem batik since 1870 (Elliot, 2013). Lasem batik is made using typical Chinese patterns 
that change with fashion and are products that reflect the tastes of the owner-managers. 
The golden age of the Lasem batik industry was in the nineteenth century Dutch colonial 
period, and remnants of the past supremacy of Chinese Indonesian batik owner-managers. 
The situation for Lasem batik owner-managers became extremely difficult following the 
arrival of the Japanese occupiers in 1942 when they blocked the export and import of raw 
materials and seized property owned by the ethnic Chinese owner-managers (Kwartanada, 
2002). After Indonesian independence in 1945, both the Old Order (1945-1966) and the 
New Order (1966-1998) Governments discriminated against the ethnic Chinese owner-
managers, and this situation reached its peak with the enactment in 1967 of an assimilation 
policy designed to rob Indonesian Chinese of their identity and other rights by restricting 
their mobility (Suryadinata, 1976; Coppel 2004; Suryadinata, 2003; Nurcahyo, 2016). 
However, the ethnic Chinese owner-managers were able to survive this difficult period and 
have managed to sustain their family businesses. 
 
The ability of Chinese Indonesian family firms to sustain their businesses by coping with 
different conditions that threatened their businesses cannot be denied. Chinese Indonesian 
owner-managers have managed to survive in difficult conditions and exploit the 
opportunities to develop their businesses. This is proven by the existence of several fifth-
generation ethnic Chinese family firms still operating today. The question of how Chinese 
Indonesian batik owner-managers have been able to develop and sustain their business 
over time in a dynamic environment will be addressed in this chapter. 
 
Using the perspective of mixed embeddedness (Kloosterman, 2010), changes occurring at 
each level and in each context will be examined; and the way ethnic Chinese owner-
managers have responded to change will be explored. At the micro level, the way ethnic 
Chinese owner-managers have responded to disruption derived from inside the family and 
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the firm will be studied. Attempts will then be made to find how the Chinese Indonesian 
family firm’s resources encourage business sustainability by considering the intermingling 
between the family and the firm. At the meso level, an endeavour will be made to analyze 
how Chinese Indonesian owner-managers have responded to disruptions derived from 
market dynamics. Then, at the macro level, this chapter will look at the ways ethnic 
Chinese owner-managers have responded to disruptions resulting from political and 
economic dynamics.  
 
To understand the nature of sustainable ethnic Chinese family firms in the traditional batik 
industry in Lasem, Indonesia, this chapter begins with a study at the micro level of the 
individual and his or her resources, namely, general characteristics of a Chinese Indonesian 
batik family firm, tangible and intangible business inheritance and family disruption. The 
meso level of market opportunity includes changes in fashion trends, technological 
environment and competitive environment. Next, the macro level of the economy and 
political climate include public policy changes.  
 
5.2 General Characteristics of Chinese Indonesian Family Firms 
This section describes the characteristics of ethnic Chinese batik firms in general by 
looking at business sustainability at the micro level. Traditional batik businesses run by 
Chinese Indonesian owner-managers take the form of family firms, which are owned and 
operated by the family. Most of the Chinese Indonesian owner-managers inherited the firm 
from their parents. Only three Chinese Indonesian owner-managers started their own batik 
firm. Two of these revived their parents’ batik business that had been closed down.  
 
All the married Chinese Indonesian owner-managers ran their businesses with their 
spouses. There is gender based occupational segregation within ethnic Chinese batik 
businesses. The woman has a dominant role in handling almost all daily business 
managerial activities, for instance, production management, human management, financial 
management and marketing. Production management includes deciding on patterns and 
colours, managing material and contact with suppliers, providing the colouring formula, 
counting pieces of cloth given to the outsource workers and checking the quality of the 
batik clothes. The woman is active in managing batik workers by recruiting and paying the 
workers. She also does in-house marketing while doing other daily business activities and 
domestic tasks at home. Her most important role is being financial manager. Women play 
an active role within the house/business, whereas men play a dominant role outside the 
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house, such as taking part in exhibitions, looking for resellers outside the town, attending 
gatherings and others community activities. Although women play a dominant role in the 
daily batik business activities, men are recognised as the business owners. 
 
Besides spouses, some participants had asked their younger brothers and their wives to 
help them. Liang Tio San stated that he started to include his younger brother and his wife 
when he felt that his growing business was too much to handle alone. The reason Liang 
Tio San chose family members was that he only wanted people in the business that he 
could fully trust. Liang Tio San gave his younger brother a position as his deputy for such 
business activities as taking part in exhibitions, negotiating with banks and participating in 
organisations such as Lasem Batik Cooperation, Historical Communication Forum 
Society38 and, Tridharma Trimurti39. 
 
Some participants involved their children in their batik business. Wen Soen Lie, for 
example, was assisted by her only daughter Tan Mei Lian, now living in Jakarta, and by 
her adopted son Liem Kiat Siaw, now living with her in Lasem. The following is Wen 
Soen Lie’s account of how meaningful her children’s contribution is. 
Tan Mei Lian is Wen Soen Lie’s daughter who has been living in Jakarta since she was at 
university. She decided to remain in Jakarta after her marriage to a Jakarta resident; her 
father-in-law provided the couple with a house. As a mother, Wen Soen Lie wanted to give 
business capital to Tan Mei Lian. In 2008 Tan Mei Lian had the opportunity to open an 
exhibition stand without charge in Thamrin City (Jakarta) and Wen Soen Lie provided her 
with some batik cloth as business capital. Since then Tan Mei Lian has been running her 
own batik business in Jakarta using her mother’s batik business name, i.e. Sinar Megah. Tan 
Mei Lian’s business flourished, and it has given Wen Soen Lie a large number of orders. 
Wen Soen Lie completely entrusted her batik marketing to Tan Mei Lian. With Tan Mei 
Lian’s extensive network, Sinar Megah also gained access to the foreign market through 
exhibitions she joined in Turkey and Malaysia, and also her network of state dignitaries. Tan 
Mei Lian once received an order from Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the then President of 
Indonident of Indonesia, for 500 pieces of batik cloth based on a patent agreement 
stipulating that the product’s pattern and design was not allowed to be reproduced for a 
period of one year. The current president, Jokowi, who replaced him, also placed on order 
with Tan Mei Lian. She has a good business network to access the Indonesian’s President’s 
family. Meanwhile, Liem Kiat Siaw, Wen Soen Lie’s adopted son, became involved in the 
Sinar Megah batik business in 2011 after deciding to move to Lasem to be with Wen Soen 
                                                
38 Forum Komunikasi Masyarakat Sejarah (FOKMAS) 
39 Tridharma Trimurti is a religious organisation which is also a social community of a Chinese society in 
Lasem. However, the organisation’s activities are not exclusive to ethnic Chinese. 
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Lie. His task is participating in the exhibitions that are held outside the town and 
representing Wen Soen Lie’s family firm in organisational activities, such as cooperatives 
because Wen Soen Lie’s husband is severely ill.  
When taking part in an exhibition, Wen Soen Lie seldom hires any employees. She prefers 
to ask her children and her son-in-law for help, as she trusts family members more than 
anybody else. In addition, she feels that profit should be shared with her own family 
members rather than with outsiders. Because she is getting old and has to take care of her 
ill husband, she asks Liem Kiat Siaw to replace her in activities that require leaving the 
house. The family’s involvement and their roles are presented in the table below.  
 
Table 5.1 Family Involvement and Their Roles in an Ethnic Chinese Family Firm in 
the Lasem Batik Industry 
The family firm Family members’ 
involvement 
Descriptions 
Bunga Megah The owner Name: Huang Tjaw Hien 
Gender/Age: Male/87 
Role: Is not too active in the business; 
helps with making Chinese character batik 
patterning designs and welcoming buyers 
at home.  
Spouse Name: Muningsih 
Gender/Age: Female/69 
Roles: Undertaking daily business 
activities, such as managing batik workers, 
mixing colour formulas, directing batik 
colours, patterns and motif designs, 
managing materials, contacting suppliers, 
conducting business transactions and 
financial management.  
Sinar Megah The owner Name: Wen Soen Lie 
Gender/Age: Female/71 
Roles: Undertaking daily business 
activities at homes, such as managing batik 
workers, mixing colour formulas, 
managing materials, welcoming buyers at 
home, directing batik colours, patterns and 
motif designs, contacting suppliers, 
conducting business transactions and 
financial management. 
Son Name:   Liem Kiat Siaw 
Gender/Age: Male/22 
Roles: Active in batik organisation 
representing his mother’s batik firm, 
marketing at exhibitions, controlling 
outsource batik workers.  
Daughter Name:  Tan Mei Lian 
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Gender/Age: Female/35 
Roles: Marketing batik products in Jakarta 
and any other exhibitions. 
Rusa Kuning The owner Name:  Tjiang Sian Me 
Gender/Age: Female/71 
Roles: Undertaking daily business activity, 
such as managing batik workers, mixing 
colour formulas, managing materials, 
directing batik colours, patterns and motif 
designs, contacting suppliers, conducting 
business transactions and financial 
management. 
Spouse Name:  Zhang Ling Shi 
Gender/Age: Male /70 
Roles: Welcoming buyers at home. 
Son Name: Zhang Liem Tjan 
Gender/Age: Male/33 
Roles: Controlling outsource batik 
workers. 
Gaman Jaya The owner Name:  Liang Tio San 
Gender/Age: Male/47 
Roles: Marketing, negotiation with bank 
and government officials, controlling the 
outsource workers, looking for exhibition 
opportunities, marketing in exhibitions, 
active in organisations. 
Spouse Name: Kie Lian Nio 
Gender/Age: Female/37 
Roles: Undertaking daily business 
activities at home, such as managing batik 
workers, conducting business transactions 
and financial management, managing 
materials, contacting suppliers, welcoming 
buyers at home, mixing colour formulas, 
directing batik colours, patterns and motif 
designs. 
Younger brother Name: Liang Lay Hien 
Gender/Age: Male/33 
Roles: Substituting for, and helping the 
owner in activities, active in organisations, 
marketing at exhibitions 
Younger brother’s 
wife 
Name: Lu Soen Tjen 
Gender/Age: Female/30 
Roles: Helper  
Maju Raya The owner Name:  Zhang Liem Tjan 
Gender/Age: Male/33 
Roles: Marketing and managing outsource 
batik workers. 
Spouse Name:  Siauw Shin Lie 
Gender/Age: Female/27 
Roles: Undertaking daily business 
activities, such as managing batik worker 
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A batik business is either single family or multi-family owned. Nearly all the participants’ 
businesses were single family owned, with family members assisting the business 
activities. Only one participant, Siem Djun Gwan, was involved in a multi-family owned 
business, because there are two Rembulan batik family members who are willing to 
continue the business. 
Siem Djun Gwan is the youngest son of the PNMs’ three children. Together with his older 
brother, he inherited Rembulan batik in 2007 after his father passed away and his mother 
at home, managing materials, directing 
batik colours, patterns and motif designs, 
conducting business transactions and 
financial management.   
Mother Name:  Tjiang Sian Me 
Gender/Age: Female/71 
Roles: Mixing colour formulas 
Merah Delima The owner Name:  Lie Sio Lan 
Gender/Age: Female/33 
Roles: Undertaking all business activity by 
herself, such as managing batik workers, 
mixing colour formulas, directing batik 
patterns and motif designs, managing 
materials, contacting suppliers, marketing 
atexhibitions, conducting business 
transactions. 
Hijau Daun The owner Name:  Liem Lie Tiaw 
Gender/Age: Male/31 
Roles: Welcoming buyers at home, 
marketing at exhibitions, managing batik 
workers, contacting suppliers, managing 
materials, undertaking business 
transactions and financial management.   





Roles: Welcoming buyers at 
home, negotiation with bank and 
government, managing 
materials, conducting business 
transactions and financial 
management, contacting 
suppliers, marketing at 







Roles: Directing batik colours, 
batik patterns and motif designs. 
Mother Name:   Kho Lan Me 
Gender/Age: Female/72 
Roles: Not too active in the business; helps 
in creating new designs. 
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became ill. His older sister did not receive any legacy from the family business and has 
joined her husband in Kupang, East Nusa Tenggara. The Rembulan family’s batik and brass 
businesses were informally bequeathed to Siem Djun Tan and Siem Djun Gwan. In the legal 
and formal documents of ownership, however, the batik business was put in Siem Djun 
Tan’s name and the brass business was put in Siem Djun Gwan’s. This was done for 
convenience in the registration of individual business ownership. In daily activities, all 
business decisions are jointly made and profit is shared evenly. To show respect to his 
parents, Siem Djun Gwan regularly gives money to his mother taken from the profit gained 
from the Rembulan batik and brass businesses. 
 
In general, ethnic Chinese batik owner-managers have an informal business structure. Only 
three participants had an Individual Business Licence (known as SIUP40 for short) from the 
government to run their batik business. Only two people were aware of their obligation to 
pay tax and had an Obligatory Tax Payer’s Registration Number (known as NPWP for 
short). Most participants were reluctant to do this, reasoning that their business is a home 
industry with uncertain income, such that sometimes they may have no buyers at all for a 
whole month. Besides, they say, no bookkeeping accounts are kept; thus, it is difficult to 
determine the amount of taxes. 
 
In the batik production process, Chinese Indonesian owner-managers are assisted by 
village-based female workers whose batik skills have been passed on from generation to 
generation. Chinese Indonesian owner-managers distinguish between batik workers who 
work in the workshop, and those who work in their own houses (referred to as outsourced 
batik workers). The participants employed both kinds of workers, although most are 
workshop batik workers. The practice of hiring workshop batik workers is a custom that 
has been passed from generation to generation, making it easier to control both quality and 
productivity, and assuring availability of ready-to-sell batik clothes. Meanwhile, 
outsourced workers are employed to meet the need for batik cloth that cannot be produced 
in sufficient quantity by workshop batik workers. 
 
Most of the participants used a wage system called borongan (known as piece work), 
whereby workers are paid based on the number of pieces of cloth completed. The amount 
paid is also determined according to the level of difficulty of the different kinds of work, 
such as nglengkreng, nerusi, and nembok. The average payment for each piece of cloth 
                                                
40 Surat Ijin Usaha Perdagangan (SIUP) 
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completed at the time of the research in 2014 was IDR2,50041 for nerusi, IDR4,00042 for 
nembok and IDR 500043 for nglengkreng. Only two participants, Lie Sio Lan and Siem 
Djun Gwan, paid daily wages to the workers, ranging from IDR25,00044 to IDR50,00045 
per day. Daily wages were given to maintain the quality of the work and only applied to 
the kind of batik cloth known as alusan46 (an exclusive piece of cloth). Sometimes it took 
three to six months to complete a single piece of cloth. Chinese Indonesian owner-
managers employed specific workers, usually male, for the colouring process. However, 
due to a decline in demand nowadays, some participants used their female batik workers to 
do colouring to cut the cost. 
 
In their daily activities, Chinese Indonesian owner-managers directed their workers 
regarding patterns, showing which isen-isen (motif details) were to be drawn on the cloth 
and which part of the cloth was to be covered with wax. Participants who had a large 
number of workers tended to appoint one of the skilled workers who could be trusted to 
assist them in giving directions for colouring and in handling quality control. However, 
Chinese Indonesian owner-managers always prepared the colouring formula themselves, 
because they felt that this must be kept in strict confidence. They only hand over the 
composition of the formula to their own descendants whom they trust. Having a blood 
relationship does not necessarily ensure access to information about the colouring formula.   
One of the participants, Lie Sio Lan, said that in the past her mother refused to tell her 
anything about the colouring formula she was then using, and she was often not allowed to 
witness the colouring process. This became one of her first constraints when she took over the 
business after her mother died. Luckily, Lie Sio Lan found the notebook her mother used, so 
she was able to find out what materials were mixed for colouring.  
 
Tjiang Sian Me was aware of the importance of keeping the colouring formula secret. She 
placed each ingredient in separate, small plastic bags. Each was weighed just before the 
colouring process and shaken together in one plastic bag. Only then was the mixture given to 
the workers. In addition, Liang Tio San added that one of the key successes in running his 
batik business was his secret colouring formula. 
                                                
41 It is equivalent to £0.129 with exchange rate £1 equal to IDR19,370 in 2014 
(source:http://www.bps.go.id/LinkTableDinamis/view/id/952) 
42 It is equivalent to £0.206 with exchange rate £1 equal to IDR19,370 in 2014 
(source:http://www.bps.go.id/LinkTableDinamis/view/id/952) 
43 It is equivalent to £0.258 with exchange rate £1 equal to IDR19,370 in 2014 
(source:http://www.bps.go.id/LinkTableDinamis/view/id/952) 
44 It is equivalent to £1.290 with exchange rate £1 equal to IDR19,370 in 2014 
(source:http://www.bps.go.id/LinkTableDinamis/view/id/952) 
45 It is equivalent to £2.581 with exchange rate £1 equal to IDR19,370 in 2014 
(source:http://www.bps.go.id/LinkTableDinamis/view/id/952) 
46The term alusan is used for batik cloth with exclusive patterns and high quality drawings. 
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This indicates that Chinese Indonesian owner-managers are aware of the importance of 
keeping the colouring formula secret for the sake of their business.  
 
Chinese Indonesian batik owner-managers generally used naphthol (a chemical dye 
substance) for colouring. This colouring method has been passed down through the 
generations. Only three participants later adopted another colouring technique, namely, 
indigosol (another chemical dye substance). The difference between these two substances 
is in the dying process and the outcome of colours. Unlike the napthol products, the 
indigosol products need to dry under the sun to bring out the colour. In addition, the 
indigosol colours are brighter than the napthol colours. The indigosol method was learnt by 
a few ethnic Chinese owner-managers through a training course in Bandung in 2015, 
which was conducted by the Ministry of Cooperation and Small Medium Enterprises 
through the government of Rembang Regency. The training was conducted by a batik-
producing expert who was invited from the Pekalongan batik industrial centre. Since then 
Liang Tio San, Siem Djun Gwan and Wen Soen Lie, while still using naphthol, have also 
used indigosol to enrich the colour variation of their batik products. Several light colours, 
such as pink, pale yellow, pale green and pale blue, can only be produced by using 
indigosol. Indigosol enriched shades of colour have become one of the characteristics of 
contemporary Lasem batik, while naphthol colouring remains a main feature of classical 
Lasem batik. Several participants who did not adopt the indigosol technique said that they 
had not attended the training, and therefore did not know how to do colouring with 
indigosol. Only Lie Sio Lan who did attend the training, did not adopt indigosol colouring 
because she wanted to keep her focus on producing classical batik. 
 
All Chinese Indonesian owner-managers sold hand-drawn batik products in the form of 
long batik cloth. Only two owner-managers, Liang Tio San and Siem Djun Gwan, also sold 
ready-to-wear batik clothes. They undertook product diversification when they noticed the 
market potential of ready-to-wear clothing products such as dresses and shirts. They 
acknowledged that some customers do not buy batik cloth, as they do not have good 
dressmakers or tailors. Despite the sale opportunities for ready-to-wear clothing, most 
Chinese Indonesian owner-managers have chosen not to take this opportunity. Because 
consumers have varied sizes of clothes and different tastes, there is greater risk that 
garment would remain unsold. Thus, with the cost of hand-drawn batik clothes and the 
additional cost of sewing the ready-to-wear clothing, the risk of loss would be greater. 
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Ethnic Chinese batik products are distinguished as either classical batik or contemporary 
batik. Contemporary batik does not follow standard rules or an existing pattern, and is 
usually made following a current trend. Nearly all Chinese Indonesian batik owner-
managers make classical batik, preserving what their predecessors have done, such as 
colouring with the naphthol method and using traditional motifs and designs. In the course 
of time, however, Liang Tio San chose to make contemporary batik, which he thought was 
more colourful. Huang Tjaw Hien also introduced contemporary batik by producing batik 
with Chinese proverbs and with Lasem’s motifs used as the background. 
 
There is a shared consensus between ethnic Chinese and Javanese owner-managers for 
categorizing their target market for their product from low, middle to upper class product 
based on the price. Low class product is the cheapest batik tulis product, middle class 
product has modest price and upper class product has the highest price. Usually, the price 
is also representing the quality of the product; the higher of the quality means the higher of 
the product price. However, the price range of product categorization is different for each 
ethnic group. Javanese product categorization will be explained further in chapter 6.  
 
The price for low class ethnic Chinese batik product is around IDR 120,000-IDR 
250,00047, while the price of middle class product is around IDR 500,000-IDR 
1,800,00048, and the price of higher class product is around IDR 1,800,000-IDR 
13,000,00049 (see table 5.2). Most Chinese Indonesian owner-managers sell the low-to-
middle class product category. 
 
Only Lie Sio Lan specifically caters for middle-to-upper class products. This higher end 
market includes batik lovers, functionaries and batik collectors. She uses patterns and 
motif designs created and developed by her mother, since her mother’s batik is well known 
as an exclusive, classical, Lasem batik. Lie Sio Lan takes orders for classical batik 
products50. Only Siem Djun Gwan sells all product categories, ranging from the lower to 
the upper product class. He attempts to get more customers by widening the target market.  
 
 
                                                
47 Around £6.19 - £ 12.90 based on the exchange rate £1 equivalent to IDR19, 370 in 2014 (Source: 
http://www.bps.go.id/LinkTableDinamis/view/id/952) 
48 Around £25.81-£92.93 based on the exchange rate £1 equivalent to IDR19, 370 in 2014 (Source: 
http://www.bps.go.id/LinkTableDinamis/view/id/952) 
49 Around £92.93-£671.14 based on the exchange rate £1 equivalent to IDR19, 370 in 2014 (Source: 
http://www.bps.go.id/LinkTableDinamis/view/id/952) 









Retailer Wholesaler Product 
Categorization 
Price of one hand 
made batik cloth 
(in IDR) 
Price of one hand 










£12.90 - £25.81 
Wen 
Soen Lie  




£6.45 - £51.62 
Tjiang 
Sian Me 




£12.90 - £38.72 
Liang 
Tio San 




£6.19 - £38.72 
RDI √ √ Low Class  250,000 £12.90 
Lie Sio 
Lan 
√ √ Middle -Upper 
Class 
1,800,000 –  
13,000,000 




√ √ Low-Middle 
Class 
 150,000 –  
3,000,000 




√ √ All Classes 
(low, middle, 
upper) 




Table above shows that the prices set by Chinese Indonesian batik owner-managers ranged 
from IDR 120,00052 to IDR13,000,00053; however, they were normally willing to give a 
discount when people bought in large quantities. Below is how Liang Tio San negotiated 
the price with a government official who was going to bring 25 guests from the Agrarian 
Office of Central Jawa Province:  
“... well madam, choose the ones you want, just look around first. Here we set a wholesale 
price. When you choose that item (pointing to the stack of batik clothes), that costs 
                                                
51 Based on the exchange rate £1 equivalent to IDR19, 370 in 2014 (Source: 
http://www.bps.go.id/LinkTableDinamis/view/id/952) 
52 It is equivalent to £6.195 with exchange rate £1 equal to IDR19,370 in 2014 
(source:http://www.bps.go.id/LinkTableDinamis/view/id/952) 
53 It is equivalent to £671.14 with exchange rate £1 equal to IDR19,370 in 2014 
(source:http://www.bps.go.id/LinkTableDinamis/view/id/952) 
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IDR120,00054, I will give you best price, you only have to pay IDR100,00055. This costs 
IDR500,00056 and you only have to pay IDR350,00057. Just choose which ones do you want, 
and we will give you discount for sure .... Well then, I’ll give you the exact price. Those 
clothes pile costing IDR160,00058 you only have to pay at IDR120,00059. Those costing 
IDR130,00060 you can get only IDR100,00061.” 
 
Liang Tio San often received visits from government officials who usually brought in a 
large number of visitors. Liang Tio San commonly negotiated the price in advance with the 
person who brought the guests before the actual visitors came. It was common for this 
person to act as an intermediary because the guests were usually from other cities and 
looking for a special Lasem souvenir to take home. Lasem batik is usually bought as a gift 
or as a souvenir, especially for official government  guests who visit the local government. 
Normally, the institution has a budget for purchasing souvenirs for guests; however, if the 
budget is limited or there is no budget, the guests visit the batik firm and buy with their 
own money. Therefore, Liang Tio San prepares for the government’s guests by having a 
large stock of batik clothes to offer customers a range of options.  
 
To determine the price, the Chinese Indonesian owner-managers apply certain criteria, 
since, in their opinion, batik is a work of art. The price is dependent on the quality of the 
batik cloth and the appeal of the design. Wen Soen Lie said, 
“Price is a matter of taste. When it is considered good, the price will be high. Otherwise it 
will be cheap.”  
Evidence that batik is a work of art with no fixed price range is evident from the case of a 
collector who bargained fantastic price of IDR200,000,00062 for a piece of classical batik 
cloth produced by Merah Delima,  during an exhibition in Jakarta in 2010. . Lie Sio Lan, 
                                                
54 It is equivalent to £6.19 with exchange rate £1 equal to IDR19,370 in 2014 (Source: 
http://www.bps.go.id/LinkTableDinamis/view/id/952) 
55 It is equivalent to £5.16 with exchange rate £1 equal to IDR19,370 in 2014 (Source: 
http://www.bps.go.id/LinkTableDinamis/view/id/952) 
56 It is equivalent to £25.81 with exchange rate £1 equal to IDR19,370 in 2014 (Source: 
http://www.bps.go.id/LinkTableDinamis/view/id/952) 
57 It is equivalent to £18.07 with exchange rate £1 equal to IDR19,370 in 2014 (Source: 
http://www.bps.go.id/LinkTableDinamis/view/id/952) 
58 It is equivalent to £8.26 with exchange rate £1 equal to IDR19,370 in 2014 (Source: 
http://www.bps.go.id/LinkTableDinamis/view/id/952) 
59 It is equivalent to £6.19 with exchange rate £1 equal to IDR19,370 in 2014 (Source: 
http://www.bps.go.id/LinkTableDinamis/view/id/952) 
60 It is equivalent to £6.71 with exchange rate £1 equal to IDR19,370 in 2014 (Source: 
http://www.bps.go.id/LinkTableDinamis/view/id/952) 
61 It is equivalent to £5.16 with exchange rate £1 equal to IDR19,370 in 2014 (Source: 
http://www.bps.go.id/LinkTableDinamis/view/id/952) 
62It is equivalent to £14,394.70 with exchange rate £1 equal to IDR13,894 in 2010 (Source: 
http://www.bps.go.id/LinkTableDinamis/view/id/952)  
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however, chose not to sell it, and still had it in 2014 because this was made when her 
mother was still alive.  
 
In fact, the Chinese Indonesian owner-managers are very flexible in deciding the price. 
They could offer  the same cloth for a different price, depending on where the cloth is 
sold, who the buyers are, and the level of demand. For instance, they usually lower the 
price in the last days of an exhibition; they set a higher price for the functionaries who buy 
batik clothes; they lower the price when the market is flagging. However, production costs 
have a strong impact when deciding the price. 
 
The ethnic Chinese batik owner-managers, as mentioned in the previous chapter, are 
concentrated in the Chinatown area located at Lasem’s city centre, comprising Sumber 
Girang, Babagan, Karangturi and Gedong Mulyo. On average, Chinese Indonesian owner-
managers live in old Chinese houses inherited from their predecessors, the architecture of 
which is a mixture of Chinese, Dutch East Indies and Javanese styles, with high walls 
complete with double layered main gates. Customers who came had to press the doorbell 
first, since the outer door of the house was always closed. They usually do not know when 
their houses were built, but they have been in the family for many generations and they 
continue to preserve them in order to pass them on to the next generation. Only three 
Chinese Indonesian owner-managers did not live in old Chinese houses. 
 
The ethnic Chinese owner-managers’ houses also determine the way they conduct 
business. Chinese Indonesian owner-managers who lived in old Chinese houses did not 
have separate batik showrooms. They used the central living room, which looked like a 
large open structure in front of the house, as the place for welcoming and engaging with 
customers. The workshop was located in the back part of the house surrounding the main 
building, and was equipped with a well used in the colouring process. Their stock of batik 
cloth was kept in cupboards, usually in the back part of the main house. They would bring 
the stock out to the living room and spread the pieces of batik cloth on the table when 
prospective customers came to the house. Several participants still maintained this practice 
in 2014. Only Huang Tjaw Hien owned a gawangan63 (hanging rack) that he used as a 
showcase, placed near the stock cupboard in the back part of the main building of the 
house. He would then invite his guests to go straight to the production area at the back part 
of his house if they wanted to choose any batik clothes and see the production process. He 
said that he started doing this after he received many visitors, ranging from the media, 
                                                
63A wooden piece of equipment used to hold batik cloth. 
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government officials, researchers to tourists, who wanted to see the batik production 
process and the beautiful construction of his old Chinese house while buying his batik 
cloth for souvenirs. 
 
The Chinese Indonesian owner-managers who did not live in old Chinese houses, such as 
Siem Djun Gwan, Liang Tio San and Wen Soen Lie, had renovated their houses by 
building showrooms in the front part of their houses. They said that the showroom was 
used to receive prospective customers and display their batik cloth. Their showrooms 
looked modern and were equipped with showcases. In front of her house, Wen Soen Lie 
built a shop measuring approximately 5 metres x3 metres with an iron roller door, a style 
common for shops in Indonesia. Siem Djun Gwan even air-conditioned his showroom, and 
installed a carpet for his prospective customers who preferred to sit on the floor. According 
to him, customers felt more comfortable when selecting batik cloth if they were free from 
the heat, because it could take some time to choose batik cloth. Prospective customers first 
opened the batik folds one by one, and then spread each to see whether the pattern and 
colour suited their taste. 
 
The target market for ethnic Chinese batik owner-managers are batik lovers. With the 
Lasem batik market spreading, it no longer merely targets ethnic Chinese customers. 
Owner-managers market to Jakarta, Surabaya, Serang, Banten and Medan, based on the 
opportunity to participate in exhibitions and maintain their predecessors’ resellers. Most 
Chinese Indonesian owner-managers made Jakarta their main target, since that 
community’s interest in batik, particularly Lasem batik, is quite substantial. The 
exhibitions in Jakarta usually attract many visitors, coupled with high purchasing power. 
Lie Sio Lan stated that she once had a turnover of IDR450 million64 from a five-days’ 
exhibition in Jakarta in 2010. In addition, Liang Tio San said that most of the turnover of 
his batik sales came from the exhibition in Jakarta. 
“When joining an exhibition in Jakarta in 2010, it is promising. Usually when I bring 20 
sacks, only 7 remain…… One sack contains 80 pieces. Sometimes even before entering the 
exhibition, I can get as much as IDR100 million65.” 
 
The Lasem batik-marketing region is now narrower than it was in its golden age during the 
Dutch occupation. It once extended to areas outside Java, such as Sumatra, Bali and 
                                                
64 It is equivalent to £32,388.08 with exchange rate £1 equal to IDR13,894 in 2010 (Source: 
http://www.bps.go.id/LinkTableDinamis/view/id/952) 
65 It is equivalent to £7,197.35 with exchange rate £1 equal to IDR13,894 in 2010 (Source: 
http://www.bps.go.id/LinkTableDinamis/view/id/952) 
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Gorontalo (Sulawesi Island), and batik was exported overseas to countries such as 
Malaysia, Singapore and Suriname. Nowadays, Lasem batik owner-managers do not 
export their product directly overseas because batik products are not as popular as they 
once were, as experienced by Lie Sio Lan’s mother. Lie Sio Lan said that her mother once 
joined an exhibition in Dubai, but nobody bought her product because the local community 
was not interested in batik cloth. She did not expect this to happen because her product was 
favoured in the domestic market. Moreover, joining the exhibition was very expensive and, 
although the stand was free, Lie Sio Lan’s mother still had to pay high expenses for 
accommodation and transportation. Since then, Lie Sio Lan’s mother has been unwilling to 
join any overseas exhibitions. Based on her mother’s experience, Lie Sio Lan does not 
intend to export her products. In her opinion, unlike other kinds of textile, only certain 
communities appreciate batik. Therefore, understanding a local community where the 
exhibition is conducted is important before deciding to join the exhibitions. Liang Tio San 
was also unsure of how batik would be accepted in a foreign market, saying: 
“…. Well, of course it’s difficult to sell. People buy batik here in Indonesia, because we are 
proud to wear it as part of our culture. Foreigners’ tastes are difficult to predict and various. 
Moreover, batik has colourful and rich patterns and not everybody likes it. But, if for 
souvenirs, it’s possible. People will buy, as souvenir.” 
This suggests that batik as a fashion product is highly dependent on the taste of the wearer 
and serves as an expression of a person’s identity, thus the batik market nowadays is 
strongly localized. 
 
Batik owner-managers marketed the products through direct selling to buyers and to 
intermediaries such as traders, middlemen and competitors. Traders bought products 
continuously and resold them. They often used a fixed purchase system whereby they 
obtained special prices for resale, and the goods or items could not be returned or 
exchanged. Some other trading systems used by the batik owner-managers include a 
consignment system, where goods were given to the seller but payment was not made until 
they had been sold; and a credit system, in which payment was made within a one to two-
month period. An important consideration in using this system was the trader’s good 
rapport. Another option was working with middlemen, such as guides and travel agents, 
who worked solely to bring in prospective buyers. According to Liang Tio San, some 
people act as ad hoc middlemen, bringing him colleagues or business contacts that are 
visiting Lasem and want to buy a special Lasem souvenir. Liang Tio San said that he gives 
a commission to these middlemen, the amount of which depends on how much was bought 
by his or her guests. 
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In marketing batik products, ethnic Chinese owner-managers use Black Berry Messenger 
(BBM) to communicate with buyers. As reported by Lie Sio Lan: 
“Initially, I used a mobile phone in making contact with buyers. I would send pictures 
through multi-Media Messaging Service (MMS). Then, many of my customers asked me to 
buy a Black Berry to be able to have contact through BBM. It is cheaper than using MMS, 
because buyers usually asks for more than one picture. So they persuaded me to buy Black 
Berry which I bought in 2011. Many exhibition visitors added me in their contact list. They 
ask for pictures of batik cloth and pick the ones they like. Then they send me money and I 
send them the cloth by expedition. Just as simple as that. So I distribute pictures when I have 
a new collection using BBM.” 
 
Since 2011, Liang Tio San and Siem Djun Gwan have shared this experience. Only the 
young generation use BBM to communicate with buyers. BBM was found helpful as the 
communication tool that allowed them send pictures on a low budget.  They stated the 
BBM number on their name card and distributed it widely at each exhibition where they 
participated. However, only Lie Sio Lan is relatively active with her BBM by publishing 
pictures when she has a new collection, since she sells an exclusive batik for medium-high 
class customers. The other Chinese Indonesian owner-managers tend to use BBM only to 
communicate with their buyers. They are not actively selling the product through BBM, 
since they have lots of stock and it is time consuming for them to take pictures of all their 
stock, managing the stock ready for sale and making transactions through BBM. The 
reason is they have many pieces of cloth and some cloth might have been bought by other 
customers who came to their houses. Since each piece of cloth is special, they do not have 
a copy.  
 
The marketing strategy of ethnic Chinese batik owner-managers, especially the younger 
generation, relied heavily on exhibitions in big cities. They actively attended exhibitions, 
particularly batik exhibitions. Through exhibitions they contacted many buyers and 
attracted potential new ones.  However, the older generation still relied on intermediaries 
to market their product. Almost all the older generation, including Huang Tjaw Hien and 
Tjiang Sian Me, felt they were no longer able to join exhibitions outside town due to 
physical constraints. Moreover, they worried that the profit would not cover all the costs of 
the exhibition. However, the older generation was helped by competitors in selling their 
batik clothes at the exhibition. For instance, Tjiang Sian Me said that Liang Tio San helped 
to market her batik product through exhibitions by bringing Tjiang Sian Me’s classical 
 99 
batik products for display in the exhibitions, because Liang Tio San does not produce 
classical batik himself, meanwhile some exhibition visitors asked him for classical batik 
clothes.  This arrangement suited Tjiang Sian Me because she was happy she did not need 
to go to the exhibition to sell her products. Liang Tio San sold Tjiang Sian Me’s products 
on consignment whereby the payment was made only after the clothes were sold. Liang 
Tio San was free to set the selling price of Tjiang Sian Me’s batik products at the 
exhibitions. Tjiang Sian Me applied this strategy to survive in a tight market. It also 
overcame her physical mobility constraints to participate at the exhibition. This strategy is 
only employed by the older generation. The younger generation of ethnic Chinese owner-
managers do not cooperate in this way with other younger generation ethnic Chinese 
owner-managers in marketing the products. Neither does this marketing strategy apply 
between different ethnic backgrounds. 
 
5.3 Tangible and Intangible Business Inheritance 
This section discusses the sustainability of business at the micro level by looking at the 
crucial aspect of business assets inheritance in ensuring business sustainability.  Interviews 
with ethnic Chinese batik owner-managers showed that the tangible, as well as intangible, 
assets of their businesses had typically been inherited from one generation to another. The 
intangible assets are in the form of business skills, including knowledge of production and 
colouring techniques including the colouring formula, business management, managing 
batik workers, financial management, the network with resellers and suppliers. 
Importantly, they also inherited their predecessor’s business reputation in the batik 
business. This is illustrated in the case of Hijau Daun batik, which was run by Liem Lie 
Tiaw who belongs to the fifth generation. 
Liem Lie Tiaw belongs to the fifth generation of the Huang’s batik family. He learnt the 
business from his predecessors, who have passed away. His grandfather, Huang Tek Khoen, 
told him that he inherited the business from his great grandfather. Liem Lie Tiaw heard from 
his predecessors and the community that in the past his great grandfather, Huang Tjien Tie, 
was a very big batik producer in Lasem. During the golden age of Lasem batik (around the 
19th century), Huang Tjien Tie’s batik market extended to foreign countries, such as 
Singapore and Malaysia. Unfortunately, Huang Tjien Tie’s business was closed down in 
1942 when the Japanese occupied Indonesia. Huang Tjien Tie had seven children, two of 
whom were Huang Tek Khoen, Liem Lie Tiaw’s grandfather, and Huang Tjaw Hien, who 
still runs his own business today; Huang Tek Khoen gave his business his own name. Huang 
Tek Khoen’s batik business was smaller than Huang Tjien Tie’s. Liem Lie Tiaw was not 
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certain when Huang Tek Khoen started his batik business. He only knew that his grandfather 
employed a large number of workers. Nearly all the female residents of Jeruk village 
became his grandfather’s batik workers. Huang Tek Khoen’s house was very big, with about 
1.8 hectares used for the house and batik production which showed the extent of Huang Tek 
Khoen’s batik firm at that time. While Huang Tek Khoen’s batik business was in its golden 
age, it was able to produce 100 pieces of cloth every month and employed 425 workers. The 
products were exported to Singapore, Japan and the United States of America through an 
intermediary in Cirebon. On his death in 1973, the property was bequeathed to two of his 
children. Liem Lie Tiaw’s mother, Huang Tek Lien, inherited half, and Huang Tek Lien’s 
older sibling inherited the other half. It was Huang Tek Lien who continued Huang Tek 
Khoen’s batik business. With the change of ownership, the name was changed to Hijau 
Daun, because the government prohibited the use of Chinese names under the assimilation 
policy66 at that time.  
 
Almost all the ethnic Chinese batik owner-managers inherited intangible assets from their 
parents with the exception of Wen Soen Lie, whose parents dealt with sundries rather than 
batik. Even though her parents were not batik owner-managers, her business was 
increasing. She was already familiar with all business activity, such as marketing, financial 
management and managing workers. Furthermore, Wen Soen Lie had the opportunity to 
learn batik when she was living with her cousin who ran a batik business. Seeing her 
cousin’s success, Wen Soen Lie was inspired to learn more and started her own batik 
business. 
 
The majority of Chinese Indonesian batik owner-managers were brought up in batik-
producing families, and spontaneously acquired knowledge about batik from their family 
elders. 
As Tjiang Sian Me related: 
“In the past, when my mother was making batik, I often watched her. I ask things like what 
colour will you give to this cloth, mom? So, it is how she taught me at that time. Later on, 
my mother said that her batik firm one day would be mine. She asked me to carry it on.” 
 
The ethnic Chinese batik owner-managers learned by watching, listening and discussing 
while living in the family. Therefore, an ethnic Chinese batik producer’s house became a 
business incubator for the next generation. Liang Tio San recalled this when reminiscing 
about his childhood, when he often disturbed his mother’s batik workers. It was from there 
that he started to understand how a piece of batik cloth was produced. 
                                                
66 around 1967 
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“Well…. I was a naughty boy… at home I took part in colouring … 
I seldom playing outside. I just stayed at home …. I saw batik workers doing their jobs. 
Colouring…. drawing on batik cloth … I often disturbed them ….” 
 
Batik workers also became a source of knowledge about patterns that were frequently 
made. Lie Sio Lan admitted that she learnt a lot of patterns from her batik workers, who 
had often been directed by her mother when she was still alive. The batik workers 
themselves had already learnt the typical Lasem batik patterns which often served as the 
background of batik cloth, for example latohan (sea grass motif), kricak (small stone), 
sekar jagat (world of flower), and watu pecah (broken stone), as most of them were 
descendants of batik artisans and had acquired knowledge from the previous generations. 
 
Tangible assets that were inherited included land, buildings, equipment, and raw materials; 
often employees were also bequeathed from generation to generation. Batik workers 
usually preferred to stay when they were comfortable in their working environment. The 
provision of business inheritance normally only happened when parents were old, no 
longer in good physical condition or sick. 
 
The process of determining who would continue the family business began when parents 
aged and physical constraints meant they required their children’s assistance. Ethnic 
Chinese batik owner-managers want to keep their business going, especially when business 
is prospering. Tjiang Sian Me, for example, asked her youngest son, who was considered 
the least successful of the siblings, to continue her business. Conversely, when a Lasem 
batik business is not prospering, parents tend to let their children look for better 
opportunities in big cities.  
 
As Indonesians of Chinese descent, the Chinese Indonesian batik owner-managers in 
Lasem generally followed the patriarchal Chinese tradition, where the family structure was 
based on patrilineal descent, and the power and authority were in the hands of a man. 
Confucian teachings ascribe the power in the family to the father, and the children are 
obliged to be devoted to their parents. These teachings were dominant in an ethnic Chinese 
batik producer’s life in Lasem, although they could be flexible in practice when 
circumstances changed. The business was normally bequeathed to the oldest child or sons. 
Siem Djun Gwan’s parents gave legacies only to their two sons; their daughter did not 
receive anything because she lived with her husband on another island. Siem Djun Gwan 
explained that his grandfather, Kho Tjoe Yap, bequeathed his batik business to his only 
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son, Kho Tjoe Liong, not to her mother Kho Lan Me. Kho Lan Me decided to start her own 
business.  
 
Business successors were first chosen from nuclear family members, but when no one was 
willing to take this responsibility, then this offer was made to extended family members. 
This happened when a first-line successor had better opportunity than continuing his or her 
parents’ batik firm. This was the case with Liem Lie Tiaw, who was initially unwilling to 
take over the business because he already had a good job in Surabaya. Liem Lie Tiaw’s 
older sister also declined, thus his father chose one of Liem Lie Tiaw’s cousins as his 
successor. This indicates that changing situations and conditions encourage Chinese 
Indonesian batik owner-managers to become more flexible in the way they chose 
successors. Business sustainability was evidently more important than holding firmly to 
Chinese traditions. It shows that non-economic factors succeed in encouraging potential 
successors in taking over the firm; if continuing the family firm is perceived as a duty and 
that duty is not fulfilled it might lead to feeling guilty (Katila, 2002). 
 
Of all participants over seventy years old, only Huang Tjaw Hien still had problems in 
finding a successor. The potential successor reluctantly agreed to take over the batik family 
firm, because he already had a more lucrative opportunity in other cities. This becomes a 
serious threat to a batik firm’s sustainability. This was experienced by Huang Tjaw Hien.  
In 2012 he had initially persuaded his son Huang Tjaw Han to continue his batik firm. 
However, Huang Tjaw Han later decided to return to Bogor, because he was offered a 
promising job. With no successors willing to continue Bunga Megah batik, Huang Tjaw 
Hien’s wife decided to keep the batik firm running until she was no longer able to handle it. 
When this happens, and if nobody in the family is willing to continue the business, Bunga 
Megah batik will most likely close down. Huang Tjaw Hien feels desperate, because he had 
not found potential successors within his family who are willing to continue the business.  
In fact, the absence of a successor could potentially threaten the sustainability of the firm. 
The above situations show that specific conditions and situations such as desirability, 
traditions and a perception of the potential worth of the business among potential 
successors all can play a role in determining the success of succession (Getz and Petersen, 
2004). 
 
5.4 Family Life Disruption  
Disruption can arise from inside the family firm, since in a family firm, the business and 
the family are intertwined. This presents the micro level perspective in looking at 
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business sustainability, which sees internal disruption impacting on the business as well as 
family affairs. In a family firm, business life cannot be separated from family life; one is 
embedded in the other. 
 
Disruption in a family might impact on the business’s financial viability, for instance, 
when a family member is seriously ill. This was the experience of Liem Lie Tiaw’s family 
during a difficult time in their batik firm. 
The difficult time started in 1992 when Liem Lie Tiaw’s father was diagnosed as suffering 
from lung cancer. The family’s finances were concentrated on covering his medical costs, 
placing a critical strain on the Hijau Daun family firm. Along with Liem Lie Tiaw’s illness, 
several disadvantageous events occurred which impacted on the business. In 1998, the 
economic crisis caused the worst conditions for the Hijau Daun family firm. The Hijau Daun 
family firm was forced to temporarily stop operating. When demand for Lasem batik 
recovered in 2004, Hijau Daun started production again. However, Liem Lie Tiaw’s family 
faced another problem when his mother fell ill and died in October 2011. Not long 
afterwards, his father’s lung cancer became worse, and business profits were fully dedicated 
to his recovery. However, the business profit was still not enough, as medical costs over five 
months amounted to more than IDR100,000,00067. The family had to borrow money. Liem 
Lie Tiaw felt depressed thinking about the large costs that he had to cover; along with 
having to fulfil the wishes of his father and older sister, which was not in line with his desire 
to have a career in the big city as he had already. Initially he persisted in his stance not 
return home, until his father got very ill and his sister insisted him to continue the family 
firm, as he is the only son in the family. Liem Lie Tiaw could not refuse his sister’s request, 
which he highly respected after a series of contentious arguments. His father finally died in 
May 2012. Afterwards, Liem Lie Tiaw had problems repaying his family’s loan, and this 
took all the business profits. Things became worse when his older sister died one after 
another in January and June 2013. To cover the burial costs, Liem Lie Tiaw borrowed from 
his relatives and his former boss. To stabilize his business finances, Liem Lie Tiaw obtained 
Partnership and Environmental Care Programme aid of IDR25,000,00068 from Askes (Health 
Insurance) in 2013, using his motorbike as a guarantee. 
 
In general, illness of family members heavily drains family businesses financially. The 
lack of awareness in joining health insurance can take away funds from the business, as in 
the case above. Business profits originally allocated for production must be used to cover 
medical costs.  
                                                
67 It is equivalent to £7,158.70 with exchange rate £1 equal to IDR13,969 in 2011 (Source: 
http://www.bps.go.id/LinkTableDinamis/view/id/952) 




Furthermore, succession tension can also arise when the children have no intention to 
continue the family business. Interestingly enough, the pressure to continue the business 
can be a positive (business continuation as such) as well as negative factor in business 
sustainability. Ultimately, the pressure might have an impact on how he or she manages 
the business which can lead to low performance (due to low morale) and thus can also 
potentially threaten business sustainability. 
 
Accidents are other events that threaten family finances, particularly when serious injury 
results in high medical costs. Further, sudden death of family elders also threatens the 
sustainability of ethnic Chinese batik owner-managers’ businesses, especially if the 
successors have not yet learnt to manage the family business and are burdened with the 
responsibility for settling unpaid loans. Lie Sio Lan experienced a similar disruption in her 
family life. 
In 2000 Lie Sio Lan had an accident that put her in hospital for two months, with medical 
costs of IDR250,000,00069. The batik business at that time was slack, her mother had to look 
for loans for the medication and treatments. Fortunately, her uncle was willing to bear the 
costs and she did not have to return the money. The family’s financial position was very 
difficult at that time, since Indonesia was in the midst of the economic crisis. The batik 
business stalled and unsold stock was piling up. To survive, her mother borrowed money 
from her friends by pawning her batik products. The Merah Delima batik family firm was 
saved when, in 2005, the demand for classical batik started to rise again. The stockpiled 
supply sold out. Her mother was able to take advantage of the high demand for batik, since 
producing batik clothes was time consuming. Lie Sio Lan’s mother exploited the revitalized 
batik market by actively taking part in exhibitions in big cities, and formed batik cluster 
groups in 2004. The cluster members were village women who were interested in doing 
batik work. Some of them were newbies and the others were batik workers who had been 
laid off during the economic crisis around 1998. Lie Sio Lan’s mother took this action to 
bolster the decreasing number of batik workers, as skilled workers were becoming very 
difficult to find. Lie Sio Lan’s mother’s efforts were fruitful, as her product had become 
well known in Jakarta. She received orders from government officials, among them 
Purnomo Yusgiantoro, the Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources, who placed an order 
for around 300 clothing items. 
 
Lie Sio Lan’s hardest experience was when her mother suddenly died in March 2010 and 
she had to continue the Merah Delima batik firm. She had not had the opportunity to learn 
                                                
69 It is equivalent to £17,483.74 with exchange rate £1 equal to IDR14,299 in 2000 (Source: 
http://www.bps.go.id/LinkTableDinamis/view/id/952 
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batik business management directly from her mother before her mother’s death. The main 
constraints in taking over were not knowing the colouring formulas and the obligation to 
continue paying bank loans. She never joined her mother when she was colouring; but 
fortunately, her mother had recorded her colouring methods and materials in a notebook. It 
was like a recipe book. She was lucky to find that book. Her mother was doing colouring the 
day before she died and her notebook was left on the table when she was taken to the 
hospital. Her mother usually kept that book secretly. Lie Sio Lan learnt the colouring 
formula from her mother’s notebook. All that was left to her was about IDR6,000,00070, 
some raw materials, and some batik cloth ready to be coloured and several batik clothing 
items ready to be sold. Her mother had been preparing batik cloth for an exhibition to be 
held in Jakarta before her death. Her mother’s sudden death was the most difficult time for 
Lie Sio Lan. She was relying on her mom financially and lived with her mom. Lie Sio Lan 
faced further economic hardship. Her stepfather did not want to pay the bank loans since he 
felt that Lio Sio Lan was responsible for the loans because the Merah Delima batik firm was 
taken over by her. Therefore, she had to find IDR3,800,00071 every month to pay the bank 
loan. Fortunately, at the exhibition in Jakarta, Lie Sio Lan made an extraordinary sales 
amount of IDR450,000,00072, thus the bank loan of IDR200,000,00073 could be paid in full.  
 
This demonstrates that the family’s financial condition affects their business operations. 
Similarly, business sustainability provides the family’s finances; thus, the family’s 
financial position and family affairs are interrelated and inseparable. A sudden death also 
creates tension family firm succession due to not having decided yet who will take over the 
business; since no preparations have been taken or made in choosing the successor, 
succession occurs by default. 
 
Another event that impacts on the family and firm financially is the need for education 
funding. This occurs when the ethnic Chinese owner-managers send their children away to 
universities in other cities. There is a trend in the ethnic Chinese community in Lasem to 
provide a good education for their children by sending them to universities in big cities like 
Semarang, Jakarta and Surabaya. This necessity arose when the children graduated from 
senior high school, because there is no higher education institution in Lasem, particularly 
at university level. It indicates that Chinese Indonesian owner-managers are aware of the 
                                                
70 It is equivalent to £431.84 with exchange rate £1 equal to IDR13,894 in 2010 (Source: 
http://www.bps.go.id/LinkTableDinamis/view/id/952 
71 It is equivalent to £273.50 with exchange rate £1 equal to IDR13,894 in 2010 (Source: 
http://www.bps.go.id/LinkTableDinamis/view/id/952 
72 It is equivalent to £32,388.08 with exchange rate £1 equal to IDR13,894 in 2010 (Source: 
http://www.bps.go.id/LinkTableDinamis/view/id/95231,470.73 
73 It is equivalent to £ 14,394.70 with exchange rate £1 equal to IDR13,894 in 2010 (Source: 
http://www.bps.go.id/LinkTableDinamis/view/id/95231,470.73 
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importance of education for their children. As well, it generates prestige if they are able to 
send them outside the city for their education. However, the choice of the university 
depends of their financial ability. Chinese Indonesian families usually choose a university 
in Surabaya or Jakarta as they consider that a metropolitan city would provide better 
education and more opportunities for their children’s future. When this is not possible, they 
choose a less expensive university in other cities.  
Tjiang Sian Me experienced difficulty when three of her sons went to university in 
Yogyakarta and Semarang. Her children’s education expenditure drained the family 
finances. She reduced her ready-to-sell inventory of batik clothes, because she needed the 
firm’s money to pay her sons’ education expenses. This occurred at the same time as 
reduced demand for batik during the post-economic crisis around 1998-2005. By 2005, her 
business was in severe financial hardship. Then she received monthly financial support 
from her eldest son who had graduated and was earning money. Later, her business began 
to grow and she used her son’s money to expand the business by increasing production 
until she no longer needed her children’s financial support. She was able to pay for her 
children’s weddings: oldest son in 2008, middle son in 2010 and youngest son in 2012, 
because demand for her batik was growing.  
 
This demonstrates that the business supports the family’s financial need, and vice versa, 
because ethnic Chinese owner-managers integrate family money and business money. It 
also demonstrates that disruptions in the family impact on family sustainability and 
appropriate responses are needed to keep the family business running.  
 
Chinese Indonesian batik owner-managers commonly include family members in their 
business. This sometimes causes tension in the workplace, which leads to family conflict. 
This was the case with Liang Tio San, who included his youngest brother Liang Lay Hien 
and his wife Lu Soen Tjen in the management of the Gaman Jaya batik firm. A quarrel 
arose because Liang Lay Hien wanted Liang Tio San to share income rather than pay him a 
salary. He felt that a salary alone was not fair because Liang Lay Hien and Lu Soen Tjen 
shared management responsibility with Liang Tio San. Liang Tio San, however, he felt 
that the salary was sufficient. He refused to share business profits with his brother. Liang 
Lay Hien and his wife finally decided to leave the Gaman batik firm in 2013. Liang Tio 
San admitted that he found it difficult to manage his growing business by himself after his 
younger brother and sister-in law left. He needed a trust-worthy and reliable person to help 
him with daily activities and replacing his role if needed. The Gaman batik firm was the 
biggest batik business in Lasem during this research study. Liang Tio San was the only 
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batik producer in Lasem with workshops in four different locations: Sumber Girang, Karas 
Jajar, Ngropoh, and Karangturi villages. Therefore, he asked another brother to work with 
him, because Liang Tio San was the second child in a family of six. He felt he could trust 
family members more than anybody else. This business conflict then led to a family 
conflict. When Liang Tio San’s mother passed away, Liang Lay Hien did not come to his 
mother’s house for the funeral because Liang Tio San had shared the house with his 
mother while she was alive. It is evident that conflict in business has a detrimental effect 
on family relationships; family members’ involvement in business is likely to create 
tension in family life when disagreements occur in the firm. 
 
5.5 Changes of Fashion Trends 
At the meso level, changes in fashion trends (see chapter 4 for details) impact on the 
fluctuation in batik sales, which affects business sustainability. Ethnic Chinese Lasem 
batik owner-managers exploited this opportunity by increasing production and expanding 
their market throughout the Indonesian archipelago, Singapore and Malaysia. Huang Tjaw 
Hien said that his father, Huang Tjien Tie, exported his batik clothes overseas through a 
Dutch ship courier agent. Huang Tjien Tie was brave in taking the high risk in the hope of 
a substantial return by taking advantage of massive rising demand. Huang Tjien Tie 
communicated with overseas buyers only by letter. He would send the order first and then 
the buyers would send the payment via bank transfer after the buyers received the delivery. 
Trading this way was quite risky; but Huang Tjien Tie never experienced any deception 
and business relations were maintained based on trust. Response to the immense demand 
was achieved by adopting cap (stamp tool) as a new method in applying wax on the 
clothes besides canting (a pen-like tool).  
 
With the arrival of modern clothing styles, the fashion trend changed after 1940. This 
resulted in a decreasing demand for batik clothes. According to Tjiang Sian Me, her 
mother then decided to reduce production.  
 
Batik fashion became a trend again in the 1970s, batik is perceived as formal Indonesian 
cloth. The woman wore batik cloth together with kebaya as a lower garment and the man 
wore a batik shirt as a top. Although batik once again became a fashion trend, in Huang 
Tjaw Hien’s experienced the demand for his batik products was about the same as before. 
There was no obvious difference.  
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UNESCO announced that batik was Indonesia’s cultural heritage product in 2009 (Chong, 
2012). According to participants’ opinions, pride in wearing batik cloth, and the desire to 
preserve batik as an Indonesian cultural product, extended the use of batik to any occasion, 
not only for formal events. This boosted batik demand during that period. 
 
Most ethnic Chinese batik owner-managers said that Lasem batik was favoured and the 
most popular compared to batik made in other industrial batik centres in Indonesia. In fact, 
Lasem batik has many fans at the exhibitions, especially in Jakarta, and the owner-
managers achieved greater income from those events by selling many clothes.  Liang Tio 
San mentioned that, at one exhibition, he could sell 2,340 pieces of clothing on average. In 
2010, even before he entered the exhibition stall, Liang Tio San had sold 
IDR100,000,00074 worth of batik when he met buyers in the car park. This opportunity 
enabled him to successfully develop his business. He was able to buy some property for 
the family. Siem Djun Gwan added that around 2008–2010 became his golden era for his 
batik business. He seldom brought home any remaining clothes from exhibitions he took 
part in; nearly all had been sold. Lie Sio Lan had a similar experience. She sold as much as 
IDR450,000,00075 worth of batik at the 2010 Indonesia Fashion World exhibition in 
Jakarta. Also in the year 2010, Liem Lie Tiaw added that he managed to make 
IDR60,000,00076 and IDR70,000,00077 at each exhibition in Jakarta. Since then most 
Chinese Indonesian batik owner-managers, the young generation in particular, have been 
keen on joining exhibitions in Jakarta, such as the Gelar Batik Nusantara (Nusantara Batik 
Display) exhibition and Indonesia Fashion World exhibition because the Jakarta 
community has a strong interest in batik products. The exhibition arena became the right 
place for marketing Lasem batik products. Moreover, Liang Tio San and Siem Djun Gwan 
sold, not only batik in the form of cloth, but also in the form of ready-to-wear clothing.  
 
5.6 Technological Innovation 
At the meso level, innovations in textile-printing machine technology were felt to be a 
threat to the sustainability of Chinese Indonesian batik firms which sold the lower-middle 
class products. In 2012, textile-printing technology emerged that could make identical 
                                                
74 It is equivalent to £7,197.35 with exchange rate £1 equal to IDR13,894 in 2010 (Source: 
http://www.bps.go.id/LinkTableDinamis/view/id/95231,470.73 
75 It is equivalent to £32,388.08 with exchange rate £1 equal to IDR13,894 in 2010 (Source: 
http://www.bps.go.id/LinkTableDinamis/view/id/95231,470.73 
76 It is equivalent to £4,318.41 with exchange rate £1 equal to IDR13,894 in 2010 (Source: 
http://www.bps.go.id/LinkTableDinamis/view/id/95231,470.73 
77 It is equivalent to £5,038.14 with exchange rate £1 equal to IDR13,894 in 2010 (Source: 
http://www.bps.go.id/LinkTableDinamis/view/id/95231,470.73 
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copies of hand-drawn Lasem batik products, known as printed batik. Liang Tio San was 
affected when his batik product was copied using a textile-printing machine. Below is 
Liang Tio San’s experience when he discovered that a textile company in Jakarta, named 
Sumber Agung, had copied his hand-drawn product to produce a printed batik version.  
In 2013, unlike previous years, his business was slack. In his opinion this was caused by the 
large amount of printed batik in Jakarta, which was his main hand-drawn batik market. He 
investigated further, and made the discovery that Sumber Agung Company in Jakarta had 
used many of his hand-drawn batik patterns to make a printed version. He noticed the 
printed batik products which he saw in the exhibition by chance. Moreover, he also saw a 
duplicate printed batik product of his friend’s, Muchlis, a Javanese batik producer hand-
drawn motifs and patterns design being resold. Initially, Liang Tio San was shocked and 
matched his hand-drawn batik with that of the printed batik. The patterns and marks of the 
wax drops were faithfully duplicated, thus, people with no knowledge of batik quality would 
be deceived. When the hand-drawn and printed products were put side by side, they look 
identical. This very much disturbed him. The printed product was being sold for only 
IDR37,50078, whereas the lowest price of his genuine hand-drawn batik product was around 
IDR350,00079. Liang Tio San estimated that Sumber Agung had duplicated about 20 of his 
batik patterns, maybe more.  Therefore, he was annoyed, and wondered why the company 
did not create its own patterns. According to Liang Tio San, no other printing companies 
had been able to make identical copies. Later, he found that the company had the latest 
textile-printing machine that could exactly reproduce the genuine product using only 
photographs.  
 
Liang Tio San realized that what the company did was an act of piracy that should be 
brought to court. However, he decided not to report to the police because he thought the cost 
would not be worth taking action against a large company in the court. Whatever happened, 
he would be the loser. Liang Tio San did, however, report to the government through an 
officer of the Department of Industry. However, they could do nothing, because Liang Tio 
San had not patented his batik patterns. He himself was reluctant to apply for patents 
because of the high cost of patent fees. Besides, it would be difficult to obtain patents for his 
entire product range since he has many different patterns and motifs. It would be costly and 
almost impossible to have patents issued for all of them. According to Liang Tio San, none 
of his hand-drawn batik pieces was alike. 
 
                                                
78 It is equivalent to £0.536 with exchange rate £1 equal to IDR20,097 in 2013 (Source: 
http://www.bps.go.id/LinkTableDinamis/view/id/95231,470.73 




Liang Tio San’s experience demonstrated the threat that modern textile-printing 
technology posed to the sustainability of Lasem hand-drawn batik owner-managers. 
Furthermore, many consumers found it difficult to distinguish between the genuine hand-
drawn product and the printed one. The availability of printed batik impacted mainly on 
the batik business selling the lower-middle class products, where usually customers saw 
batik more for its function, unlike middle-upper class products that are sold for customers 
who saw batik as an art product. Consequently, this market preferred lower priced batik, 
without being concerned whether or not it was a genuine product. 
 
None of the Chinese Indonesian batik owner-managers was interested in adopting the 
printing technology. They continued producing hand-drawn batik, reasoning that hand-
drawn patterns were the main distinguishing characteristic of Lasem batik. Only one 
producer, Siem Djun Gwan, tried once to sell printed batik he ordered from a batik 
company in Pekalongan, but it did not prove saleable. Later, Sinar Megah batik also tried 
to sell printed batik at an exhibition, however, it was not saleable. Neither ordered printed 
batik  anymore. 
 
5.7 Competitive Environment 
At the meso level, changes in the competitive environment affect business sustainability. 
The owner-managers’ ability to manage the challenges caused by changes in the local 
opportunity structure determines the business’s ability to survive from time to time. The 
increasing demand for Lasem batik cloth made many people interested in opening a batik 
business. After 2005, a significant number of new owner-managers emerged. In 2006, 20 
Lasem batik owner-managers were registered in the batik cooperative, comprising 14 
Chinese Indonesian and 6 Javanese owner-managers.80 By 2014, the number of 
cooperative members had increased sharply to 70 people, comprising 56 Javanesse owner-
managers and 14 Chinese Indonesian owner-managers. Membership was not obligatory, 
thus there were other owner-managers who had not joined the batik cooperative. 
According to the participants, the increasing numbers of new batik owner-managers made 
competition among them very tight. 
 
The growing number of batik owner-managers in Lasem reduced the availability of good 
batik workers, and competition to recruit skilled workers was unavoidable. The increasing 
number of owner-managers was not matched by an increasing number of batik workers, 
                                                
80Source: outcome of research conducted by the Institute of Indonesian Pluralism, 2007 
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and all the participants felt this. Ethnic Chinese owner-managers adopted several strategies 
to attract and or keep their batik workers loyal. They competed by increasing wages so that 
their workers would not move to their competitors, and they treated their workers well to 
keep their loyalty. In 2010, Lie Sio Lan increased wages from IDR20,00081 to IDR55,00082 
per day; she gave them a bonus of IDR25,00083 for Saturday work and an additional bonus 
of IDR25,00084 if they did not take any day off during the week. Huang Tjaw Hien 
supplied a more varied menu for their lunch, because previously they were always given 
the same meal every day. Siem Djun Gwan gave his workers the opportunity to go on tour 
together at the end of the year, and provided a medical allowance for workshop workers. 
Liang Tio San was more aggressive in his attempt to secure workers.  
To secure the availability of workers, in 2011 Liang Tio San introduced an innovative loan 
scheme whereby his workers could borrow money without lodging a guarantee. Through 
him they could gain access to the BRI bank credit scheme, with Liang Tio San as the 
guarantor. To do this he lodged the deeds of his house as a guarantee against a loan totalling 
IDR900,000,00085. This was then divided among his 175 workers according to their ability 
to make repayments, in amounts which ranged from IDR2,000,00086 to IDR5,000,00087. 
Loans had to be settled within three years and the workers could only resign their jobs if 
they fully repaid their loan first. Liang Tio San realized that this practice was high risk. 
However, it works well to keep batik workers loyal. He could not do much if the worker 
defaulted on the loan. To minimize the risk, Liang Tio San gave loans cautiously and he 
formed his workers into groups and appointed one member of each as the head to take care 
of the instalments. He chose people who were respected by the rest of the group members as 
a group head. Thus, the group members might be encouraged to repay the loan on time. On 
the other hand, the heads have to make sure of the payment for each month. Informally, the 
head is responsible for the monthly payment of the loan to be repaid by all the group 
members. The instalments are different for each group. It highly depends on Liang Tio 
San’s level of trust and his agenda. For instance, there is a group of five persons, with IDR5 
million in loans for each person, at 0.5% interest per month over three years. Thus, the 
                                                
81 It is equivalent to £0.695 with exchange rate £1 equal to IDR13,894 in 2010 (Source: 
http://www.bps.go.id/LinkTableDinamis/view/id/95231,470.73 
82 It is equivalent to £3.958 with exchange rate £1 equal to IDR13,894 in 2010 (Source: 
http://www.bps.go.id/LinkTableDinamis/view/id/95231,470.73 
83 It is equivalent to £1.799 with exchange rate £1 equal to IDR13,894 in 2010 (Source: 
http://www.bps.go.id/LinkTableDinamis/view/id/95231,470.73 
84 ibid 
85 It is equivalent to £65,712.616 with exchange rate £1 equal to IDR13,696 in 2011 (Source: 
http://www.bps.go.id/LinkTableDinamis/view/id/95231,470.73 
86 It is equivalent to £146.028 with exchange rate £1 equal to IDR13,696 in 2011 (Source: 
http://www.bps.go.id/LinkTableDinamis/view/id/95231,470.73 
87 It is equivalent to £365.070 with exchange rate £1 equal to IDR13,696 in 2011 (Source: 
http://www.bps.go.id/LinkTableDinamis/view/id/95231,470.73 
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group head has to collect money from each member IDR819,440 each month and give the 
collected money to Liang Tio San. 
 
In 2008 he also bought land and built a workshop in Karas Jajar, a village where many of his 
workers were living. He took this initiative because Indriyati (a Javanese batik producer) 
constantly visited his workers, enticing them with the promise of higher wages. He 
appointed the village head of Karas Jajar as leader of his workshop. Several of his workers 
in Sumber Girang did not agree with this idea, because there was a big old tree believed to 
have supernatural qualities on the land. However, considering the proximity of the land to 
where his workers lived, Liang Tio San went ahead with his plan. Since then, the tree has 
become a tourist attraction. Many of the tourists who come to see it then come to look at 
Liang Tio San’s batik products. 
 
Liang Tio San invested the profits from batik sales in property; some of which were used as 
workshops. He also built a workshop in Ngropoh in cooperation with bank BRI, and it 
became a batik village for tourism destination around 2012. As in Karas Jajar, this workshop 
was located close to his workers’ domiciles. 
 
Liang Tio San succeeded in attracting enough workers to increase his production by 
providing soft loans and by building a workshop in his batik workers’ village. This had a 
negative impact on other batik owner-managers. Huang Tjaw Hien, among others, said that 
10 of his skilled workers left him to go to work with Liang Tio San. Many Chinese 
Indonesian owner-managers were unhappy with Liang Tio San’s manoeuvres to get 
workers, and conflict was inevitable. Lie Sio Lan was one of the unhappy owner-
managers. 
When Lie Sio Lan took over her mother’s business in 2010, competition was very tight. 
Owner-managers were struggling against one another to get workers. She had no choice but 
to increase wages, because there were competitors who paid high wages and enticed 
workers with the provision of working capital for their husbands by giving them soft loans. 
Consequently, to cover the high labour cost, Lie Sio Lan had to increase her selling price. 
One of her skilled workers left her to join Liang Tio San for the higher wages of 
IDR35,00088 per day offered by Liang Tio San. Lie Sio Lan, however, did not remain silent. 
She visited the worker and asked her to come back, offering her a higher wage than Liang 
Tio San’s offer, about IDR50,00089. Lie Sio Lan increased the wages by up to 40%, thinking 
                                                
88 It is equivalent to £2.519 with exchange rate £1 equal to IDR13,894 in 2010 (Source: 
http://www.bps.go.id/LinkTableDinamis/view/id/95231,470.73 
89 It is equivalent to £3.599 with exchange rate £1 equal to IDR13,894 in 2010 (Source: 
http://www.bps.go.id/LinkTableDinamis/view/id/95231,470.73 
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that Liang Tio San would not be able to match the increased wages since he sold lower-
middle class product. 
The tight competition made the batik owner-managers neglect business ethics, as 
experienced by Liem Lie Tiaw. 
Liem Lie Tiaw had an unpleasant experience when taking part in an exhibition in 2011. To 
reduce costs, he shared a stand with four fellow Lasem batik owner-managers. However, a 
problem arose when each was trying to give the most competitive price and win customers 
for themselves. According to Liem Lie Tiaw, prospective buyers would normally think that 
they belonged to a single batik firm, because they were in the same stand. Once Liem Lie 
Tiaw was annoyed when a prospective buyer was negotiating with him and his competitor 
with whom he was sharing the stand took his potential buyer. The buyer had offered 
IDR2,500,00090 for an item by Liem Lie Tiaw, when suddenly one of Liem Lie Tiaw’s 
competitor who was sharing the stand with him offered his batik at the much lower price of 
IDR300,00091 at the same time Liem Lie Tiaw was in conversation with the potential buyer. 
It meant Liem Lie Tiaw lost that potential buyer. This experience made Liem Lie Tiaw 
reluctant to share an exhibition stand again with competitors, since the same thing was likely 
to happen. 
 
The tight competition for buyers made a price war inevitable, and Liang Tio San reduced 
prices to attract more buyers. In 2005, during an exhibition in Jakarta, the Raja Tawon 
Lasem batik firm offered a hand-drawn product at IDR110,000 to the Domino Hudi batik 
firm (a wholesale batik firm from Solo). Liang Tio San, whose stand was located nearby, 
offered the Domino Hudi batik firm a batik product at the lower price of IDR75,000, and 
Liang Tio San offered a further discount of IDR53,000 if the Domino Hudi batik firm 
bought in large quantities. Thus, the Domino Hudi batik firm decided not to buy from the 
Raja Tawon batik family firm and ordered 400 pieces of batik clothing from Liang Tio 
San. The owner of the Raja Tawon batik family firm, who was also of Chinese descent, 
approached Liang Tio San and reprimanded him for destroying the price of hand-drawn 
batik by lowering the price. Liang Tio San argued that he employed this strategy to attract 
buyers. The Raja Tawon batik producer was angry with Liang Tio San. In fact, most of the 
participants were unhappy with the way Liang Tio San ran his firm: the way he obtained 
batik workers, and the way he approached potential buyers by lowering the price. His 
actions were considered destructive to Lasem’s traditional batik market. Some Chinese 
Indonesian batik owner-managers reacted to the conflict by bearing grudges against one 
                                                
90 It is equivalent to £143.174 with exchange rate £1 equal to IDR13,969 in 2010 (Source: 
http://www.bps.go.id/LinkTableDinamis/view/id/95231,470.73 
91 It is equivalent to £21.476 with exchange rate £1 equal to IDR13,969 in 2010 (Source: 
http://www.bps.go.id/LinkTableDinamis/view/id/95231,470.73 
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another, ranging from not speaking to refusing to be active in the Lasem batik 
cooperative’s activities, even though they were registered, because they did not like the 
chairman. 
 
The conflict was not only among ethnic Chinese but also with Javanese batik owner-
managers. It became worse after a number of former batik workers started to sell their own 
products. In the face of tighter competition, the participants tried to maintain the quality of 
their product through such things as the neatness of the paintings and the durability of batik 
colour even after repeated washings. 
 
In order to remain sustainable in tight competition, Huang Tjaw Hien undertook a product 
innovation. The openness of the Reform government towards ethnic Chinese culture, 
from1998 until today, encouraged him to create batik with Chinese proverbs using Chinese 
character patterns. He observed that Chinese Indonesian people were no longer shy to 
show their ethnic identity, instead, they were proud to show their ethnicity. He took this 
initiative in 2008 as a survival strategy, when he started to feel weighed down by 
competition from a growing number of younger owner-managers who were more mobile 
than he was. His new batik product design found acceptance in the market. Demand for his 
batik was rising, consequently, other batik owner-managers, like Liang Tio San and Rifai, 
tried to copy him by stamping Chinese characters on the batik cloth. Initially, Liang Tio 
San asked Huang Tjaw Hien to show him how to make the Chinese characters, but he 
refused to teach Liang Tio San who was his competitor.  
 
5.8 Public Policy Changes  
Changes in the economic and political situation are often followed by policy changes by 
the government. This was presented in detail in chapter 4.  Changes in policies may bring 
either positive or negative impacts to the business entity. The appropriate response to these 
changes determines the business’s sustainability.  
 
There were two phases in ethnic Chinese batik business, ups and downs. The prosperous 
years was occured during the Dutch Colonial era (19th century) and under Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono’s regime (2004-2014), after the UNESCO announcement (2009) of batik as an 
Indonesian cultural product in particular. Meanwhile, the difficult conditions ensued 
starting with the Japanese occupation (1942-1945) to the New Order regime (1966-1998). 
This is explained as follows.  
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At the time of the Dutch Colonial era (19th century), Chinese Indonesian owner-managers 
benefited from a social stratification policy which applied to the community. The policy 
facilitated them to gain access to resources by giving them the privilege of importing raw 
materials needed for batik production. These materials included unbleached plain cloth, 
wax and colouring materials, none of which were available domestically. At that time, 
ethnic Chinese owner-managers also had the privilege of exporting batik products, which 
helped them to extend their market to countries like Singapore, Malaysia, Suriname and 
Hong Kong. They exploited this opportunity by increasing production capacity through 
increasing the number of workers and developing a production method using stamp 
equipment. The use of stamp equipment to apply wax on the cloth made the production 
process much faster and easier than using a canting92 (pen-like tool), thus demand could be 
met faster and at lower prices.  
 
The only producer in Lasem who experienced life under the Dutch Colonial era was Huang 
Tjaw Hien. He was the only participant who had been through all the different periods and 
regimes since the Dutch occupation. Huang Tjaw Hien talked about the batik firm run by 
his father under the Dutch East Indies government. The following is a paraphrase of his 
story. 
Little Huang Tjaw Hien experienced life under the Dutch East Indies government until he 
was 13 years old. To him this was the happiest time of his life, as a son of a wealthy family 
running a batik firm in Lasem. He felt that his father’s firm was indeed so big that even now 
he could not match his father’s success. To his mind the period of the Dutch East Indies 
occupation was not distressful, since owner-managers of Chinese descent obtained certain 
privileges in trade, the export and import of goods in particular. Huang Tjaw Hien’s father, 
Huang Tjien Tie, inherited his father’s firm in 1923, and became one of the Chinese 
Indonesian owner-managers who made the best use of these opportunities to develop his 
firm. This was proven by his father’s ability to extend his market outside Lasem to such 
places as Semarang, Bandung, Solo and Jogja, and even to places outside Java, like 
Palembang, Sumatera and Madura. Huang Tjien Tie even exported his product directly to 
Singapore, Malaysia and Suriname. At that time his batik was produced in the form of long 
cloth with typical Lasem patterns. The lower cloth was paired with kebaya93as the top cloth. 
Lasem batik with typical Chinese patterns attracted women of Chinese descent who had 
adopted the local community’s fashion style, as it accommodated their taste. Huang Tjien Tie 
                                                
92 Canting is a like pen tool that is used for drawing on the cloth with wax. 
93 Kebaya is a kind of blouse the front of which is pinned together. 
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was able to extend his market to Singapore and Malaysia because a large part of the 
population there was of Chinese descent. 
 
Huang Tjien Tie kept increasing his production capacity to 5000 and even 6000 pieces of 
batik cloth per month. A minimum of 10 bales of cloth was cut at once, producing 3900 
pieces of cloth ready for batik processing. Huang Tjaw Hien recalled that in exporting the 
product to Malaysia, his father sent up to 500 pieces of cloth for each delivery. To meet the 
demand, he had recruited a large number of workers. There was a village near Lasem called 
Pancur, where almost all its female adult residents became Huang Tjien Tie’s batik workers. 
 
Huang Tjaw Hien remembered clearly the long queue of workers winding past the fence 
waiting their turn to collect wages every Saturday afternoon. To lift production volume, 
besides increasing the number of workers, his father later used stamp equipment instead of 
canting. This tool shortened batik production time, thus batik clothes could be produced 
faster. 
 
However, the conditions of Lasem batik owner-managers dramatically changed during the 
Japanese occupation, which started in 1942. The comfortable life under the Dutch East 
Indies occupation changed to extreme distress with the arrival of the Japanese who then 
occupied the country. Below is Huang Tjaw Hien’s story about his father, whose firm had 
to close in 1942 because he could no longer maintain it.  
Huang Tjaw Hien recalled that his father decided to close his batik firm for fear that the 
Japanese government, known to be cruel, would take harsh action against people. The 
Japanese soldiers often came and seized their various possessions; such as rice, iron doors, 
domestic items and iron equipment. The Japanese soldiers even came looking for young girls 
for their fun. Whatever the Japanese soldiers wanted had to be given if they did not want to be 
beaten and sent to prison. For this reason, Huang Tjien Tie made a bunker to hide his young 
daughter when the Japanese soldiers were patrolling.  
 
Japanese soldiers frequently came to check the house at lunchtime to see what kind of food 
the family was eating. When they were found eating rice, the hulled rice would be taken by 
force. If they resisted, they would be beaten or burnt with a lighted cigarette. At that time his 
family was only allowed to eat cassava and corn, because rice had to be given to the Japanese. 
 
Under the Japanese government, people whom they considered disobedient were sent to the 
detention cell. Selling at a slightly higher price could also trigger the soldiers’ anger, leading 
to beatings and imprisonment. Huang Tjien Tie was so afraid he decided to close down his 
batik firm. He managed to survive using the remaining profit he still had. War conditions 
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crippled the economy, as the Japanese government pooled all resources for war operations. 
 
It is evident from this account that war condition threatened the firm’s sustainability. 
During the war, Chinese Indonesian owner-managers gave priority to their family’s safety, 
setting aside the sustainability of their firms. They chose to put their business operations on 
hold, surviving by meeting their daily needs from business income kept in reserve. 
 
Japan exercised a tight economic control policy, with heavy sanctions for any violation of 
the law and price controls to prevent price increases (Isnaeni and Apid, 2008). These 
severe economic conditions caused Lasem batik owner-managers to close their firms, since 
the community had lost their purchasing power. Huang Tjaw Hien said that it was difficult 
to obtain unbleached plain cloth, which was previously imported by the Dutch East Indies 
government. The Lasem batik industry came to a halt. 
 
In 1950, under the nationalism-oriented Old Order, Lasem did not have any batik 
cooperatives at that time and the ethnic Chinese owner-managers who ran batik firms 
tended to work as individuals. Tjiang Sian Me remembers that her grandmother’s batik did 
not sell well, as the price was not competitive with products from other batik centres and 
cooperatives, such as Yogyakarta, Solo, and Pekalongan. Nevertheless, she could maintain 
her business with limited production, reluctant to build up a stockpile of unsold clothes. 
 
Ethnic Chinese owner-managers in Lasem encountered greater difficulties with the 
promulgation of Government Regulation No 10 of 1959, which prohibited them from 
trading in sub-district level (rural) areas. They either had to transfer their businesses to 
Indonesian nationals, or relocate them to towns or cities at regency level. According to 
Huang Tjaw Hien, many ethnic Chinese owner-managers then moved to big cities such as 
Jakarta, Surabaya and Semarang. This was because Lasem was a sub-district town, below 
regency level. The majority of the ethnic Chinese owner-managers decided to move to big 
cities in order to keep their businesses rather than to have them being taken over by the 
government. A few owner-managers remained in Lasem, but ceased business activities. 
Huang Tjaw Hien’s father decided not to revive his batik firm, although in the past it had 
been quite successful. To meet the daily living and education needs of his children, Huang 
Tjaw Hien’s father used money saved from his batik firm’s profits. Huang Tjaw Hien felt 
that at that time his father was truly rich, since he was able to support his family for 
decades using only his savings. It can be imagined how successful his batik firm had been, 
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since after it closed its accrued profits were the only source of the family’s income. 
 
The next major change in the government policy was the eradication of the Indonesian 
Communist Party94 of which all Indonesians of Chinese descent were accused to be 
members due to their Chinese background, following the alleged attempted coup by the 
Communist 30 September movement (known as Gestapu) and the military response that 
killed all so-called communists in 1965/66. A participant from the older generation 
described the situation at that time, when the government persecuted PKI members. Ethnic 
Chinese owner-managers gripped with fear of the situation, such as his parents, closed 
their businesses. Some people who were accused of being PKI members suddenly 
disappeared, particularly those of Chinese descent who were considered to be connected 
with the communist party in China. Following is Tjiang Sian Me’s account of her mother’s 
discontinued business. 
“……around 1965, after the Gestapu incident, batik was not saleable. No buyers at all; so 
our stock piled up to thousands of clothes. Production stopped. It was not until the turmoil 
was over that production start again, little by little.” 
In such a chaotic condition, ethnic Chinese owner-managers could do nothing except try to 
save their own lives. Batik owner-managers temporarily stopped production and kept their 
products in storage cupboards, as there was no demand. 
 
Discriminatory treatment continued under the New Order government of President 
Soeharto (1966-1998).  The ethnic Chinese owner-managers kept their businesses going. 
Between 1970 and 1980, 140 people were registered in the Department of Industry office, 
all of them of Chinese descent.95 
 
Discriminatory treatment of Indonesians of Chinese descent affected the way batik owner-
managers ran their business. They chose to accept the government’s mistreatment by 
adjusting to the existing regulations. The government prohibited the use of Chinese names, 
thus Chinese Indonesian owner-managers changed their Chinese names to Indonesian 
ones. Huang Tjaw Hien changed his name to Sugeng Wibowo (Indonesian name). Tjiang 
Sian Me became Kinanti and Wen Soen Lie assumed her new name, Suryanti. The same 
applied to the name of batik businesses. Before Presidential Instruction No. 13 of 1967 
came into effect, ethnic Chinese owner-managers normally gave their Chinese names to 
the name of their firms. Afterwards, however, Chinese Indonesian owner-managers 
                                                
94 Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) 
95Based on an interview with Njie Tjaw Hien 
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changed the names of their firms to Indonesian names. Tjiang Sian Me, for example, 
changed the name of her batik firm inherited from her parents, Tjiang Wei Djun, to Rusa 
Kuning. However, she still used the trademark Tjiang Wei Djun through stamping the 
cloth, which her parents had used on the family’s batik clothes. She did this to preserve the 
good reputation of her family’s batik firm, already well known as Tjiang Wei Djun. 
Similarly, Huang Tjaw Hien, who started to revive his father’s firm in 1967, named his 
batik Bunga Megah. As well as Kho Lan Me, Siem Djun Gwan’s mother, who chose Naga 
for the new name of the batik firm she started in 1979. Ever since the President’s 
instruction, Chinese Indonesian owner-managers in Lasem have no longer used their 
Chinese names in their business. 
 
As there was hardly any demand, batik owner-managers resorted to approaching 
intermediaries outside the town. Tjiang Sian Me and Wen Soen Lie, assisted by their 
husbands, offered batik products to intermediaries in Surabaya. At that time, there were no 
exhibitions as there are today. Intermediaries were utilized to market their products; this 
was one strategy to keep their businesses running. 
 
Another way to maintain their businesses during the New Order period (1966-1998) was 
by having another source of income to support the business and family life, as Huang Tjaw 
Hien did by working in a private company from 1967 until 1994. Some participants chose 
to undertake business diversification. Wen Soen Lie started a sewing business and her 
husband ran a transportation business. Similarly, Siem Djun Gwan’s father ran a brass firm 
making door handles, nuts and bolts, water pipe joints, and gas stove rings, as the income 
from batik was not promising.  A brass firm offered better opportunities. The faltering 
batik firm also prompted Zhang Ling Shi, Tjiang Sian Me’s husband, to seek another 
source of income by selling snacks and raising layer hens. This indicated that the 
conditions of batik businesses during this period was indeed very fragile. 
 
In the New Order period, the government established an aid programme to improve the 
community’s economy. However, in practice this programme did not reach the ethnic 
Chinese owner-managers whose position became marginalized. Only one of the 
participants, Huang Tjaw Hien, managed to access the New Order government’s 
programme. 
Huang Tjaw Hien had extensive social relations, and through the Regent of Rembang, he 
gained access to the Permanent Business Capital Credit aimed at assisting the community by 
providing business capital at low interest with no guarantee. Huang Tjaw Hien managed 
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to get 50 million by following the Regent of Rembang’s suggestions that he should apply 
using his wife’s name, as she was a Javanese woman therefore, she was perceived as an 
indigenous resident.  
Negative sentiment was pervasive that residents of Chinese descent could not enjoy the 
benefit of any programmes launched by the government. 
 
In 1997, the end of the New Order period, Indonesia suffered from the Asian monetary 
crisis leading to an economic crisis96. By 1 January 1998, the rupiah's value had fallen to 
30 percent of its June 1997 rate against the US dollar. The pre-crisis rate of IDR4,650 
mounted to IDR10,375 for one US dollar (Adiningsih and Kadarusman, 2008) and peaked 
in June 1998 at IDR14,900 for one US dollar. This severely affected all the Indonesian 
economic pivots, including the batik industry, because most of the raw materials were still 
imported. The decline in the community’s purchasing power meant that Lasem batik had 
no buyers at all. Yet none of the ethnic Chinese owner-managers formally closed their 
firms. They carried on trying to sustain the businesses that had been run by their families 
for generations. They had to reduce the number of workers, and unsold products were 
stockpiled in the belief that one day Lasem batik would sell well again. According to Lie 
Sio Lan, her mother stopped production and temporarily dismissed her workers. To meet 
the family’s needs, Lie Sio Lan’s mother tried to get loans by pawning her batik products 
to her acquaintances. Chinese Indonesian owner-managers who had business 
diversification could survive on income from their other ventures. Siem Djun Gwan’ brass 
firm products at that time sold well, because imported products were expensive. Siem Djun 
Gwan remembered that his family’s finances were heavily supported by the brass firm. 
Siem Djun Gwan’s mother stopped her batik production until the price of raw materials 
became stable again. 
 
Besides minimizing expenditure, Chinese Indonesian batik owner-managers said they 
accepted the condition, and were hoping for improvements. Following is Huang Tjaw 
Hien’s experience in facing the critical period. 
Huang Tjaw Hien felt the 1998 crisis was the most difficult period for his business. The 
exchange rate for the rupiah against the US dollar plummeted. All imported raw materials 
were priced in US dollars. During the crisis, the cost of raw materials was four times greater. 
In addition, the consumers’ low purchasing power due to inflation caused his batik firm to 
stagger. Many of his competitors went bankrupt, and only 12 batik owner-managers in 
Lasem managed to hold on. Huang Tjaw Hien could only resign himself to this difficult 
                                                
96 The economic crisis was part of the Asian crisis that started with the fall of the Thai Bath and affected 
other Asian currencies, including the Indonesian rupiah that fell against the US dollar.  
 121 
condition and pray for his business to survive, because he still had bank loans to settle. He 
did not have any other business diversification at that time; his family relied only on his 
batik business. 
 
Huang Tjaw Hien tried to keep his firm running by dismissing his workers and stopping 
production temporarily to maintain his family’s and firm’s financial stability. He believed 
that God would make a way for his business to recover. In the meantime, the economy 
started to recover and demand for batik gradually increased. He added that the reduction of 
his former competitors from 140 to 12 gave him opportunities to build up his firm again. He 
was hoping for the time when the economic law of supply and demand would come into 
effect. With demand gradually increasing while supply was lacking, his business would 
make progress. 
It was evident that in responding to the critical conditions, Chinese Indonesian business 
owners were still able to find some opportunities amidst the turmoil. 
 
After the collapse of the New Order regime in 1998 with the forced stepping down of 
Soeharto after riots. The government programmes under Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono 
regime (2004-2014) encouraged the development of batik businesses by creating demand 
for batik after it gained legitimation from UNESCO in 2009. The government enforced 
civil servants, government owned enterprises (known as BUMN) employees, local 
government owned enterprises (known as BUMD) employees, and private employees to 
wear batik uniforms on at least one day every week. These government policies were very 
beneficial to Lasem batik owner-managers because they helped to create a market; 
especially at the time batik lasem became one of the favourites in the batik market in 
general.  
 
Chinese Indonesian owner-managers responded to the high demand by increasing 
production capacity and increasing the numbers of workers, either outsourced or 
workshop. Participants also competed to increase sales by selling low-to-middle class 
products. Only Lie Sio Lan consistently providing upper class products. She did so to keep 
a share of this high-end market aimed at government officials and domestic or overseas 
batik collectors. She maintained her reputation for high quality batik with exclusive 
designs. Although her product reached overseas consumers, Lie Sio Lan was not able to 
export directly. Consumers bought either directly from Lie Sio Lan or from her 
intermediary agents. Siem Djun Gwan’s response to the increased demand due to the 
government’s policy was similar. 
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The government’s intensive attempt to drive the growth of the Indonesian batik industry 
through different policies and programmes succeeded in increasing the demand for Lasem 
batik. Siem Djun Gwan had been aware of this since he became involved in his family’s 
batik business in 2007. Moreover, the mass media actively broadcast batik reviews that 
helped to increase the demand. Siem Djun Gwan responded by increasing his production 
capacity. He immediately employed more workshop workers and increased the number of 
employees from 30 to around 50, and production increased from 150 to 500 pieces of batik 
cloth per month. This was done to anticipate the long production process. To increase 
production, he also employed outsourced workers with wages paid for each piece of cloth. 
The Rembulan batik firm had never employed outsourced labour before; consequently, the 
workshop workers were initially opposed to this. However, Siem Djun Gwan made them 
aware that their capacity was no longer able to meet the high demand, and increasing 
production was important to take the momentum in order to develop the firm that would 
impact on them. Then Siem Djun Gwan gave them an incentive by promising to continue 
giving priority to his workshop batik workers and to giving them the privilege of an outing 
together at the end of the year to some tourism destination such as Borobudur or Batu 
Malang. Initially, Siem Djun Gwan himself delivered the cloth to the outsource batik 
workers’ homes and collected the completed cloth.  However, once his workshop batik 
workers had a better understanding and accepted the presence of batik outsource workers, 
then Siem Djun Gwan did not need to go to outsource workers’ homes. The outsource batik 
workers came freely to Siem Djun Gwan’s workshop to collect raw cloth and return the 
finished drawn materials. The workshop batik workers were then happy to interact directly 
with the outsource batik workers after they recognised their contribution in providing batik 
cloth in the production process. To prevent conflict between the two parties, Siem Djun 
Gwan distinguished them based on their functions. Workshop batik workers were assigned 
to produce batik of finest quality or the socalled batik alusan to meet the demand from the 
upper class. Meanwhile, the outsource batik workers worked to make the middle-lower class 
products. This distinction was recognised in the wages Siem Djun Gwan paid. 
 
The increasing demand had inspired Siem Djun Gwan to expand his target market. Before 
he focused on the upper-class products which were priced over IDR1,000,00097 for a piece 
of batik cloth; later Siem Djun Gwan also catered to lower-middle class products for 
IDR150,00098 to IDR1,000,00099 per piece. This decision was made to respond to 
customers’ demand for lower priced products.  Siem Djun Gwan also responded to high 
market demand by actively taking part in exhibitions to reach potential buyers outside the 
                                                
97 It is equivalent to £71.973 with exchange rate £1 equal to IDR13,894 in 2010 (Source: 
http://www.bps.go.id/LinkTableDinamis/view/id/952) 
98 It is equivalent to £10.796 with exchange rate £1 equal to IDR13,894 in 2010 (Source: 
http://www.bps.go.id/LinkTableDinamis/view/id/952) 
99 It is equivalent to £71.973 with exchange rate £1 equal to IDR13,894 in 2010 (Source: 
http://www.bps.go.id/LinkTableDinamis/view/id/952) 
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town. Siem Djun Gwan’s main target was Jakarta, since the Jakarta community was willing 
to pay for expensive hand-drawn batik products. Siem Djun Gwan produced only hand-
drawn batik although, in 2008, he experimented in selling printed batik, which was textile 
with Lasem patterns printed by a printing firm in Solo. Even though the sale price of printed 
batik was as low as IDR20,000100 to IDR50,000101 for ready-to-wear batik clothing, 
compared to hand-drawn batik cloth (not made into clothing) which cost as much as around 
IDR150,000102, his printed batik could not compete with his hand-drawn batik cloth. Thus, 
he stopped selling printed batik. According to Siem Djun Gwan, Lasem had a name for 
hand-drawn batik and this is what the customers were looking for, not the printed batik. 
 
Siem Djun Gwan marketed his products in Lasem and major Javanese cities. He never 
directly exported his product overseas. Once Siem Djun Gwan received an offer from the 
BNI (Indonesian National Bank) to attend a free exhibition in Singapore, however, 
considering the accommodation cost and limited sales opportunities, he declined. He was 
unsure about the market in Singapore and he was not prepared to take the risk.  
 
Rembulan batik was famous for its exclusive designs and elegant details. His mother is well 
known for her ability in drawing beautiful patterns and motifs. Therefore, members of the 
local government of Rembang regency often visit Rembulan batik, bringing their guests who 
are looking for special Lasem souvenirs. Its fame helped Siem Djun Gwan gain access to the 
government programmes. This gave him many advantages, such as receiving invitations to 
join exhibitions and training programmes, obtaining orders for uniforms and parcels, and 
getting new customers from the official guests who visited Lasem and wanted local 
souvenirs. Hence, Siem Djun Gwan was careful to maintain his relationship with the 
government. 
 
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s policies and programmes were successful in 
reviving the batik industry, particularly in Lasem, which had once been one of the big 
five103 producing towns in the Dutch East Indies colonial period. The appropriate response 
of Chinese Indonesian owner-managers enabled them to expand their business. They 
became confident enough to promote themselves and maintain a good relationship with the 
government. This might be related to Presidential Decree No. 6 of 2000 by President 
Abdulrahman Wahid (in office from 1999–2001), which restored the civilian rights of 
                                                
100 It is equivalent to £1.265 with exchange rate £1 equal to IDR15,803 in 2008 (Source: 
http://www.bps.go.id/LinkTableDinamis/view/id/952) 
101 It is equivalent to £3.164 with exchange rate £1 equal to IDR15,803 in 2008 (Source: 
http://www.bps.go.id/LinkTableDinamis/view/id/952) 
102 It is equivalent to £9.492 with exchange rate £1 equal to IDR15,803 in 2008 (Source: 
http://www.bps.go.id/LinkTableDinamis/view/id/952) 
103Lasem is among the core batik industrial centres in Indonesia, in addition to Pekalongan, Yogyakarta, Solo 
and Banyumas. 
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Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent. The former discriminatory practices against 
Indonesians of Chinese descent were reduced, and the local communities were encouraged 
to accept them as part of the Indonesian people. Chinese Indonesian owner-managers 
started to realize that they had the right to access government programmes. This can be 
seen, for example, by the establishment of the Lasem Batik Cooperative in 2008, the 
members of which were local batik owner-managers. Liang Tio San, as a Chinese descent 
producer, initiated this cooperative and later became its chairman, all participants were 
registered as members of the cooperative, but not all actively took part in the cooperative’s 
activities. Some only joined to obtain information about government training and 
exhibitions that was usually given through the cooperative. 
 
Another government programme that impacted positively on the growth of ethnic Chinese 
batik family firms was the Partnership and Environmental Care Programme (known as 
PKBL)104, which offered low-interest credit through BUMN105 (government owned 
enterprise). This programme resulted from a government policy that required BUMN to 
distribute the Corporate Social Responsibility fund to encourage the development of the 
national batik industry. Nearly all participants from the younger generation exploited the 
PKBL programme for batik business development, except Lie Sio Lan who did not join the 
programme because she did not have any assets that could be used as a guarantee. The 
PKBL was indeed extraordinary because, under the Old and New Order regimes, ethnic 
Chinese owner-managers could never access government programmes like this. It should 
be noted that participants over seventy years of age could not access this programme. The 
regulations specified that the applicant should be at maximum 60 years by the time the 
credit was repaid in full. 
 
The PKBL programme was utilized by Chinese Indonesian owner-managers not merely for 
obtaining funds, it was an access to free exhibition facilities. Siem Djun Gwan commented:  
“Yes, it is more for getting to the exhibitions. The exhibition is free, although the normal 
rent is quite expensive. In Jakarta, in 2010, it’s up to IDR12 million106. Besides, the stand 
has a more strategic position when given through the banks. It’s located at the front. When 
renting the stand by ourselves, we would not get that position. The bank also helps direct the 
guests to us. I’ve become BNI’s partner. Yesterday I was also asked to take part in an 
exhibition in Singapore.” 
                                                
104 Program Kemitraan dan Bina Lingkungan PKBL 
105 BUMN is Badan Usaha Milik Negara 




The PKBL programme offered loans at the low interest rate of 6% per annum, provided 
free guidance through training, helped to market the product using exhibition stand 
facilities outside the town for free, and provided accommodation refunds. The low-interest 
loan was to be settled within a period of one to three years. 
 
The participants believed that their batik businesses had started to decline again since 
2012–2013. In their opinion this happened after the central government launched a 
programme, intensively encouraging each region in Indonesia to make batik reflecting 
their own local characteristics. The emergence of batik industrial centres in several other 
parts of Indonesia contributed to the decreasing demand for Lasem batik. Liang Tio San 
commented: 
“…the difference that has affected us the most is the fact that all those regions nowadays 
have their own batik centres. So our segment has gradually reduced.” 
 
The government has also started to promote woven cloth as another typical Indonesian 
product, as Siem Djun Gwan related below: 
“Since 2012 sales haven’t been as good as before, and became even worse in 2013. Batik 
cloth used to be easy to sell. The reason is…. previously, batik was considered to be 
something special. It was demanded for all occasions. Frankly speaking, the government has 
started to shift to woven cloth, so it won’t keep on encouraging batik sales. In 2007 and 
2008 everyday batik was mentioned in the newspapers and mass media. Now there’s hardly 
any mention of it – besides more and more people have started to follow the trend, selling 
batik. So, also the number of batik sellers and owner-managers is growing.” 
The increasing number of new owner-managers also contributed to decreasing batik sales. 
For this reason, several participants later started to reduce the amount of cloth entrusted to 
the outsource batik workers, while maintaining the stock that they kept in their cupboards. 
 
5.9 Conclusion  
This chapter describes how Chinese Indonesian owner-managers were able to develop and 
sustain their business through time and changing circumstances, despite the fact that this 
generational sustainability was often challenging. Nevertheless, despite the ups and downs 
of the firms, quite a few Chinese Indonesian family batik businesses were passed on 
through successive generations. This reflects their success in handling regeneration, ability 
to respond to disruption and maintain the firm in a competitive environment. This study 
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investigates ethnic Chinese family firm sustainability at the micro, meso and macro level.  
 
At the micro level, there are several concerns that contribute to the sustainability of a 
Chinese Indonesian family firm, such as succession, unique resources possession, family 
involvement, harmonization of family life and business life, and family firm management 
issues.  
 
Succession is crucial in determining an ethnic Chinese family firm’s sustainability. In fact, 
the flexibility to designate a potential successor is the key to business succession and 
business success. Chinese Indonesian owner-managers no longer strictly adhere to the 
Chinese descent tradition, which gives priority to the oldest son to continue the business. 
The decline of a potential successor’s interest in the batik business in a modern, diversified 
economic environment, coupled with the lure of opportunities in big cities, make him or 
her less interested in continuing the family batik firm. Therefore, Chinese Indonesian 
owner-managers made adjustments to the traditional business succession patterns. They 
perceived that the sustainability of a family batik business that had been operating for 
generations was more important than clinging to cultural traditions. They realized that the 
absence of successors might threaten the sustainability of the family batik business. On the 
other hand, a belated attempt in preparing succession is also potentially perilous to 
business sustainability. The regeneration occurs when parents are already very old and 
losing mobility, even sometimes terminally ill.  This might potentially endanger the 
success of the succession process. The willingness of offspring to continue the business is 
another key success to business succession; failing to prepare will contribute to failure in 
succession.  
 
At the micro level, there are four unique resources that are essential in a Chinese 
Indonesian batik family firm and their survival. Firstly, knowledge, in particular, knowing 
the colouring formula is the unique resource of a Chinese Indonesian batik family firm. 
This knowledge is obtained from predecessors through generations, whether from direct 
learning or indirect learning like a predecessor’s recipe notebook. Ethnic Chinese owner-
managers are highly aware of the importance of keeping colouring formulas secret. They 
only passed these on to selected family members, normally their children. Secondly, the 
batik worker is another resource that is also important in running a family batik business. 
Lack of skilled batik worker might potentially threaten business sustainability. Thirdly, 
family involvement is crucial when the business is growing, as the source of trust, such as 
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a spouse, sibling or children. Besides, ethnic Chinese owner-managers like to share wealth 
between family members by involving them in the business. For old Chinese Indonesian 
owner-managers, they involved family members to help them in marketing the product, 
especially at exhibitions and be a representative of the owner at activities in the 
community, such as a cooperative. This is largely due to the immobility of the old Chinese 
Indonesian owner-managers. 
 
Next is the importance of a harmonized family life and business life. As a family firm, the 
family life and business life are intermingled and inseparable. Disruptions in the family life 
can impact on the firm’s financial condition and either encourage or threaten business 
sustainability. Some events in the family can inadvertently negatively affect the family 
firm financially. For instance, family members’ health issues, such as severe illness, 
serious accident or sudden death might drain the family financially. When disruptions 
cause financial need, they borrow money from relatives and former bosses, and utilize the 
PKBL programme. This might perilously threaten business sustainability. Other family 
events that might potentially impact on a family business financially is the education 
funding and wedding expenses of the children. In Indonesian culture, those are the 
responsibility of parents and require a lot of money. Notwithstanding, the family life 
dynamics also might have positive financial impacts on the firm. For instance, when 
children are working; they become a source of funding for the parent’s batik firm, 
especially when the ethnic Chinese batik family firm is facing difficult conditions.  
 
The involvement of family members in a Chinese Indonesian batik family firm could 
generate conflict between them that might escalate into a family conflict. This conflict not 
only threatens business sustainability but also the harmony of family life. Nonetheless, 
batik owner-managers still employ family members in the business because family are 
considered trust-worthy and will help them to avoid business risk. Further, they seem to be 
able to manage the conflict in the family so that it does not affect the business. If there 
were problems with one family member, a Chinese Indonesian owner-manager could 
easily select another family member who might be willing to join the firm.  
 
There are some management issues that impact on the business sustainability of an ethnic 
Chinese batik family firm. Firstly, managing variety in products. Chinese Indonesian 
owner-managers tend to keep producing hand-drawn batik that has performed from 
generation to generation. They also persist in echoing their predecessor’s product styles, 
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such as motifs and patterns, designs and colours. Secondly, Chinese Indonesian owner-
managers do not merely target ethnic Chinese buyers, even though their product has been 
heavily present in Chinese culture, particularly the colours, motifs and patterns design. 
Nowadays, they are more likely to target all batik lovers to market their products. 
However, they use motifs and patterns that express their taste in relation to their ethnic 
background, whatever the dynamics of the circumstances. Because the design has 
successfully passed through generations and has the unique characteristics of Lasem batik, 
this helps them to sustain the Lasem batik business industry. Furthermore, the majority of 
ethnic Chinese owner-managers are making low-middle class products to reach more 
buyers.  Few Chinese Indonesian owner-managers expand their market in order to exploit 
the opportunity of increasing market demand. Moreover, the majority of ethnic Chinese 
owner-managers target Jakarta as a potential market.  These strategies are helping the 
Chinese Indonesian owner-managers in developing their businesses.  
 
Thirdly, in pricing strategy, ethnic Chinese owner-managers are more likely to be flexibile 
in deciding the price; however, they still calculate the production cost and consider what 
they want to achieve by asking the right price. Ethnic Chinese owner-managers could ask a 
different price for the same cloth depending on the buyer, the market demand for batik at 
that time and where they make the transaction, such as at an exhibition.  Fourthly, in 
marketing the product, ethnic Chinese owner-managers use direct selling through in-house 
transactions and exhibitions, and rely on intermediaries such as resellers, middlemen and 
competitors in order to sustain the business. 
 
At the meso level, there are three dynamics in the market and opportunity structure, 
namely the fashion trend, technology development and competitive environment that have 
impact on an ethnic Chinese family firm’s sustainability. Fashion trend is a major issue in 
a batik business, increasing a demand for batik clothes when batik becomes fashionable. 
Chinese Indonesian owner-managers were enthusiastic in exploiting this opportunity to 
expand their product market. They readily adopted stamp tools to speed up the drawing 
process. Conversely, fashion trends could just as easily threaten business sustainability 
when batik is perceived as old fashioned, or not fashionable any longer. This could result 
in the demise of the family firm.  However, it is interesting that Chinese Indonesian owner-
managers are eager to keep their business going, even through periods of low demand. 
They show the gritty determination that the batik family firms have always displayed to 
preserve their businesses and retain their dignity. They have other sources of income to 
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support the family during that period. 
 
The development of textile-printing technology is unavoidable. Mostly Chinese Indonesian 
batik owner-managers choose not to adopt machine technology for their production 
process. Machine-printed batik products potentially threaten the sustainability of Lasem 
batik family firms in general. However, they believed that hand-drawn batik is the 
particular characteristic of Lasem products that they have to preserve and have their own 
market (niche market).  
 
The other crucial issue at the meso level is the competitive environment that impacts on 
business sustainability. Inability to determine a proper survival strategy might threaten 
business sustainability. Although ethnic Chinese owner-managers in Lasem batik industry 
already have a good position in the market, they have learned to be flexible to compete in a 
dynamic environment.  
 
The tight competition caused difficulty in finding skilled batik workers, since the growth 
of batik firms was not coupled with an increasing number of skilled batik workers. The 
ethnic Chinese owner-managers employed several strategies to retain their batik workers in 
response to this challenge.  For instance, increasing salary, treating batik workers well, 
giving bonuses, providing a more varied menu for lunch, facilitating a holiday tour with 
fellow-workers at the end of the year, providing a medical allowance for workshop batik 
workers, providing a soft loan scheme, opening a batik workshop in the batik workers’ 
village and training villagers in drawing batik patterns on the cloth. Ethnic Chinese owner-
managers were fully aware of the fact that their workers were vital to their business. 
Further, tight competition also stimulated an inevitable price competition among batik 
owner-managers. Ethnic Chinese owner-managers competed in lowering the price to help 
the business survive. However, production cost was taken into consideration. Chinese 
Indonesian owner-managers conducted other strategies in order to be sustainable in tight 
competition. For instance, maintaining product quality in such matters as the neatness of 
the motifs and designs, and colour durability. 
 
The tense competition in the Lasem batik industry resulted in conflict between Lasem batik 
owner-managers. Ethnic Chinese owner-managers bravely expressed their disapproval of 
competitors’ unethical practices that escalated the conflict. Some Chinese Indonesian 
owner-managers reacted to the conflict between competitors by not speaking to each other 
 130 
or refusing to be active in the cooperative because they did not like the chairman. 
 
At the macro level, there were several events that impacted on business sustainability. 
These related to economic and social dynamics that were often followed by public policy 
changes which could potentially either support or threaten business sustainability. Some 
public policies did facilitate ethnic Chinese owner-managers to develop their businesses. 
Firstly, the social stratification policy of the community during the Dutch occupation in the 
19th century whereby the Dutch colonial government promoted privilege for ethnic 
Chinese owner-managers making it easy to import batik raw materials and export the 
finished batik products. This was coupled with a rising demand for batik clothes. Ethnic 
Chinese owner-managers exploited the opportunity to increase production capacity by 
increasing the number of batik workers and introducing stamp tools to make the production 
process quicker. Ethnic Chinese owner-managers also expanded their market by exporting 
batik clothes either directly, or indirectly through intermediaries, to Singapore, Malaysia, 
Hong Kong, Suriname, USA and Japan. They also expanded markets throughout the 
Indonesia archipelago.  
 
Secondly, public policies made by the Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono regime (2004-2014) 
encouraged Indonesian batik businesses in general by increasing the market for batik. After 
Presidential Decree No. 6 of 2000 (under Abdulrahman Wahid regime) restored the 
civilian rights of citizens of Chinese descent, the ethnic Chinese owner-managers gained 
confidence in exercising their rights as citizens. Thus, when the government under Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono (2004-2014) launched development programmes for batik 
businesses, they responded by actively joining in training sessions and exhibitions 
conducted by the government. There were several policies introduced by the government 
that promote batik businesses, such as,  Presidential Decree No 39 of 2009 which decreed a 
national batik day; Ministry of Domestic Affairs Regulation No 53 of 2009 followed by 
Regulation 68 of 2015 which required all civil servants throughout Indonesia to wear batik 
as their uniforms on certain days; and PKBL which offered low-interest credit through 
BUMNs (government owned enterprises). Ethnic Chinese owner-managers responded 
positively to these policies by increasing production capacity through increasing the 
number of batik workers, mainly producing low–medium products, maintaining a firm’s 
reputation for quality batik and producing unique products, motifs, patterns and tasteful 
colours. Interestingly, ethnic Chinese owner-managers tend to be more open, eager to 
maintain a good relationship with the government and register in the cooperative batik 
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Lasem, which previously had been closed to them. 
 
There were several external pressures that threatened ethnic Chinese family firm 
sustainability. Firstly, during the Japanese occupation (1942-1945), ethnic Chinese owner-
managers closed their businesses because they were struggling to save their lives. They 
survived by living on their remaining profit. Secondly, the racially discriminatory 
conditions during the Old and New Order eras (1945-1998) caused ethnic Chinese owner-
managers to become closed and individualistic; they kept their distance from the 
government. Under the fortress programme policy in the 1950s, ethnic Chinese batik 
family firms could barely compete with indigenous batik owner-managers who had access 
to that programme. They limited clothes production and avoided stockpiling ready-to-sell 
clothes due to low demand. This difficult condition reached its peak around 1959 until 
1966 when the government published the promulgation of Government Regulation No. 10 
of 1959. It was followed by the eradication of the Indonesian Communist Party in 
1965/1966. Ethnic Chinese owner-managers chose to cease all elements of batik business 
activities during this period. Nonetheless, it was only temporary until conditions became 
stable again. Chinese Indonesian owner-managers tended to be submissive to 
discrimination treatments. They obeyed the policies such us, changing their Chinese 
business name into an Indonesian name.  Although they were following the policies, they 
still put the stamped the product with their predecessor’s batik brand using Chinese 
characters to keep the product’s brand. At that time, demand was low. Ethnic Chinese 
owner-managers employed several strategies in order to keep their businesses sustainable, 
such as, approaching intermediaries outside Lasem and having other sources of income. 
 
Another event at the macro level that impacted on business sustainability for Chinese 
Indonesian batik family firms was the monetary crisis in 1997, followed by the economic 
crisis in 1998. Chinese Indonesian batik owner-managers attempted to sustain their 
businesses by stopping production but not liquidating their business. They dismissed their 
workers, keeping a stock of cloth in storage as an investment, while awaiting the recovery 
of market demand. When batik eventually moved into a boom cycle, several Chinese 
Indonesian owner-managers obtained quick profits from the clothes they had stockpiled, 
because the batik production process took a long time, meanwhile the demand increased 
exponentially. To meet their daily needs in the critical period, ethnic Chinese batik owner-




In conclusion, ethnic Chinese owner-managers’ flexibility in responding to the various 
changes in the business environment enabled their businesses to survive in difficult times, 
and to develop whenever there was an opportunity. Their awareness of hand-drawn batik 
as their family legacy, and their determination to keep producing it, had a positive impact 
on the sustainability of these ethnic Chinese businesses. Their deeply felt belief in the batik 
business as a family tradition drove batik owner-managers to sustain their businesses 
through good times and bad times. Moreover, traditional batik as a commodity traded by 
Chinese Indonesian owner-managers has its own unique value. The traditional batik cloth 
became garments expressing the identity of the wearers and with the high quality of batik 









Chapter 6 The Emergence of Javanese Family Firms in the Traditional 




The involvement of the Javanese ethnic community in the Lasem batik industry started 
with their employment as batik workers for ethnic Chinese owner-managers. Even though 
they learned how to draw designs on batik cloth and had work experience in Chinese 
Indonesian batik firms, it was not easy for them to immediately become owner-managers. 
Limitations of capital and knowledge of the batik business, such as the colouring process 
and formulas, together with a lack of business management ability, hampered them. The 
emergence of Javanese owner-managers started after the New Order Government (1966-
1998) issued Presidential Decree No 7 of 1979 as part of the third phase of the 
government’s development plan. This facilitated employment opportunities in labour-
intensive industries, such as the batik industry, through a business development 
programme which targeted the lower levels of society in particular. 
 
When batik business-developing programmes conducted by the government became more 
accessible, the number of Javanese batik owner-managers who participated in the Lasem 
batik industry increased. In an interview with the chairman of Lasem Batik Cooperative, he 
said that in 2012 as many as 35 batik owner-managers were registered as members of the 
batik cooperative, comprising 14 Chinese Indonesian and 21 Javanese owner-managers. In 
2014 the total membership increased significantly to about 70 owner-managers, with no 
increase in the number of ethnic Chinese owner-managers. Conversely, the Javanese 
owner-managers increased to 56 in total. The increased number of Javanese owner-
managers showed the success of the government’s batik business-development 
programme, which will be explained in detail in the following section. The village 
residents who used to be batik workers were now starting their own business. Ethnic 
Javanese villagers who were formerly snack sellers in the market, makeup beauticians, 
furniture owner-managers or housewives started to go into the batik business after 
observing their neighbours’ successes.  
 
The emergence of Javanese batik owner-managers in a sector that was dominated by ethnic 
Chinese owner-managers raises questions. How did the Javanese cope with the constraints 
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of transforming themselves into batik owner-managers, and how, as newcomers, did they 
respond to the changing circumstances of tight competition? These phenomena are 
examined through the perspective of embeddedness. By investigating the changes at each 
level and in context (micro, meso and macro levels), a comprehensive picture of business 
sustainability could be formed. At the macro level, this study explores the responses of 
Javanese owner-managers to disruptions evolving from political and economic dynamics. 
It begins by identifying who provides external support to assist the Javanese owner-
managers to start-up their own businesses and how their roles have evolved. It then 
examines how they coped with the economic crisis. Meanwhile, at the micro level, it 
investigates the essential resources of Javanese owner-managers that determine business 
sustainability by considering the intermingling between the family and the firm. Lastly, at 
the meso level, it examines how Javanese owner-managers have responded to disruptions 
resulting from market dynamics; how they have responded to technological innovations in 
producing batik clothes; and how they have handled the tight competitive environment. 
Examining Javanese owner-managers’ responses to the challenges will allow a better 
understanding as to how their businesses developed over time and the extent to which they 
are able to be sustainable. The characteristics of Javanese owner-managers’ businesses will 
be discussed first. 
 
6.2 General Characteristics of Javanese Family Firms  
Javanese owner-managers’ batik businesses were family firms, owned and managed by 
members of one family. Commonly, parents ran the business assisted by family members 
who lived with them in the same house, and batik workers who were employed to meet 
production needs. These workers were often their extended family or neighbours. Unlike 
ethnic Chinese batik family firms, Javanese batik family firms had not inherited the 
business from their predecessors. Nearly all participants belonged to a first generation of 
owner-managers, who had pioneered their own batik businesses as owners and managers. 
Only one participant had received a business legacy from her partner, who was a Chinese 
Indonesian producer in Lasem.  
 
The initial involvement of the Javanese ethnic community as batik owner-managers in the 
Lasem batik industry began during the New Order Government in the 1980s and flourished 
around 2005 when the batik business was booming. Two of the nine participants, Kasmini 
and Fahri, had started their business during the New Order Government era by joining a 
batik group in their village, which was formed by the village head of the Neighbourhood 
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Association as part of the New Order Government programme.  However, only Fahri, 
together with his wife, was still running the business at the time of this research. Kasmini 
no longer ran her own business, but provided daily help in her daughter’s batik business, 
Meranti Baru Batik. Kasmini’s batik business closed in 1998 as a result of the monetary 
crisis. Meanwhile, her daughter, Indriyati, started up her own batik business in 2008. She 
had not received any legacy of tangible resources related to the batik business from her 
mother, except the knowledge of drawing batik designs on the cloth. Indriyati had been a 
batik worker in an ethnic Chinese batik firm. 
 
Women played a dominant role in the Javanese batik firms as owners and managers. These 
women were former batik workers employed by ethnic Chinese owner-managers. Of the 
nine participants, only three were male, Jasmari, Rusmanto and Fahri. It is very likely that 
women predominated because they possessed the intangible capital of batik drawing skills 
and knowledge of motifs and designs. Women have historically played a core role in 
drawing batik, this was and is seen as a ‘female’ craft (the passion, patience, diligence and 
neatness, are traditionally seen as female Javanese qualities). At the same time, batik can 
be done ‘at home’ allowing women to work and take care of children and household duties 
as well. So in fact it offers them employment and income earning opportunities. This 
encouraged them to transform themselves into batik owner-managers. 
 
All male participants involved their wives in production activities while, conversely, not 
all female participants actively involved their husbands. Their husbands had their own 
businesses, for example, Sulastri’s husband ran a small store, Kasmini’s husband worked 
as a truck driver, Indriyati’s husband was employed in a private plantation and Rukmana’s 
husband was engaged in farming. Only Mardiyana sometimes involved her husband 
actively in the production activities. He was a wholesale mango buyer, therefore he only 
worked once a year during the mango season.  
 
Women Javanese batik owner-managers displayed confidence in presenting themselves 
and acknowledging that the business belonged to them. They actively sought opportunities: 
taking part in exhibitions, looking for resellers and potential out-of-town customers and 
joining the activities of organisations such as batik cooperatives and clusters. Nearly all 
female participants seemed completely independent in running their business; however, 
their husbands served as sources of information obtained through their extensive social 
networks. For example, they could hear about the announcement from the Regent of 
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Rembang requiring civil servants to use Lasem batik for uniforms, the plan for making a 
batik village in Lasem and the agenda of the Lasem batik festival. Husbands had more time 
to spend socializing than their wives, as women had to perform household tasks as well as 
running their business. 
 
Where the husbands were the business owners, their wives also played an active role in the 
batik business when they had spare time after taking care of the household. Rusmanto’s, 
Jasmari’s and Fahri’s wives did this by undertaking production tasks such as drawing batik 
designs on cloth that required patience, attention to detail, perseverance, and tidiness, 
qualities traditionally seen as belonging to women. 
 
Javanese batik businesses were informal. They had not obtained an Individual Business 
License (known as SIUP107) nor a Tax Payer Registration Number (known as NPWP108). 
Their reason for not arranging for SIUP and NPWP was that they felt their small-scale 
home industry did not need such legality and they did not want to be burdened with taxes 
due to their small income. One participant, Rukmana, said:  
“....Yes, I don’t want to pay any taxes whatsoever. My income is still very limited, it’s not 
every day I can sell cloth. Then how could I pay for my daily need? My business is still on a 
very small scale, so it does not have to be registered... what for? It would be quite 
complicated.” 
 
The participants were reluctant to formalize their businesses, and could see no advantages 
in doing this. However, many of the participants did, in fact, have bookkeeping accounts 
for their businesses, including Indriyati, Rusmanto, Jasmari, Sulastri, Rukmana, and 
Mardiyana. They had learned through training conducted by government and non-
government programmes.  
 
Javanese owner-managers usually employed their neighbours and extended family member 
as batik workers. Almost all Javanese owner-managers lived in a small village, which had 
a strong kinship family relationship. Therefore, Javanese owner-managers had close ties to 
their workers. Familial relationship presented as the foundation of the relationship between 
Javanese owner-managers and batik workers. They mainly employed outsource batik 
workers who worked in their own home. Only a few Javanese owner-managers employed 
workshop batik workers, such as KUB Kunthi who employed a group of workers who 
                                                
107 Surat Ijin Usaha Perdagangan(SIUP)  
108 Nomor Pokok Wajib Pajak (NPWP) 
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joined together to form the batik business. Suprapti also employed workshop batik 
workers, continuing her partner’s business practices.  
 
The outsource batik worker is paid for piecework (known as the borongan system), while 
the workshop batik worker receives a daily wage. All workers are female. Most Javanese 
batik owner-managers employed outsource batik workers. Having limited financial capital, 
this helped them to control their financial resources. They could outsource work when 
required, instead of paying daily expenses for batik workers. Because the Javanese owner-
managers often had a family relationship with the outsource batik workers, and lived in the 
same area, they entrusted the workers with plain clothes to be drawn at home. The 
outsource batik worker was usually paid in advance meaning it could be risky to entrust 
plain clothes with an unknown batik worker. 
 
How the Javanese owner-managers determined daily wages for outsource batik workers 
depended on the tasks, such as nglengkreng, nerusi or nembok. They paid IDR2,500109 for 
nerusi, IDR4,000110 for nembok and IDR5,000111 for nglengkreng for each piece of cloth. 
The daily wage for a workshop batik worker in 2014 was around IDR21,000112 to 
IDR27,000113, depending on their skill and ability, their neatness and the length of time 
employed by the firm.  
 
The newly-emerged Javanese batik owner-managers in Lasem relied on external support to 
facilitate their start-up and to manage their own independent businesses. The importance of 
the provision of external support to the start-up and development phases of Javanese batik 
businesses will be discussed in the next section. 
 
6.3 External Support 
There were two phases in the emergence of Javanese owner-managers in the Lasem batik 
industry. The first phase was during the New Order Government era (1966-1998) around 
the 1980s, and the second phase occurred in the period of the Reformation government 
                                                
109 It is equivalent to £0.129 with exchange rate £1 equal to IDR19,370 in 2014 
(source:http://www.bps.go.id/LinkTableDinamis/view/id/952) 
110 It is equivalent to £0.206 with exchange rate £1 equal to IDR19,370 in 2014 
(source:http://www.bps.go.id/LinkTableDinamis/view/id/952) 
111 It is equivalent to £0.258 with exchange rate £1 equal to IDR19,370 in 2014 
(source:http://www.bps.go.id/LinkTableDinamis/view/id/952) 
112 It is equivalent to £1.084 with exchange rate £1 equal to IDR19,370 in 2014 
(source:http://www.bps.go.id/LinkTableDinamis/view/id/952) 
113 It is equivalent to £1.394 with exchange rate £1 equal to IDR19,370 in 2014 
(source:http://www.bps.go.id/LinkTableDinamis/view/id/952) 
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(1998 – today) after 2005. The development of these Javanese owner-managers occurred 
when they received support either from the government or non-government institutions. 
Almost all participants starting their own batik business had external help. Only one 
participant, Suprapti, did not have external support when she entered the batik business 
because she continued her husband’s business.  
 
External parties who played roles in the process of transforming batik workers into batik 
owner-managers are summed up in the following table. 
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Both the central and local governments played an important role in the participants’ 
process of transforming themselves into batik owner-managers. The central government 
                                                
114 Indonesian Pluralism Institute (IPI) 
 139 
operated a programme which provided aid in the production process, marketing promotion 
and market creation. Support included production and management training, grant funding, 
free exhibition stands and marketing assistance. The development programme for this 
community started during the New Order Government era under the third Five Year 
Development Plan programme (known as Repelita) which aimed to increase job 
opportunities in labour-intensive industries. The programme was implemented through the 
Ministry of Cooperation and Small Medium Enterprise of the Republic of Indonesia. The 
batik industry was considered to be labour-intensive, therefore an aid programme was 
created to develop batik business groups through the village heads. According to Kasmini 
and Fahri, the aid programme incorporated different kinds of training, including making 
batik patterns up to colouring and providing working capital in the form of equipment, raw 
materials, and financial capital. Kasmini related her experience as follows: 
In 1987, her younger sister, Juriyah, asked Kasmini to join the Meranti batik group. Juriyah 
was the wife of an RT (Neighbourhood Association) in Selopuro village which received 
government aid through the office of Rembang Regency Cooperative to develop batik 
businesses for a group of batik workers in the village. The government chose Selopuro 
village because most female villagers in Selopuro village were batik workers. Kasmini 
agreed to join the Meranti batik group even though she had run her own batik business. The 
group received aid from the Government in the form of equipment, training, raw materials 
and finance. Through Meranti batik group, Kasmini learned the colouring process; however, 
her sister, Juriyah kept the formula secret. No other group members knew the colouring 
formula. Only Juriyah, as the chairperson representing her group, received colouring 
training. Fahri, Juriyah’s relative also, joined the Meranti batik group; but he was more 
fortunate. He obtained the colouring formula from Juriyah and he had learned the proper 
colouring process through working in an ethnic Chinese batik family firm. 
 
The local government of Rembang Regency regularly offered batik owner-managers the 
opportunity to take part in exhibitions free of charge. One of the participants, Fahri, often 
used exhibition stands without charge from 2005 until 2010. However, after that he had to 
pay the rent for the stand himself, as many new owner-managers were emerging and the 
government started to shift its aid to the new batik owner-managers. Fahri’s account of his 
experience is detailed below: 
“From 2000 until 2010s, I normally got exhibition facilities from the local government. But 
now I can say I am independent. Since 2010 until now I’ve been on my own, already doing 
things by myself. In the past, when there were only a few owner-managers, it was the 
government who sponsored me, who bore the cost of the exhibition. Now there are a lot of 
owner-managers, so the government gives aid to the new owner-managers.” 
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The government’s intensive programmes to boost the batik industry encouraged batik 
workers who had been working for Chinese Indonesian owner-managers to become batik 
owner-managers. Even village officials started exploiting the new opportunities to become 
batik owner-managers, as they were among the first, due to their function, to gain access to 
the information about the government programmes. The participants’ motivation to start 
their batik business is summed up in the following table. 
 
Table 6.2 The Motivation of Javanese Batik Owner-managers to Start Their Own 
Batik Business 




-over Year Motivation 
Kasmini 62 √  1973 Increase the family income 
Fahri 54 √  1987 • Earn income to meet daily needs. 
• Obtained training from the 
government through Meranti Batik 
business group 
Suprapti 62  √ 2007 Continued batik business from Tan Go 
Liang (Chinese Indonesian owner-
manager), her partner, who had died 
Indriyati 40 √  2008 • Help her husband to meet family 
needs as her children had grown up 
• Noticed other people successfully 
running batik businesses due to 
demand for batik  
• The government provided training, 
particularly in colouring 
Rusmanto 45 √  2008 • Batik business was his only 
opportunity to meet daily needs after 
his failure to be re-elected as village 
head  
• Utilized the resources obtained from 
the training programme when still 
serving as head of the village  
• Took advantage of his ability to get 
access to government programmes 
for working capital 
Sulastri 41 √  2009 • To enhance her welfare  
• Noticed that the government gave 
much support in the form of 
training, provision of exhibition 
stands without charge 
Mardiyana 39 √  2010 • Family needs increased when her 
oldest daughter started higher 
education in Yogyakarta city 
• Wanted to be independent, detached 
from the Kunthi Business Group  
• Wanted more freedom to express 
herself in patterns and colour choice  
• Wanted to set her own prices rather 
than go on being a batik worker 
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Jasmari 44 √  2011 • Took advantage of the government 
programme in developing Lasem 
batik 
• As head of Krajan sub-village, 
wanted to empower women in his 
village who were former batik 
workers  
• Wanted to preserve typical kawung 
ece batik motif in his village 
• Eager to be independent 
Rukmana 51 √  2013 • Start their own business to enhance 
family income  
• Noticed Mardiyana’s success in 
starting her own business and felt 
able to do similar things 
 
This shows that economic motivation was the prime driver for Javanese batik workers to 
start their own batik firm.  
 
The government’s programmes were administered through the Ministry of Trade, Republic 
of Indonesia; Ministry of Cooperation and Small and Medium Enterprises of the Republic 
Indonesia; and Ministry of Youth and Sports Affairs. The programmes were given in the 
form of free training, grant funding, free marketing assistance and free exhibition stalls, 
including accommodation and transportation. At the local level, aid was administered 
either through the Lasem Batik Cooperative or the Lasem Batik Cluster. When there were 
not enough opportunities for all members, lots would be drawn. Following is Jasmari’s 
account of his experience of using a free exhibition stand from the Ministry of Trade, 
Republic of Indonesia. 
“From Rembang Office of Industry, the Lasem Batik Cooperative was allocated exhibition 
stalls without charge in Solo for three owner-managers. Three owner-managers were chosen 
by drawing lots. That time 30 people came to a meeting in the Cooperative, and the pieces of 
paper were then properly shaken. I win the lots and get free exhibition stall. Then I went to 
take part in the exhibition in Donohudhan Haj Residence Hall in Solo when the Asian 
Paralympic Games were being held.” 
 
Jasmari often obtained exhibition stands free of charge: three times from the Ministry of 
Youth and Sports Affairs and Ministry of Tourism and Creative Economy; more than five 
times from the Ministry of Trade, Republic of Indonesia and Ministry of Cooperation and 
Small and Medium Enterprises of the Republic of Indonesia. He was not only lucky in 
winning the drawing of lots for free exhibition stalls, but also benefited from his close 
relationships with a government officer. Initially he developed business acquaintance with 
 142 
the government official, but as time went on, the relationship became more familiar and 
personal, which provided an opportunity for him in getting access to government 
programs.  
“First, familiarity matters, because we are still small owner-managers and have to be 
nurtured. So, owner-managers doing small-scale business like me can get free exhibition 
facilities from government. On 5 December 2014, I got a chance to join exhibitions at 
Simpang Lima mall in Semarang during the Indonesian Film Festival. Thank God, I was 
given exhibition facilities.” 
 
Close relations with civil servants of the Ministry of Youth and Sports Affairs at provincial 
level provided an opportunity for Jasmari to get colouring training in Pekalongan twice. He 
related his experience as follows: 
“I’m well acquainted with a civil servant working in the Department of Tourism, who I met 
at the Tourism Awareness Group (Kelompok Sadar Wisata or Pokdarwis) competition, where 
I became the first winner. I got to know Ministry of Youth and Sports Affairs officer, namely 
Ms Martini. I have good relationship with her. Then, I asked her to invite me when there is 
any training. And I got the opportunities to attending training in batik colouring process, even 
twice.” 
 
In addition, Sulastri stated that her close relationship with a government officer gave her 
access to opportunities, such as free training, free exhibition stands and assistance in 
marketing. Sulastri’s government officer contact often took her products to be marketed in 
domestic or overseas exhibitions and her batik products had been displayed at an 
exhibition in Canada. Sulastri was often appointed by a government officer as a tutor to 
deliver training in the batik making processes. She was asked by the Ministry of 
Cooperation and Small and Medium Enterprises of the Republic Indonesia of Blora 
Regency to provide batik training. Becoming a batik tutor enriched her network, 
particularly with the government officer who provided her access to government batik 
programmes.  
 
The other programme delivered by the Ministry of Tourism and Creative Economy and 
Ministry of Youth and Sports Affairs included competitions for the Tourism Awareness 
Group. This group comprises people involved in tourism who support the welfare of the 
community. As prizes, grants were provided through the Tourism Independent Programme 
of National Community Empowerment 115, which promotes welfare and creates job 
                                                
115 Known as Program Nasional Pemberdayaan Masyarakat (PNPM) Mandiri Pariwisata  
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opportunities for poor communities to become more independent through the tourism 
industry. The President of the Republic of Indonesia first launched this programme in 
2007.116 The grant funding was managed by Tourism Awareness Group members to 
develop the village community. Jasmari, who won grant funding from the Tourism 
Independent programme of National Community Empowerment, experienced this. He used 
the funding to develop batik production activities in Babagan village by recruiting village 
women who were willing to become batik workers because Babagan villagers used to be 
batik workers when the batik business flourished under the Dutch Colonial government in 
the 19th century. 
 
In addition to these government bodies, other institutions also aided the Javanese owner-
managers’ transformation process. These included the National Handcrafts Board117, 
government owned enterprises, non-government organisations (NGOs) and Chinese 
Indonesian Batik Owner-managers. These bodies provided aid in the form of working 
capital, training, free exhibition stands and marketing assistance. The role of each 
association is discussed below. 
 
Firstly, the National Handcrafts Board is a government established, non-profit community 
institution that supports and observes the cultural and arts. Its activities comprise nurturing, 
developing, sustaining and promoting the nation’s cultural legacy, namely the crafts that 
have grown and developed in different areas of Indonesia. Each regency or town 
throughout Indonesia has its own Regional National Handcrafts Board called Dekranasda, 
headed by the regent’s or the mayor’s wife. This organisation helped in the process of 
transforming batik workers into batik owner-managers. Rusmanto was one participant who 
benefitted from free exhibition facilities and obtained aid five times. Similarly, Sulastri 
was given a free exhibition stand from the Dekranasda in Lasem. Indriyati had been able 
to sell her batik products on consignment in the Dekranas exhibition hall in Semarang, 
where the selling price was determined by the Dekranas.  
 
Secondly, Government Owned Enterprise (known as BUMN)118 is a business unit 
belonging to the government. For this reason, the government required BUMN to provide 
the Partnership and Environmental Care Programme (known as PKBL)119 as a form of 
                                                
116Source:http://www.tnp2k.go.id/id/tanyajawab/klusterii/kelompokprogramberbasispemberdayaanmasyarak
at-programnasional-pemberdayaanmasyarakat-papan-mandiri/accessed on 28 November 2016. 
117 Dewan Kerajinan Nasional or Dekranas 
118 BUMN is Badan Usaha Milik Negara  
119 PKBL is Program Kemitraan dan Bina Lingkungan  
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BUMN’s Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR for short). This was determined in the 
regulations of BUMN state Minister Number Per – 05/MBU/2007 about BUMN’s 
Programme of Partnership with Small Enterprises and Environmental Care Programme.  
PKBL programmes offered a very low interest rate of 6% per annum, with maximum loans 
of IDR75 million120 repayable within a maximum of three years. This programme helped 
Javanese owner-managers to access loans using flexible collateral assets. Rusmanto, 
among others, borrowed IDR20 million121 with only his motorbike certificate of ownership 
(valued at IDR7 million122) as collateral for the loan. This programme was normally 
provided to groups of five owner-managers. BUMNs that provided the PKBL funds for 
batik owner-managers were the Mandiri Bank, Indonesian National Bank (BNI) and Bank 
of Republic Indonesia (BRI), health insurance (ASKES) and Indonesia Integrated Security 
Printing and System (called PERURI). Most participants took advantage of the PKBL 
programme within one to four years after the establishment of their batik businesses.  
 
Besides offering business loans, PKBL offered participants free exhibition stands as well as 
transportation and accommodation costs during the exhibition. Jasmari was given a free 
exhibition stand from the BRI bank for five days at Patra Jasa Hotel, Semarang, on the 
occasion of a Congress organized by the Association of Indonesian Women Entrepreneurs. 
Rusmanto obtained an exhibition stand from Mandiri Bank at the Jakarta Convention 
Centre for five days. He felt very fortunate because if he had been required to pay it would 
have cost IDR15 million123. Furthermore, the location of the stand was strategic, because 
the area was specifically allocated for sponsors. Rusmanto was also given IDR4 million to 
reimburse his transportation, meal and accommodation costs during the exhibition. He was 
able to attend batik training in Solo, and then join a comparative study tour in Japan. These 
opportunities came from PERURI after he applied for a loan of IDR 30 million124 from the 
PKBL programme. Rusmanto easily accessed the PKBL programme since he has wider 
networks. As a head of a batik cluster, he was known within society and many people 
came to him when they needed information about the Lasem batik industry. Therefore, his 
wider networks provided him greater opportunity. As the head of a batik cluster he was 
frequently contacted by the institutional bodies running the programmes related to 
                                                
120 It is equivalent to £3,871.967 with exchange rate £1 equal to IDR 9,370 in 2014 
(source:http://www.bps.go.id/LinkTableDinamis/view/id/952) 
121 It is equivalent to £1,032.525 with exchange rate £1 equal to IDR19,370 in 2014 
(source:http://www.bps.go.id/LinkTableDinamis/view/id/952) 
122 It is equivalent to £361.384 with exchange rate £1 equal to IDR19,370 in 2014 
(source:http://www.bps.go.id/LinkTableDinamis/view/id/952) 
123 It is equivalent to £774.394 with exchange rate £1 equal to IDR19,370 in 2014 
(source:http://www.bps.go.id/LinkTableDinamis/view/id/952) 
124 It is equivalent to £1,548.787 with exchange rate £1 equal to IDR19,370 in 2014 
(source:http://www.bps.go.id/LinkTableDinamis/view/id/952) 
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developing the batik industry and they offered opportunities to the cluster members to 
participate in their programmes. However, he took the opportunities for himself, if he were 
interested, and initially shared with his close relatives, before offering the opportunities to 
batik cluster members.  
 
Besides being able to take part in exhibitions, training, and comparative study, after joining 
the PKBL programme with the Indonesian National Bank (BNI) by forming a joint 
enterprise group, named KUB 125 Sri Ratu, Sulastri made an agreement with BNI to rent 
one of her properties in Babagan village and rebuild it as a batik showroom. Sulastri not 
only enjoyed the rental income but also could sell her batik products in this shop. At the 
end of the rental period, she obtained the building valued at IDR300 million126.  
 
Thirdly, an NGO named the Indonesian Pluralism Institute (IPI) played an important role 
in the process of transforming batik workers into owner-managers. IPI’s programme was 
limited to a group of ex-batik labourers who had chosen to be trained as entrepreneurs. 
Two participants became beneficiaries of IPI’s aid, Rukmana and Mardiyana. This institute 
is a non-profit organisation that had researched the Lasem batik revitalization since 2004. 
Based on that research, a joint enterprise group, known as KUB Kunthi, was formed which 
appointed former batik workers with experience in working in ethnic Chinese batik firms 
as its members. 
 
IPI appointed Rukmana as head of KUB Kunthi and asked her to look for batik workers 
who were willing to become group members. Based on an interview with Wang Shen Ren, 
the director of the Indonesian Institute of Pluralism, IPI provided aid and advocacy to 
create batik owner-managers and promote women’s well-being in Jeruk village. He 
realized the importance of IPI in facilitating the success of the community empowerment 
programme through KUB Kunthi. IPI gave support and advocacy intensively from 2006 
until 2010. The support was in the form of training that included batik work, colouring 
with chemicals as well as natural substances, design, business management, organisation, 
marketing and book keeping. Rukmana and Mardiyana attended training given directly by 
experts. For example, for colouring, Rukmana and Mardiyana were sent to Pekalongan127 
                                                
125 Kelompok Usaha Bersama (KUB) 
126 It is equivalent to £15,487.868 with exchange rate £1 equal to IDR19,370 in 2014 
(source:http://www.bps.go.id/LinkTableDinamis/view/id/952) 
127 Pekalongan is a city in Central Java Island in Indonesia well known as a centre for batik l in Indonesia.   
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to learn the process of chemical colouring, and to Imogiri128 to learn natural colouring. IPI 
also invited a designer directly from Jakarta to give training at KUB Kunthi. For this 
reason, Rukmana then felt that she no longer needed to join any training organized by the 
government. Aside from training, IPI also provided marketing assistance. Through one of 
its members, Ms Yola, IPI helped to market KUB Kunthi’s products in Jakarta. As stock 
became available, Mardiyana would send it to Jakarta. When each batik piece was sold, Ms 
Yola would send the money. When there was an exhibition, IPI NGO would invite KUB 
Kunthi to participate. 
 
In addition, IPI NGO’s aid included initial working capital, such as tools and equipment 
for batik work, construction of a workshop and a well valued at IDR10 million129, 65 
pieces of unbleached plain cloth 2.5 m X 1.1 m, 500 kg of wax, and wages of up to IDR3 
million130 per month until KUB Kunthi had earned income from the batik sold. Rukmana 
said that when there was not enough money to pay the workers’ wages and her batik stock 
had not been sold, she would ask IPI for the cash needed. In addition, according to 
Rukmana and Mardiyana, IPI staff accompanied them to meet the supplier of batik raw 
materials in Solo, enabling them to get supplies at lower prices. The comprehensive 
support given by IPI made Rukmana feel that she did not need to join the cooperative, as 
everything was provided by IPI. Actually, Rukmana followed the advice of IPI to not join 
the cooperation. However, it later became known that there was conflict between the head 
of IPI and the head of the cooperative. This intensive advocacy programme formally came 
to an end in 2011; however, support in the form of product marketing assistance in Jakarta 
and advice continued informally.  
 
Fourthly, external support came from ethnic Chinese owner-managers when the 
participants were trying to start their batik businesses although Chinese Indonesian owner-
managers were not intentionally helping batik workers to start their own business. One 
Chinese Indonesian producer (Jie Kio) gave Kasmini the opportunity to buy unbleached 
plain cloth, wax and colouring materials. She was lucky, because, at that time, Chinese 
Indonesian owner-managers had a very closed attitude, and none was willing to help in 
either colouring or providing batik materials. With Jie Kio’s help, Kasmini was able to 
produce batik cloth to sell by herself, although only on a very small scale because her 
                                                
128 Imogiri is a village in Yogyakarta, on Java Island in Indonesia, which had been a source of batik workers 
when Yogyakarta batik was flourishing. 
129 It is equivalent to £565.067 with exchange rate £1 equal to IDR17,697 in 2006 
(source:http://www.bps.go.id/LinkTableDinamis/view/id/952) 
130 It is equivalent to £169.520 with exchange rate £1 equal to IDR17,697 in 2006 
(source:http://www.bps.go.id/LinkTableDinamis/view/id/952) 
 147 
capital was limited. As a former batik worker for Jie Kio, Kasmini’s privileged relationship 
allowed her to buy the raw materials for drawing batik, such as plain cloth and wax, and 
take her clothes to be coloured.  
 
Another producer who assisted some participants in starting their business was Lie Sio 
Lan’s mother, owner of Merah Delima. Lie Sio Lan’s mother was encouraged to provide 
batik training, without charge, to village residents and schools that were willing to include 
batik as an extracurricular activity. This was done to encourage more of the younger 
generation to become batik workers, because young villagers were reluctant to do this 
work. The resultant shortage of batik workers was critical to her business, because batik 
production is time consuming. Rusmanto and Sulastri appreciated Lie Sio Lan’s mother’s 
movement in providing free training in drawing batik. Lie Sio Lan’s mother was active in 
revitalizing Lasem batik in collaboration with the government. Indriyati was one 
participant who was helped by Lie Sio Lan’s mother to obtain information that helped her 
to access training in the colouring process conducted by the government.  
 
6.4 Transfer of Knowledge 
Participants learned about different aspects of the batik business from a wide variety of 
sources. For example, Mardiyana learned from her grandmother, her former work place, 
the government and IPI NGO. To provide a more comprehensive picture, the participants’ 
sources of knowledge are presented in the following table. 
 





















































Suprapti X     X   
Kasmini X  X      
Fahri X  X    X  
Indriyati X X X      
Sulastri X X X X   X X 
Jasmari   X X     
Rusmanto   X X    X 
Rukmana X    X  X  
Mardiyana  X X  X  X  
 
Most participants came from batik workers’ families and had experience working in 
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Chinese Indonesian batik family firms. They learned about patterns and design motifs, and 
combining colours, through their daily activities. Participants from batik workers’ families 
inherited intangible assets such as how to draw on the cloth from their parents through 
involvement in batik making from an early age. Their parents often brought home the plain 
cloth to be drawn to increase family income. They were paid according to the number of 
pieces of cloth they completed, and they normally mobilized all family members to help 
finish the work. This created the opportunity for learning. 
 
Children gained explicit or tacit knowledge from their parents through experience and 
observation The mother would draw on the cloth using a canting (a pen-like tool), while 
the child listened and observed. Rukmana commented: 
“In the past, my mother became a batik worker in a Chinese Indonesian batik firm. My mom 
often brought the cloth home to work on it. Although I was still very little, I often watched 
and tried to do what I saw from her. In the end I got used to it. So, when the completed batik 
cloth was taken back to the Chinese Indonesian producer, I was given some money. How 
happy I was, as I was just a little girl then. Sometimes the Chinese Indonesian producer gave 
me a cake. Not bad, I could help my parents.” 
 
Some participants learned from their grandmothers. Mardiyana was one of these. Her 
grandmother was an outsource batik worker. Meanwhile, Mardiyana’s mother worked 
every day in a Chinese Indonesian producer’s workshop in Lasem. Mardiyana sometimes 
accompanied her mother to her work place.  
“It took me a long time to learn from grandma. I enjoyed helping since the fourth grade of 
primary school, but only for the easiest parts. I still couldn’t do large patterns. Grandma did 
this. I just did the little things. Sometimes, on Sundays when I didn’t have to go to school, I 
accompanied my mom when she went to work in Lasem. She went there almost every day. 
She was paid based on how much cloth she completed.” 
 
Consequently, knowledge transfer of between generations happened when children became 
involved in the older generation’s economic activities.   
 
Transfer of knowledge occurred not only from older generations in the family, but also 
from the ethnic Chinese batik owner-managers who employed them. Rukmana was one of 
these. 
“Yes, in the past when I was working, of course I also had to be able to differentiate the 
motifs. This is sekar jagad. This is gunung ringgi.  I learnt from my boss who explained to 
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the buyer about the name of the motifs when he explained to the buyers names of his 
products.”  
Aside from knowledge about patterns, some participants also learned how to do pattern 
duplication effectively and efficiently. Mardiyana had formerly worked for Rembulan 
batik and she remembered: 
“For a long time, I’ve been used to making Lasem patterns, so I’ve become familiar with 
them. The Chinese Indonesian owner-managers I worked for provided all the patterns, large 
and small. They provided a ready-made batik cloth as an example, and then I was asked to 
make one like that. So, I did not use a pencil, I just duplicated the pattern by putting the 
master cloth under the one where a duplication would be made.” 
Participants also learned how to combine patterns because Chinese Indonesian owner-
managers instructed their workers in pattern arrangements. 
 
Experience in a Chinese Indonesian batik family firm provided participants with 
opportunities to become familiar with different kinds of patterns and also to practice their 
skill in drawing. The participating workers would put the master cloth or pattern sample 
under the plain cloth on which drawings would be made. Wax would then be applied using 
a canting following the lines that were dimly seen. Through this continuous daily practice, 
the participants improved their drawing skills, until eventually they no longer needed a 
master pattern. The designs had been clearly imprinted in their minds and only had to be 
poured out on the cloth. Chinese Indonesian owner-managers only had to tell them the 
name of a particular pattern and where it should be placed. The duplicating process was 
usually reserved for new patterns or for inexperienced batik workers who were still 
learning. 
 
Consequently, Chinese Indonesian batik family firms became business incubators for 
Javanese owner-managers who were formerly batik workers. Fahri learned about the 
colouring process when working for a Chinese Indonesian batik producer. However, he 
could not do the colouring process by himself, as the colouring substances were always 
premixed and measured out in separate plastic bags by the Chinese Indonesian owner-
managers. Fahri just applied them in the colouring process. This made it difficult for the 
participants to imitate the colours produced by ethnic Chinese batik owners.  
 
Participants who had no experience working for ethnic Chinese owner-managers and did 
not come from batik making families learned through the training programmes organized 
by the government. These participants included Rusmanto, the former head of Pohlandak 
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village, Pancur district, and Jasmari, the head of Krajan village, Lasem district. As village 
level government officials, they could access training programmes conducted by the local 
government, because they were information channels for the government programmes. 
Merely attending the training sessions was not enough for Rusmanto and Jasmari to gain a 
full understanding of batik, since this takes more than one or two months. Moreover, they 
had no experience in the complicated processes of the batik business. Rusmanto and 
Jasmari expanded their knowledge by learning from batik outsource workers and local 
residents who had participated in the training programme. 
 
The training programmes conducted by the government also enriched the knowledge of 
participants who came from batik workers’ families and had experience working in ethnic 
Chinese batik family firms. This training taught them the new skills that were important for 
starting a batik business. 
 
Knowledge did not come only from the government’s training programmes. Some 
participants also learned through training organized by non-government institutions, such 
as an IPI NGO. Some were also helped by a Chinese Indonesian producer, who provided 
free training in batik work. Rusmanto recalled this and explained that, when he became the 
head of Pohlandak village in 2006, Lie Sio Lan’s mother asked him to be the coordinator 
for his village residents who were willing to do batik work. He said that Lie Sio Lan’s 
mother found it difficult to get batik workers. Rusmanto noticed that, at that time, only the 
older generation in the village still did batik work. The younger generation showed little 
interest, as they preferred to work in factories or shops for better wages. Lie Sio Lan’s 
mother’s training generated several new outsource batik workers. Sulastri also learned 
from Lie Sio Lan’s mother.  
“I used to be a batik worker. Then the Local Government of Rembang was active in helping 
us, the grassroots community, to have better income. Batik training was organized for us. 
Batik training was given through the Mandiri PNPM. Twenty people from one 
neighbourhood were taken to be trained in batik work in Lie Sio Lan’s mother’ house. She 
taught us the whole batik process from drawing patterns on a piece of batik cloth up to 
colouring; however, she did not tell the formula. She already passed away before our training 
was completed, in the early of 2010s if I’m not mistaken. Then finally her colleague, Mr. 
Rusmanto, taught us. He’s my cousin.” 
 
In another case, Suprapti learned not only from her parents but also from her partner, Tan 
Go Liang was a Chinese Indonesian batik producer. From her mother, she learnt batik 
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making skills. However, from Tan Go Liang she learned about business management, such 
as managing the workers, finance management and the colouring process. She used to be 
one of the  batik workers of Tan Go Liang,  until later  she became his mistress. After he 
passed away, she was the only heir to Tan Go Liang’s batik firm, as he did not have a wife 
or children.  
 
6.5 Limited Financial Capital 
One of the major impediments for the Javanese batik owner-managers in starting and 
developing their business was limited financial capital. Rukmana related, 
“At first, I was wondering whether it would be possible for me to become a producer, as 
becoming a producer required a lot of capital. I needed capital before I could sell batik 
products, and I need to sell batik products to accumulate working capital. It’s the same as 
keeping stock available. So, I wasn’t brave enough to start a batik business.” 
 
Most former batik workers, who were generally poor villagers, had financial difficulty in 
setting up their businesses. Village communities in the Rembang regency were usually 
farmers, but if they did not have rice fields and could not afford to rent plots of land, they 
were likely to become agricultural labourers or batik workers. Javanese owner-managers 
who lacked capital employed several strategies to initiate and develop their businesses. 
This sub-section will explain those strategies. 
 
They minimized costs by involving their family members in their business, including their 
spouses, parents, younger siblings and children. Jasmari and Fahri’s wives worked to 
reduce the cost of employing batik workers. Similarly, Indriyati involved her mother in 
drawing batik designs on cloth. Sulastri asked her parents to help fold and count the batik 
pieces. Rukmana asked her son to do colouring, while her daughter drew the patterns on 
the cloth. Mardiyana asked her husband to help with the colouring, while her daughter did 
the drawing. Rusmanto mobilized his family members: his wife assisted in the production 
and marketing at home, while his two younger siblings did the colouring and collected the 
finished product from the outsource batik workers’ houses. 
 
To reduce labour costs, whenever they could, participants tended to undertake the 
production activities by themselves rather than employing workers. Female participants, in 
particular, tried to produce the batik work themselves, amidst the activities of managing 
their business. Mardiyana (among others) did the batik work herself rather than pay for 
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additional batik workers, as did Sulastri, who still drew the batik patterns herself whenever 
she was not busy taking part in exhibitions or providing training. When she was not taking 
part in exhibitions, Indriyati also prepared the cloth and then drew the designs by applying 
wax on the cloth. Below is the summary of family involvement in Javanese family firms. 
 
Table 6.4 Family Involvement and The Roles in Javanese Batik Family Firm in 
Lasem  
The family firm Family members’ 
involvement 
Descriptions 
Kasmini The owner Name: Kasmini 
Gender/Age: Female/62 
Roles: Undertaking daily business activities, 
such as, managing batik workers, general 
business transactions, financial management, 
managing materials, contact with suppliers, 
drawing batik designs on the cloth 
Daughter Name: Indriyati 
Gender/Age: Female/40 
Roles: Drawing batik designs on the cloth 
Tan Go Liang The owner Name: Suprapti 
Gender/Age: Female/62 
Roles:  Undertaking daily business activities, 
such as, general business transactions, 
financial management, managing batik 
workers, managing materials, contact with 
suppliers, drawing batik designs on the cloth 
Rusa Makmur The owner Name: Fahri 
Gender/Age: Male/54 
Roles: Undertaking daily business activities, 
such as, general business transactions, 
financial management, managing batik 
workers, managing materials, contact with 
suppliers and customers 
Spouse Name: Sriyani 
Gender/Age: Female/46 
Roles:  Drawing batik designs on the clothes 
Kamboja The owner Name: Rukmana 
Gender/Age: Female/51 
Roles:  Undertaking daily business activities, 
such as, managing batik workers, general 
business transactions, financial management, 
managing materials, contact with suppliers, 
drawing batik designs on the cloth 
Son Name: Bima 
Gender/Age: Male/23 
Roles: Helping in colouring process 
Daughter Name: Kartika 
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Gender/Age: Male/23 
Roles:  Drawing batik designs on the cloth 
Raja The owner Name: Rusmanto 
Gender/Age: Male/45 
Roles: Active in the business activities, such 
as, managing batik workers, welcoming 
buyers, business transactions, mixing 
colouring formula, general business 
transactions, financial management, contact 
with suppliers, marketing at exhibitions, 
active in organisations’ activities 
Spouse Name: Waryati 
Gender/Age: Female/39 
Roles: Active in business production such as 
drawing batik designs on the cloth, managing 
raw material, selecting the cloth to be 
coloured; marketing product at home 
Younger Brother Name: 
Baskoro 
Gender/Age: Male/26 
Roles: Helping Rusmanto by 
counting clothes, welcoming 
buyers, colouring activities and 
collecting finished product from 




Roles: Helping Rusmanto by 
counting clothes, welcoming 
buyers, colouring activities and 
collecting finished product from 
outsource batik workers’ houses 
Mawar Melati The owner Name: Jasmari 
Gender/Age: Male/44 
Roles:  Active in the business activities such 
as, managing batik workers, general business 
transactions, financial management, 
marketing at exhibitions, mixing colouring 
formula, contact with suppliers, welcoming 
guests, active in organisations’ activities 
Spouse Name: Rokhayah 
Gender/Age: Female/40 
Roles: Drawing batik designs on the cloth 
Suka Rame The owner Name: Sulastri 
Gender/Age: Female/41 
Roles:  Undertaking daily business activities 
such as, managing batik workers, general 
business transactions, financial management, 
managing materials, contact with suppliers, 
drawing batik designs on the cloth, active in 
organisations’ activities 
Mother Name: Triyanti 
Gender/Age: Female/71 
Roles:  Folding finished batik cloth 
Meranti Baru The owner Name: Indriyati 
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Participants tended to employ outsource batik workers rather than workshop batik workers 
as a means of coping with their limited capital as this reduced production costs. Most of 
the batik workers have kinship relationship with the owner-managers. According to 
Rukmana, it was more economic than paying daily wages, because the cost for an 
outsource batik worker to complete one piece of cloth was much less. She related as 
follows: 
“… yes, I also sent the cloth outside (outsource batik worker) to be finished. For example, I 
paid the outsource worker IDR50,000131 for each finished product. Here, when the patterns 
are rather complicated, the cost is IDR25,000132 a day, and one piece takes three or four 
days, meaning that the total cost is between IDR75,000133 and IDR100,000134 and so on…” 
 
                                                
131 It is equivalent to £2.581 with exchange rate £1 equal to IDR19,370 in 2014 
(source:http://www.bps.go.id/LinkTableDinamis/view/id/952) 
132 It is equivalent to £0.775 with exchange rate £1 equal to IDR19,370 in 2014 
(source:http://www.bps.go.id/LinkTableDinamis/view/id/952) 
133 It is equivalent to £3.872 with exchange rate £1 equal to IDR19,370 in 2014 
(source:http://www.bps.go.id/LinkTableDinamis/view/id/952) 
134 It is equivalent to £5.163 with exchange rate £1 equal to IDR19,370 in 2014 
(source:http://www.bps.go.id/LinkTableDinamis/view/id/952) 
Gender/Age: Female/40 
Role:  Undertaking daily business activities 
such as, managing batik workers, general 
business transactions, financial management, 
managing materials, contact with suppliers, 
drawing batik designs on the cloth 
Husband Name: Rosidi 
Gender/Age: Male/45 
Role: Active in organisations’ activities 
Mother Name: Kasmini 
Gender/Age: Female/62 
Roles: Drawing batik designs on the cloth 
Gajah Buana The owner Name: Mardiyana  
Gender/Age: Female/39 
Roles:  Active in the business activities such 
as, managing batik workers, general business 
transactions, financial management, managing 
materials, marketing at exhibitions, mixing 
colouring formula, contact with suppliers, 
active in organisations’ activities 
Husband Nama: Guntoro 
Gender/Age: Male/45 
Roles: Helping in colouring process, except in 
mango season. 
Daughter Nama: Suliyanti 
Gender/Age: Female/20 
Roles:  Drawing batik designs on the cloth 
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Another benefit of this practice, according to the participants, was the fact that they did not 
have to provide a workshop with the necessary equipment and pay the additional costs for 
the workers’ lunches, since the outsource workers worked in their own homes. The 
Javanese owner-managers lived near the outsource batik workers’ homes, thus it was easy 
for the participants to control them. Several outsource batik workers employed by the 
participants were relatives they knew very well, thus the participants had a high level of 
trust in them.  
 
As an economic measure, participants usually received prospective buyers in the family 
living room. Fahri decided not to open a showroom due to his limited capital; he 
prioritized his funds for taking part in exhibitions, since exhibitions were considered to be 
an effective way to find customers. To use the living room, he only needed to equip it with 
shelves to display their products, as every house basically had a living room located at the 
front of the house furnished with tables and chairs. Participants put the shelves near the 
chairs and tables so that buyers could see the display on the shelves. Some participants 
made some changes to the living room to suit the needs of their batik business. Sulastri 
changed the living room so that it looked like a batik shop equipped with two glass show 
cases containing folded batik pieces, a clothing rail display to hang batik garments and 
three hanging racks (known as gawangan) to hang the batik clothes for display. Indriyati 
divided her living room into two sections, one equipped with tables and chairs for 
receiving guests and the other decorated like a showroom equipped with hanging racks, 
shop windows, clothing rail display for hanging garments and mannequins. 
 
Two participants, Mardiyana and Jasmari, opened showrooms in another place while still 
accepting guests at home. Mardiyana rented a kiosk for IDR3,000,000135 a year across the 
main road of Pancur village, next to an alley leading to her village and about five hundred 
metres from her house. Her house was located well inside the village, so she decided to 
rent a kiosk in a strategic place by the side of the main road so that customers would find it 
easier to visit her shop. Rural houses had no numbers or street names and were only known 
by the name of the village, the number of the Neighbourhood Association (known as RT) 
and a Local Association (RW) number; hence it was not easy for customers to find her 
house. Mardiyana chose to work alone in her shop to reduce costs. As a result, when there 
were a lot of orders she had to close her shop while she made the batik herself at home. For 
the same reason, Jasmari decided to rent a small shop beside Lasem highway next to 
                                                
135 It is equivalent to £154.879 with exchange rate £1 equal to IDR19,370 in 2014 
(source:http://www.bps.go.id/LinkTableDinamis/view/id/952) 
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Babagan village resort, about 300 metres from his house. Jasmari employed a shop keeper 
as he did not want to close the shop when he was occupied with his business activities at 
home and or had to perform his duties as head of the sub-village.  
 
Another strategy to address limited capital was producing only a small quantity of batik 
cloth in the start-up phase. Most participants employed this strategy, particularly those who 
were ex-batik workers and  had no external financial support. Kasmini, for example, would 
make one or two pieces of her own batik cloth while still working as an outsource worker 
for a Chinese Indonesian producer. Mardiyana did this before she eventually decided to be 
independent and resign from the Kunthi Joint Enterprise Group. Rukmana did the same 
when she was learning to sell her own product.  
 
Limited capital forced participants to produce hand-drawn batik in the form of cloth only 
rather than finished clothing (batik garment). This minimized the risk, as people’s clothing 
tastes and sizes differed widely. The small scale owner-managers maintained that when 
batik was available in the form of cloth, consumers would be free to choose the patterns 
they liked and could have the cloth made into clothes in the fashion and sizes of their own 
choice. 
 
Besides selling batik cloth, participants chose to sell only fast moving items. This was 
done for the sake of quick turnover so that participants could maintain production levels. 
Consequently, all participants aimed their batik product at the low-middle class products 
with prices ranging from IDR60,000136 to IDR1,000,000137. The number of potential 
customers in that product’s market was quite large. Participants did not sell the upper class 
products, as the production process for high quality products was longer, complicated and 
required a great deal of accuracy. This meant a longer waiting time before payment was 
received. One participant sold hand-drawn as well as printed batik, such as machine made 
and cold wax silk-screened products because their low price meant they sold easily. 
Rusmanto, chairperson of Lasem Batik Cluster, related his experience as follows: 
“There was a customer who came to me and said .... ‘Sir, I have an order for 1000 pieces, but 
my budget is only IDR50,000138 for a piece’. So, it’s of course impossible for me to give 
hand-drawn batik. It must be printed. I gave her a suggestion like this. Madam, if you want 
                                                
136 It is equivalent to £3.097 with exchange rate £1 equal to IDR19,370 in 2014 
(source:http://www.bps.go.id/LinkTableDinamis/view/id/952) 
137 It is equivalent to £5.163 with exchange rate £1 equal to IDR19,370 in 2014 
(source:http://www.bps.go.id/LinkTableDinamis/view/id/952) 
138 It is equivalent to £2.581 with exchange rate £1 equal to IDR19,370 in 2014 
(source:http://www.bps.go.id/LinkTableDinamis/view/id/952) 
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to order with Lasem patterns with a budget of IDR50,000139, it means we’ll have them 
printed .... in Pekalongan or Solo. Mr Markum, one of Lasem batik producer, is already 
reducing his batik workers, as now, batik printed with Lasem patterns is available in Solo. 
He prefer to buy batik printed and resale it, since it is cheap.” 
 
Most participants were not concerned whether their buyers were resellers or end users. 
What was important to them was that their batik product sold. However, two participants, 
Kasmini and Suprapti, sold their product only to resellers. Kasmini said that resellers 
bought in large quantities thus, no matter how many clothes she made, her product would 
find a ready market. She made to order. Suprapti also sold only to resellers to continue her 
husband’s business practice.  She continued selling to several resellers who had become 
their regular customers and made to order. This was done to minimize the risk of the goods 
not being sold. The table below summarizes their product categorization, their target 
market, and the selling price range of their batik products. 
 





Retailer Wholesaler Product 
Categorization  
Price of one hand 
made batik cloth 
(In IDR) 
Price of one hand 
made batik cloth 
(Equivalent in 
GBP)140 
Kasmini  √ Low-Middle 
Class 
Closed Closed 




£5.163 - £51.626 




£5.679 - £38.720 




£7.744 – £25.813 




£5.163 - £38.720 




£4.647 - £38.720 




£4.647 - £51.626 




£7.744 - £51.626 




£5.163 - £51.626 
 
The price of Javanese batik low class products is around IDR90,000 to IDR150,000141, 
while the middle class product price is around IDR500,000 to IDR1,000,000142. Further, no 
Javanese owner-manager sells upper class products. 
                                                
139 ibid 




6.6 Economic Crisis 
The economic crisis in 1998, following the 1997 monetary crisis in South East Asian 
countries, had a significant impact on the participants’ batik businesses. The price of 
imported batik raw materials soared, because the exchange rate of the rupiah to the dollar 
increased sharply. At the same time, the community’s purchasing power dropped owing to 
the high rate of inflation. Of the three participants whose businesses had been established 
before the economic crisis, only two, Fahri and Suprapti, managed to maintain their 
business. Fahri was fortunate, as he made profits during the economic crisis due to his 
considerable stock of unbleached plain cloth, the price of which increased up to six times, 
from IDR40,000143 to IDR250,000144 per piece. Fahri’s accumulated capital increased 
rapidly. However, he was compelled to temporarily stop production because there were 
almost no buyers. He decided not to close his Rusa Makmur batik family firm waiting for 
demand to recover.  Meanwhile, Suprapti at that time only assisted her partner in the batik 
firm and all decisions related to the batik business were made by him. She noticed that her 
partner reduced batik workers and only produced a small number of batik pieces during the 
economic crisis. 
 
While Fahri and Suprapti were able to maintain their batik businesses, Kasmini decided to 
stop production as she had no capital to buy plain unbleached cloth when the price went up 
drastically. Moreover, Kasmini was not sure about the community’s purchasing power, 
because she had to increase her selling price to cover the high price of raw materials. She 
explained:  
“Well, in fact there were buyers, only a few, but the problem was I couldn’t afford to buy 
the unbleached plain cloth. The price suddenly increased to IDR250,000145. Then how 
could I sell it, how much could I price it? Normally I sold jarik (local term for batik cloth) 
at IDR11,000146 – IDR13,000147 but at that time,  it  suddenly went up, so how high would 
it be? Would there be any buyers?” 
                                                                                                                                              
141 Around £4.647 to £7.744 based on the exchange rate £1 equivalent to IDR19,370 in 2014 (Source: 
http://www.bps.go.id/LinkTableDinamis/view/id/952) 
142 Around £25.813 to £51.626 based on the exchange rate £1 equivalent to IDR19,370 in 2014 (Source: 
http://www.bps.go.id/LinkTableDinamis/view/id/952) 
143 It is equivalent to £3.051 with exchange rate £1 equal to IDR16,650 in 1998 
(source:http://www.bps.go.id/LinkTableDinamis/view/id/952) 
144 It is equivalent to £19.07 with exchange rate £1 equal to IDR16,650 in 1998 
(source:http://www.bps.go.id/LinkTableDinamis/view/id/952) 
145 It is equivalent to £19.07 with exchange rate £1 equal to IDR16,650 in 1998 
(source:http://www.bps.go.id/LinkTableDinamis/view/id/952) 




Another consideration that made Kasmini close down her batik business was that her 
children had completed their education and some of them were now working outside the 
town; therefore, she no longer had dependants needing financial support. In addition, her 
husband was still working as a truck driver and her children who had work frequently sent 
her money. Consequently, in 1998 she closed down her business. She started helping her 
daughter Indriyati open her own batik business. It is clear that participants ran their batik 
businesses only as a financial resource to meet the family’s daily needs. 
 
6.7 Technological Innovation 
Several participants assumed a relatively open attitude towards new things, particularly 
technological innovation in batik production and saw it as an opportunity. One of the 
opportunities was the rapidly developing textile printing machine technology. These 
machines could now produce good quality identical copies of hand-drawn batik cloth. 
Printed batik can be mass reproduced in a short time, thus the production cost is much 
lower than hand-drawn batik. Although several participants were attracted by the low 
production cost, none of them adopted the machine-printing technology due to the high 
cost of investment in the machine. Only one participant, named Rusmanto, sold machine 
printed batik by ordering the clothes from another batik firm in the batik centres in 
Pekalongan and Solo. Many batik owner-managers in those cities had been adopting 
machine-printing technology; therefore, Rusmanto just placed orders with them for printed 
batik with Lasem patterns.  
 
The government had once organized training in hand printed batik such as silk screen batik 
(known as sablon batik). This is a non-machinery method. According to Rusmanto, many 
people attended the training, but they did not practice it as they were not accustomed to 
using silk screens, therefore, the results were not satisfactory. Silk screen batik is produced 
by using a screen to apply the colouring substance to the cloth by stencilling. This 
screening process is very fast, since there is no wax application and dyeing. This is the 
reason why silk screen batik is much cheaper than hand-drawn batik. However, the quality 
of silk screen batik is far below the hand-drawn batik. Hand silk screening does not need 
large capital as it does not use machinery; however, it needs highly skilled workers to 
apply the colouring substance to the cloth using the silk screen. According to the local 
                                                                                                                                              
147 It is equivalent to £.992 with exchange rate £1 equal to IDR16,650 in 1998 
(source:http://www.bps.go.id/LinkTableDinamis/view/id/952) 
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owner-managers, buyers were still more interested in Lasem hand-drawn products rather 
than silk screened batik. Several Lasem batik owner-managers had tried offering silk 
screened batik to prospective buyers; however, the buyers still insisted on buying hand-
drawn batik. A participant named Sulastri gave an account of her experience as follows:  
“…. At the exhibition, well, one or two Lasem batik owner-managers offered the 
inexpensive silk screen batik. But I noticed it didn’t seem too saleable. Usually the 
prospective buyers who get offered batik printed or silk screen batik, on the contrary, always 
asked for hand-drawn batik, although it was more expensive. So, what’s the point of selling 
that kind of stuff?” 
 
In 2010, the government introduced another new technology in batik making using cold 
wax, called cold wax silk-screened batik, to owner-managers in Lasem through training. 
This kind of batik is still classified as a true batik product as it uses the wax-resist dyeing 
process, unlike machine batik and hand printed batik. Rusmanto, head of Lasem Batik 
Cluster, explained: 
“In fact, cold wax silk-screened still belongs to batik category, as the batik categorized by 
UNESCO is the kind of cloth making that uses wax-resist dying process. So, when wax is 
still used it means it’s still batik… hence what distinguishes it from the hand-drawn product 
is the colour quality and the neatness of the motifs and patterns. The thick or thin layer of the 
wax affects the colour produced. Then, the other thing is like this… (he showed me the 
product of cold wax silk-screened), cold wax silk-screened can only be done on one side, 
unlike hand-drawn batik which can be drawn both sides” 
 
Cold wax silk-screened batik is produced through the same process as hand-drawn batik, 
whereby wax is applied to the plain cloth. The only differences are that the instrument used 
to apply wax on the cloth is not a canting but a screen, the same as in the production of silk 
screen batik. Therefore, the wax application process is quicker. Even though it is 
categorized as batik, the market is still less interested in the cold wax-screened batik, since 
the end quality is far below hand-drawn batik.  
 
Subsequent to the training organized by the government, some batik owners tried to 
produce it, but they said it did not get a positive response from the customers. Indriyati 
explained: 
“The cold wax system is similar to silk screening…. It doesn’t sell well. It’s different from 
hand-drawn batik that was printed by hand one by one using canting (a like pen tool). Lasem 
batik is genuinely hand-drawn. A friend of mine brought some when there was an exhibition, 
but they didn’t sell. In the end the stock piled up.” 
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Furthermore, although the national government organized training in silk-screened batik 
making, the local government of Rembang Regency wanted the batik industry in Lasem to 
keep its traditional batik as a unique characteristic of the region and appealed to the 
participants to keep producing it. The local government was also concerned to maintain 
Lasem as a centre of hand-drawn batik because it is a labour-intensive industry. Sulastri 
recalled these times: 
“… once there was training in drawing, marketing, also to making batik silk screen batik and 
cold wax silk-screened. But after some consideration, the Rembang regency didn’t allow it. 
The training in making silk screen batik and cold wax silk-screened were just enriching the 
participants’ knowledge. So, after that training, there was no follow-up whatsoever from the 
local government. Well, villagers all need to work, sis… whereas printing and silk screening, 
only a few workers are needed… So, we chose to sustain Lasem batik, to give villagers 
jobs.” 
 
The encouragement to sustain hand-drawn batik was also communicated through the 
meetings of organisations such as clusters and cooperatives. Javanese batik owner-
managers responded to this differently. Most of them decided to keep selling and 
producing only hand-drawn batik products. However, a few owner-managers sold printed 
batik, such as silk-screened and cold wax silk-screened products. Rusmanto, head of the 
Lasem Batik Cluster, said that he and Markum sold silk-screened as well as printed batik. 
However, they did not produce it themselves. Rusmanto was the only one of the nine 
participants representing Javanese owner-managers who sold hand printed batik as well as 
machine printed and cold wax silk-screened batik, exploiting the opportunity and 
speculating on this new kind of batik product that could be sold far cheaper than hand-
drawn batik. He ordered non-hand-drawn batik products from owner-managers in other 
batik centres, such as Pekalongan, Solo and Yogyakarta, due to his limited financial capital 
for machinery and the limited availability of local human resources. To achieve a good 
quality product, production of silk-screened and cold wax silk-screened batik required 
skilled workers, particularly in smearing the wax on the batik sheet Meanwhile, batik 
workers in Lasem were only trained to draw patterns by applying wax on the cloth using a 
canting. 
 
6.8 Competitive Environment 
The emergence of new Javanese owner-managers resulted in tighter competition among 
Lasem batik owner-managers. These owner-managers were located in a small rural area 
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of only 4.504 ha148, in which there could only be a small number of local customers and a 
limited number of workers. As the number of batik owner-managers increased, the 
competition between them became stronger. This greatly affected the participants who had 
started their business prior to the Lasem batik boom in 2005. Below is the experience of 
Fahri, one of the participants who had been running his business since 1987 who felt the 
impact of the tighter competition with the emergence of a number of new batik owner-
managers. He felt that the competition for recruiting and holding workers, and attracting 
consumers by reducing prices, was increasing significantly. 
Fahri started his batik business in 1987. The batik market was slack then, unlike conditions 
today. He marketed his batik only in the local markets of Lasem and its surroundings. He 
said that his business then was running smoothly, as there were only a small number of 
competitors, unlike today, when the market has extended to Jakarta and other big cities like 
Bali and Semarang. According to Fahri, competition began to increase in 2007 when a lot of 
new batik owner-managers emerged. With batik booming, many people immediately started 
to sell batik, particularly those who were formerly outsource workers who now became 
sellers in their own right. In his opinion, the training conducted by the government gave 
them the courage and ability to obtain loans from the bank. Fahri then, willy-nilly, had to 
compete for workers by offering higher wages, following the market. According to him, this 
was the result of the increasing number of owner-managers, while there was no increase in 
the number of skilled workers. In addition, more new owner-managers were competing by 
lowering prices to attract buyers. Fahri complained about this, as this made his business not 
as busy as it had been between 2005 and 2007. 
 
Unlike Fahri, participants who started their business after 2008 stated that they faced no 
significant problems in the very competitive environment. As newcomers, they coped with 
the difficulties in obtaining workers by relying on the availability of batik workers in their 
own environment, particularly in their own families. They exploited their extended family 
members to help them. Following is Sulastri’s account of her experience:  
“Yes, there is a competition, of course …. but it is all our relatives who help us. Formerly 
they worked for the Chinese Indonesian, sorry …. Now I can produce batik myself, so, I 
recruited them. Generally in the village, they’re still related to us, aren’t they, sis? So, they 
are happy to help me.” 
 
                                                
148 Source: http://www.rembangkab.go.id/Pemerintahan/geografi/letak-dan-luas-wilayah 
    accessed on September 2016 
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Most Javanese owner-managers made use of kinfolk to secure the availability of batik 
workers. The Javanese in Lasem followed the kindred system called “sanak sedulur”149  in 
different activities, social as well as economic, that require many workers, such as building 
houses, working agricultural fields and in plantations. This tradition also applies in the 
labour intensive batik business. Mardiyana said that after she had a batik business of her 
own, a lot of her relatives asked to be recruited as outsource workers. This helped her a lot 
in meeting the customers’ orders.  
 
As a senior actor in Lasem’s batik business, Fahri also applied the same strategy as that 
employed by the newcomers; however, he still felt there was some decline in production, 
particularly in the productivity of the outsource batik workers. According to Fahri, an 
outsource batik worker could now receive orders from more than three owner-managers; 
whereas formerly, it was only from one or two owner-managers. As a result, there was 
often a delay in orders handled by outsource batik workers. In addition, when there were 
owner-managers who offered higher wages, the outsource batik workers were likely to 
give priority to those who paid the higher wages. 
 
The fact that workers lived close to the Javanese owner-managers’ houses also made it 
easy for them to get workers. The participants normally employed their relatives and 
neighbours who lived nearby. Mardiyana related as follows:  
“I’ve got two workers who come every day. There is Sukini, a relative. She formerly worked 
for KUB Kunthi, but, as she had problems with people there, she came to me and was asking 
for job. Well, no problem. Then I said to Ms Rukmana, the head of KUB Kunthi, rather than 
working for other people, how about if she helped me. And also Mutah who is living nearby. 
She comes here daily after finishing her house work.” 
 
Only one participant, Suprapti, had a business in Lasem, at Karangturi village, which she 
inherited from her Chinese Indonesian partner. A lot of her workers came from Pohlandak 
village, about three kilometres from Suprapti’s workshop. Nevertheless, according to 
Suprapti, her workers were quite loyal, since most of them were related to her. Moreover, 
they were old and reluctant to move to another producer, as this would mean that they 
would need to adjust to their new employer. They tended to work in the place that they 
were used to. Suprapti still preserved her partner’s practice of employing workers in the 
                                                
149 A kinship system that includes siblings, cousins, uncles and aunts, father and mother’s in law, and other 
close relations of husbands and wives (Moehadi et. al., 1988) 
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workshop with wages paid after the work was completed (based on piece work), since it 
was much easier in controlling to meet the production target. 
 
Javanese participants understood that, as newcomers in the Lasem batik business, they had 
to introduce their products into a market dominated by the products of senior and 
established owner-managers. They adopted a low-price strategy to attract buyers. Normally 
the hand-drawn product offered by Javanese owner-managers was 20% to 30% cheaper 
than the ethnic Chinese owner-managers, for example, a batik product priced at 
IDR750,000150 by Chinese Indonesian owner-managers could be bought for IDR550,000151 
from Javanese owner-managers. Indeed, there were no criteria in determining the selling 
price, as hand-drawn batik was an art product, particularly high quality batik with 
exclusive patterns. However, for batik products with a lower quality, the average price 
depended on the price prevailing in the market and was determined by the number of 
colours. Therefore, differences in the prices by Javanese owner-managers and those by 
ethnic Chinese owner-managers could be considerable. 
 
Furthermore, facing tight competition, most participants were very flexible in the 
bargaining process and offered large discounts. This was done to make the consumers 
remain loyal to them. Indriyati’s experience is reported below: 
“There was an order for 20 pieces of batik cloth, not bad. I asked for IDR1,000,000152 per 
piece, but he wanted it to be reduced to IDR800,000153. Well, no problem… he’s a 
wholesaler, so no problem. If it suits him, he can order from me again.” 
 
Low prices, as well as discounts for large quantity purchases, are employed to make 
customers loyal and attract more potential buyers. Following is Mardiyana’s account of her 
experience.  She felt that her business increased after becoming widely known within the 
community for her low-priced products and discount programme, which were passed on 
from one person to another by word-of-mouth.  
Mardiyana originally had only one buyer from Pati154. In 2011, she received orders for 60 
batik uniforms at the time of the election of the village head in Pati. Then, in 2012, she 
received an order for 65 batik uniforms for the Neighbourhood Women’s Association 
                                                
150 It is equivalent to £38.720 with exchange rate £1 equal to IDR19,370 in 2014 
(source:http://www.bps.go.id/LinkTableDinamis/view/id/952) 
151 It is equivalent to £28.395 with exchange rate £1 equal to IDR19,370 in 2014 
(source:http://www.bps.go.id/LinkTableDinamis/view/id/952) 
152 It is equivalent to £51.626 with exchange rate £1 equal to IDR19,370 in 2014 
(source:http://www.bps.go.id/LinkTableDinamis/view/id/952) 
153 It is equivalent to £41.300 with exchange rate £1 equal to IDR19,370 in 2014 
(source:http://www.bps.go.id/LinkTableDinamis/view/id/952) 
154 Pati is a small city near Lasem.  
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(known as PKK155); and in 2014 as many as 90 batik uniforms were made. According to 
Mardiyana, her low prices for the orders for batik uniforms made her customers loyal to her. 
Subsequently, her customers spread the information about the quality and the price of her 
product from one person to another giving her a reputation. In addition, she also gave a 
further price reduction when the order was for large quantities. Two-colour batik normally 
priced at IDR150,000156 per piece was then reduced to IDR125,000157 for large orders. This 
strategy was quite successful in attracting buyers. Customers from other villages started to 
come to buy from her. When she asked the buyers how they knew about Mardiyana’s batik 
business, it turned out that the information came from her loyal customers. Consequently, 
Mardiyana learned that the more buyers were satisfied with her batik product, particularly 
the price, the more buyers would come to her. Mardiyana said that almost every buyer 
bought her product because it was inexpensive. Her batik was priced at IDR300,000158 to 
IDR500,000159. Batik Gaman, the famous batik firm in Solo, is one of her loyal customers. 
They routinely order from Mardiyana; however, they are very selective about the quality. 
They choose only an excellent quality product, meaning neat printing, no drops of wax and 
even colouring. Mardiyana has been serving this customer diligently. 
 
The low price of the batik clothes offered by Javanese owner-managers made resellers 
interested in buying their products. Even a big firm in Solo, like Batik Rencong, chose to 
buy Mardiyana’s Lasem batik rather than producing the goods itself, notwithstanding that 
it would be easy for Batik Rencong to produce its own hand-drawn batik using Lasem 
patterns. 
 
Flexibility also contributed to maintaining resellers’ loyalty. At the beginning, Mardiyana 
sold to resellers for cash only and the selected items had to be paid for in full. Later, 
Mardiyana adopted a consignment system whereby payment for the goods was made after 
the reseller had sold the item. This system was introduced at the reseller’s request. Batik 
Rencong, and other buyers, asked if payment could be made within a one-month period. 
These systems generated cash flow problems for her batik business, because her working 
capital was limited. However, she had no choice if she wanted to maintain the consumers’ 
loyalty. Fortunately, she obtained a soft loan through the PKBL programme.  
                                                
155 Pembinaan Kesejahteraan Keluarga (PKK) 
156 It is equivalent to £7.745 with exchange rate £1 equal to IDR19,370 in 2014 
(source:http://www.bps.go.id/LinkTableDinamis/view/id/952) 
157 It is equivalent to £6.453 with exchange rate £1 equal to IDR19,370 in 2014 
(source:http://www.bps.go.id/LinkTableDinamis/view/id/952) 
158 It is equivalent to £15.488 with exchange rate £1 equal to IDR19,370 in 2014 
(source:http://www.bps.go.id/LinkTableDinamis/view/id/952) 




Participants tended to be flexible when making transactions, since they were aware that, as 
newcomers, they had to provide something interesting to attract prospective buyers. 
Jasmari, for example, offered the convenience of deferred payment using bank transfer. 
Below is Jasmari’s account of his experience. 
While taking part in exhibitions, Jasmari several times met consumers who wanted to buy 
his batik, but had no cash with them. Jasmari was prepared to take the risk by entrusting his 
batik clothes to the person he had just met for the first time. Jasmari offered buyers the 
convenience of allowing them to take his batik clothes first and pay later via bank transfer 
after they returned home from the exhibition. The value of transactions by this means 
amounted to between IDR2,000,000160 and IDR4,500,000161. One time there was a buyer 
from Cirebon bringing no cash who looked at his batik products and liked them. She 
intended to resell Jasmari’s batik products to her friends. Therefore, Jasmari allowed her to 
take his batik clothes and it was agreed that payment would be made later through bank 
transfer. After three months, however, there was no transfer from that customer. Jasmari 
became concerned because the value of the transaction was high at IDR12,000,000162. When 
Jasmari contacted the customer by phone, she said she would return the remaining unsold 
batik clothes and pay for the batik that had been sold in full within three months. However, 
the remaining pieces were returned six months later and only IDR5,250,000163 was 
transferred. This was the worst experience he ever had. Nevertheless, this experience did not 
make Jasmari change his strategy of entrusting batik clothes to buyers who he met for the 
first time. Not long afterwards, a lecturer from Gajah Mada university came and was allowed 
to take his product with payment to be made later via bank transfer. He was always lucky, 
since he never had a loss. 
 
Jasmari considered that his strategy was effective in dealing with customers and ensuring 
that they bought from him again. Another advantage that Jasmari offered was allowing his 
resellers to exchange the batik clothes for those with different patterns. Rusmanto did the 
same thing with his resellers. He employed this strategy when dealing with resellers, either 
those who were loyal customers or new customers. The reason behind his strategy is that 
batik is an art product, thus not affected by the cost of depreciation. This meant that the 
reseller could exchange batik clothes that were difficult to sell with new patterns, motifs 
                                                
160 It is equivalent to £103.252 with exchange rate £1 equal to IDR19,370 in 2014 
(source:http://www.bps.go.id/LinkTableDinamis/view/id/952) 
161 It is equivalent to £232.318 with exchange rate £1 equal to IDR19,370 in 2014 
(source:http://www.bps.go.id/LinkTableDinamis/view/id/952) 
162 It is equivalent to £619.515 with exchange rate £1 equal to IDR19,370 in 2014 
(source:http://www.bps.go.id/LinkTableDinamis/view/id/952) 
163 It is equivalent to £271.038 with exchange rate £1 equal to IDR19,370 in 2014 
(source:http://www.bps.go.id/LinkTableDinamis/view/id/952) 
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and colours. Neither was Rusmanto worried about his batik clothes being accidentally 
exchanged with his competitors’ batik clothes, as he could distinguish between his and 
others’ products. According to him, every producer has their own peculiarities of colours, 
patterns and design motifs and imposed their personal taste on their products. In addition, 
Rusmanto was also prepared to allow pay later payment options to buyers he already knew 
well. 
 
To be able to sell at a low price, some participants skipped the process of ngetel, the 
process of preparing the unbleached plain cloth before the batik work started, thus 
allowing the cloth to absorb the colours properly. This process took three weeks to 
complete, depending on the weather. By omitting this process, labour cost and time could 
be reduced. Although the appearance of the end product of the batik cloth did not show any 
difference, the colour of the batik product that did not go through the ngetel process would 
fade quickly.  
 
Amidst the tough competition, many participants were less concerned about the profit 
expected from each batik piece sold. They just concentrated on how their product could be 
sold. Rusmanto’s explained as follows: 
“When buying hand-drawn batik in Lasem, actually the buyers are subsidized by village 
residents. If we just count the regional minimum wages for the workers, it would be 
impossible for us to sell one colour hand-drawn batik at IDR100,000164. It is by no means 
possible, since it takes longer than two days to finish a batik cloth. Just say when wages were 
IDR30,000165, it would be IDR60,000166 for two days. There’s still some other costs, such as 
wax, the cloth, how much? The colouring substance, how much so…. it means that it’s still 
subsidized by the village residents. But what else can we do. The most important thing is that 
the product is sold. Otherwise we can’t compete.” 
Javanese batik owner-managers tend to take risk by having a loss in revenue merely to be 
able to compete in tight competition.  
 
In addition, participants actively marketed directly to either resellers or end consumers. 
Mardiyana, among others, carried her own product to the shops in Kudus, Pati and 
Semarang167. A few participants offered their products directly to end customers by taking 
                                                
164 It is equivalent to £5.163 with exchange rate £1 equal to IDR19,370 in 2014 
(source:http://www.bps.go.id/LinkTableDinamis/view/id/952) 
165 It is equivalent to £1.549 with exchange rate £1 equal to IDR19,370 in 2014 
(source:http://www.bps.go.id/LinkTableDinamis/view/id/952) 
166 It is equivalent to £3.098 with exchange rate £1 equal to IDR19,370 in 2014 
(source:http://www.bps.go.id/LinkTableDinamis/view/id/952) 
167 Kudus, Pati and Semarang are cities along the coast in Central Java Island in Indonesia.  
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batik clothes to the government offices. Participants who had been a head of a village or 
sub-village exploited their networks with the civil servants, which they had built when they 
were still active. Rusmanto recounted that:  
“I went to the government office. The fact that I am well acquainted with them made it easier 
for me to get access to offering my batik product to them. They were greeting 
me….So…..pak lurah (name for a male village head) is now doing batik work, don’t you? 
… of course we’re going to buy … I have a good relationship with them. Then, I urged those 
people in the office. They bought … only few clothes were remaining. So, thank God … As 
a result, my business is making fast progress.” 
Participants exploited their good relationship with prospective buyers and encouraged 
them to buy their product. 
 
Several participants, such as Sulastri, Indriyati and Rusmanto actively offered their product 
via Black Berry Messenger (BBM) media. Sulastri’s experience in marketing her product 
through BBM is described below. 
Faced by tight competition, Sulastri used BBM to help her market her batik clothes. At every 
exhibition, she would distribute her business cards complete with home address, telephone 
number and her BBM number. Afterwards, Sulastri invited the exhibition visitors to be her 
BBM contacts. Later on, they would be in touch and received offers of Sulastri’s latest batik 
clothes. Sulastri frequently promoted her batik clothes by posting photos on BBM. Normally 
Sulastri displayed ten pieces of batik clothes in one photo. Those who were interested would 
then contact Sulastri and she would send details of the batik selected together with the price. 
When the price had been agreed, the buyer would then transfer the money to Sulastri’s bank 
account and the evidence was sent via BBM. Once she received the money transfer from the 
buyer, she would send the package by delivery service. She sent the delivery service receipt 
to the buyer via BBM as a proof of transaction. This selling system using BBM had been in 
operation since the beginning of 2009, when many people were using BBM as a means of 
communication. Sulastri usually used BBM when selling to resellers. 
 
BBM facilitated Javanese owner-managers in making business transactions, not only as 
communication tools, as it was quicker and cheaper than communicating by telephone. 
Further, by using BBM, photos could be sent and prospective buyers could see the batik 
clothes collection. The BBM broadcast system enabled Javanese owner-managers to offer 
their range of batik clothes to all of their customers connected through BBM. Almost all 
the participants who have the Black Berry application in their mobile phone used BBM 
media to advertise products and facilitate transactions except for Suprapti and Rukmana 
who were not familiar with the use of BBM technology. 
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Despite tight competition, participants said that they still cooperated with their 
competitors. This cooperation normally extended to sharing the rent of an exhibition stand 
because the small-scale business owners could not afford the costly rent on their own.  
Another joint effort was to sell a competitor’s product at the exhibitions. Mardiyana related 
her experience as follows:  
“Big batik owner-managers are of course unwilling to help in selling our product, because 
they could sell their own batik clothes. Often, the small batik owner-managers are willing to 
help each other in marketing batik clothes in exhibition. We usually cooperate in exhibitions, 
because we need lots of batik clothes stock to offer in exhibition in order to cover exhibition 
stall rent fee. If there’s an exhibition, they (Mardiyana’s competitors) come to see me and 
offer me to bring my batik product in exhibition. If I already have lots of batik clothes in 
stock, I choose to go to the exhibition myself. But, if I only have few batik clothes, I’ll 
usually allow them to take mine… because it is not beneficial to go to exhibition when I do 
not have enough stock to offer.” 
 
Similarly, Sulastri, a participant who became a tutor in the batik training programmes, said 
that she had often assisted in marketing products made by her former trainees who were 
trying to run their own batik business. She was also head of a joint work group named 
KUB Sri Ratu with 30 members which had been trained by the Indonesian National Bank 
(BNI). Despite the fact that she had run a business on her own, Sulastri kept helping to 
market KUB Sri Ratu’s product.  
“They make batik clothes piece by piece and then gathered all their batik clothes here. Then 
once a month they count the number of clothes which have been sold.  Yes, it’s like a little 
cooperative … I’m the head of the group who markets their product. They are indeed very 
happy when their batik clothes sold. I never hide them … All batik clothes that I get have 
been put here together with my own batik products. It’s up to the buyers to select the ones 
they want. Doesn’t matter whether the products are mine or theirs.” 
 
It was obvious that amidst the tight competition, Javanese owner-managers were still 
willing to help one another. 
 
There were conflicts among the Javanese producers; however, these did not appear on the 
surface. Normally if participants disagreed with somebody’s action, they would just talk 
about it behind the person’s back, without taking any action. They tended to hide the 
conflict. One participant, Indriyati, had a conflict with another Javanese producer who 
accused her of duplicating patterns. Nevertheless, she did not talk about it directly with 
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Indriyati but only through outsource batik workers employed by these two owner-
managers. The Javanese batik owner-managers were not inclined to be involved in a vulgar 
conflict. Displeasure or disagreement with somebody’s action was responded to merely by 
gossiping about it behind the person’s back. For example, if some members of a 
cooperative or cluster felt that there was some unfairness in the allocation of free 
exhibition stalls and free training, they just talked between themselves without any further 
action. Below is Fahri’s account of his experience. 
“For example, if there are people assigned by the government to go to the exhibition, it 
would always be the same people, people who have close relationships with the government. 
Those who are active are likely to be the same people. Those who haven’t got such 
relationships will not be included; those who don’t want to be too close will be seldom 
selected. Like me, I am very rare get the opportunity, because I am not too close with them. 
Those who like being close to them will often be given the opportunity. They do a lot of 
lobbying. For instance, if there’s a free exhibition stall, the ones that are well informed are 
those who have close relationships with the government, it’s the head of the community. As 
for clusters, they rarely share any activities. If there is any aid from government, they’ll 
enjoy it themselves. So, what can I do? Well, no problem … the only thing I can do is just 
talking with my friend.” 
 
Participants tried to maintain harmony between business and their social life by not taking 
any confronting action. They also tended to hide internal family conflicts. 
 
6.9 Conclusion 
From the discussion of the participants’ experiences above, it can be concluded that 
external support from the government as well as non-government institutions played an 
important role in the process of starting and developing the Javanese owner-managers’ 
business. This aid helped participants in coping with limited working capital and limited 
knowledge required in running a batik business and supported the Javanese in starting up, 
developing and sustaining their batik businesses. 
At the macro level, government public policy was found to be the major influence on 
Javanese batik owner-managers in starting up a batik business. Firstly, the community 
developing programme during the New Order Government era with the third Five Year 
Development Plan (known as Repelita), which aimed to increase job opportunities in 
labour-intensive industries. These aid programmes helped batik workers to start-up 
businesses by providing training from making batik patterns up to colouring and funding. 
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Secondly, the policies that promoted demand for batik, such as Presidential Decree No 39 
of 2009 issued 2 October as National Batik Day, Ministry of Domestic Affairs Regulation 
No 53 of 2009 followed by Regulation 68 of 2015 about the requirement for all civil 
servants throughout Indonesia to wear batik as their uniforms on a certain day, Regulations 
of BUMN state Minister Number Per – 05/MBU/2007 about BUMN’s Programme of 
Partnership with Small Enterprises and Environmental Care Programme (PKBL). The 
Javanese owner-managers responded positively to the government aid programmes and the 
government policies that encouraged batik demand, and provided financial capital through 
soft loans. Most of them saw the opportunity and started their own batik business. Javanese 
owner-managers competed to get access to the government facilities by exploiting 
nepotism. They built a strong relationship with government officials to get access to he 
government’s aid programmes. In fact, a few of them used power as the head of a 
community to access the opportunity and shared it only with close relatives.  
 
External support also came from other institutions that supported government programmes 
in developing batik business, such as Dekranas, BUMN, as a government-owned 
enterprise, allocated Corporate Social Responsibility funds for programmes to help 
develop the batik industry through the Environmental Care Partnership Programme 
(PKBL). This programme gave loans with a flexible guarantee and low interest, and other 
facilities, including free exhibition stands, accommodation, training and opportunity for 
comparative study. Nearly all of the Javanese owner-managers took this opportunity to 
support their limited financial capital.  
 
Another external organisation that gave full and intensive support for a four-year period 
was the NGO, the Institute of Indonesian Pluralism (IPI). It provided training, marketing 
assistance and working capital for batik workers’ wages, built workshops, constructed 
wells to support production activities, provided batik raw materials and funds. Everything 
required to start-up a batik business was supplied by IPI, including opening access to 
suppliers of raw materials. In addition, a few Chinese Indonesian batik owner-managers 
unintentionally contributed in helping Javanese owner-managers to start their own business 
by providing colouring services for payment, allowing their outsource batik workers to buy 
batik raw materials, giving training in batik drawing as well as assisting in obtaining access 
to training in colouring.  
 
Besides public policy, the economic crisis was another issue at the macro level that 
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impacted on the family firm’s sustainability.  There were two Javanese family firms who 
experienced economic crisis in 1998. The Javanese owner-managers responded to the 
economic crisis by stopping their business; one of them closed down the firm permanently 
since there was little demand for her products. On the other hand, the other Javanese 
producer who benefitted from the rising price of raw materials during the economic crises 
accumulated business capital by holding considerable unbleached plain cloth, wax and 
ready-to-sell batik clothes.  Nonetheless, he stopped production temporarily due to scarce 
demand then recommenced business when demand recovered.  
 
At the micro level, there were several concerns that affected the sustainability of a 
Javanese family firm, such as lack of financial capital, lack of batik business knowledge, 
possession of unique resources, family involvement, harmony in both family life and 
business life, and management issues. Any of these might potentially encourage or threaten 
the sustainability of the business. 
 
Financial capital is essential in determining the sustainability of a Javanese family firm, 
with limited financial resources being the main problem for Javanese batik owner-
managers. They employed several strategies to cope with this issue. Firstly, they 
minimized production costs by involving family members in business activities and 
handling the production process by themselves. Secondly, they employed outsource batik 
workers rather than workshop (or daily) batik workers. This reduced production costs as 
they did not have to provide lunch for the workers, and did not have to provide the vast 
workshop and necessary production equipment because the worker works in her own 
home. Thirdly, they used their living rooms as showrooms instead of renting a store. 
However, a few Javanese owner-managers rented a store to make their business easily 
accessible because their home was in the rural area.  
 
Most Javanese owner-managers produced hand-drawn batik imitating ethnic Chinese 
owner-managers’ batik patterns and design motifs. In order to maintain a production level 
with limited financial capital, they focused on producing fast moving items, such as batik 
cloth (fabric) considering that people have different tastes and sizes it is too risky to sell 
finished clothing (garment). Javanese owner-managers engaged in low cost production 
activities, such as undertaking production themselves, enlisted help from family members, 
and skipped the ngetel process in producing batik. Secondly, Javanese owner-managers 
sold low-middle class products that have high product turn-over. Thirdly, Javanese owner-
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managers engaged in a low pricing strategy. As newcomers, this strategy succeeded in 
attracting buyers and helped them to penetrate the market. Fourthly, as a marketing 
strategy, Javanese owner-managers conducted direct selling, such as in-house transactions, 
exhibitions, brought the clothes directly to potential customers (door to door marketing). 
They also relied on intermediaries such as resellers and competitors. It is interesting that 
Javanese owner-managers often cooperated with their competitors in marketing batik 
products, for example, to enable participation in an exhibition, they shared a stand which 
could be expensive; let the competitor take their batik product to be sell at an exhibition. 
Therefore, limited capital encouraged them to cooperate with their competitors.  
 
Knowledge of the batik business was important for Javanese owner-managers. Lack of this 
knowledge, especially in the colouring formula, hampered them in starting their own 
business. Therefore, they were heavily reliant on external support to learn through training 
programmes. The Javanese owner-managers accumulated their knowledge in various 
ways: from their mother or grandmother, previous work experience, training programmes 
organized either by the government or non-government institutions, and ethnic Chinese 
batik owner-managers.  
 
Besides knowledge, acquiring batik workers was also important in sustaining the business. 
Javanese owner-managers had the advantage by having batik family background. They 
therefore had no difficulty in assuring the availability of batik workers. They simply 
exploited their extended family to help in the production process. The Javanese tradition of 
involving kinfolk in various activities, social as well as economic, benefited the Javanese 
owner-managers in starting up and sustaining their batik businesses.  
 
The intermingling of both family and business life in a family firm is unavoidable. Events 
in the family life could impact on the business life, and vice versa. When the sustainability 
of a Javanese family firm was threatened, as in the economic crisis, a producer chose to 
close the business because there was no demand, she was no longer responsible for her 
children’s education, her husband had a source of income and her adult children sent her 
money. This indicated that, for the Javanese, their batik business was perceived merely as a 
source of income.  Consequently, when the business faced difficulty, they could easily 
close the business and rely on other sources of income. 
 
At the meso level, there were three dynamics in the opportunity structure, notably fashion 
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trend, technology development and competitive environment. Firstly, when batik was 
fashionable, demand increased. Javanese owner-managers exploited fashion trends in batik 
by starting-up their new businesses. Massive support from government and non-
government organisations, through training and financial assistance, enabled these new 
Javanese batik firms to grow. Some of them engaged in nepotism in order to get access to 
these opportunities.  
 
Secondly, Javanese batik owner-managers had a positive response to the development of 
production technology, either manual or mechanical. As newcomers, they were open to 
opportunity and willing to try. This was apparent when they enthusiastically participated in 
the training programmes in batik making using new manual methods, such as silk-screened 
batik and cold wax-screened batik. Ultimately, however, these did not go well because the 
processes were more difficult and they were not accustomed to it. When they tried to sell 
those batik products by ordering from other batik owner-managers in batik centres, such as 
Pekalongan and Solo, they discovered that they were not saleable. Some Javanese owner-
managers also tried to sell machine printed batik which they ordered form batik owner-
managers in other batik centres because the machinery was too expensive for them to 
purchase. Again, the product was not saleable. It shows that, as newcomers, the Javanese 
owner-managers were more aggressive in trying new technology; however, the market did 
not respond well. Consequently, they kept producing hand-drawn batik. 
 
Thirdly, as newcomers in a competitive environment, most Javanese owner-managers were 
aware that they needed to offer something better to compete with the ethnic Chinese 
owner-managers who pioneered Lasem batik. They applied several strategies in order to 
compete. Their main strategy was to offer low prices. Further, Javanese owner-managers 
offered flexibility in the bargaining process by giving additional discounts for large orders. 
Javanese owner-managers also offered flexibility in the payment system by providing 
merchandise on consignment, payment by instalments, and entrusting the goods to the 
buyers with payments sent later by bank transfer. These strategies could attract new 
consumers and encouraged loyalty. 
 
Another strategy employed in order to survive in tight competition was marketing the 
product proactively by relying on exhibitions outside the town. In addition, Javanese 
owner-managers actively visited resellers locally and sometimes outside the town. They 
were flexible in maintaining good relationships with resellers. They provided flexibility in 
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returns policy, such as exchanging the batik clothes for different colours and motifs 
whenever those clothes were not saleable. Javanese owner-managers also practised direct 
selling by utilizing the networks they had built with civil servants. To enhance their 
marketing activities, Javanese owner-managers also used BBM communication media. 
 
Tight competition meant competition for skilled batik workers. Javanese owner-managers 
exploited the advantages of batik workers in their family network. It was relatively easy to 
recruit batik workers from their neighbours and relatives, since villagers were usually 
related to one another through kinship ties. Further, living in the same area with their batik 
workers was another advantage for Javanese owner-managers. They could easily access 
their batik workers and manage and control the work. In addition, Javanese owner-
managers offered higher wages to compete in a competitive environment. 
 
Conflicts between owner-managers could not be avoided in these competitive conditions. 
Normally, when Javanese owner-managers disagreed with competitors, they only talked 
about it behind the person’s back (gossiping) without taking any further action. They 
avoided direct communication and confrontational action. This prevented any vulgar 
conflict. In this way, harmony among owner-managers could be maintained and it created 
the possibility of cooperation between competitors.   
 
In conclusion, Javanese owner-managers relied heavily on Government support in 
sustaining their business, especially in the start-up phase. This support helped them 
overcome basic obstacles in running a batik firm, specifically limited financial capital and 
knowledge of the batik business.  Thus, maintaining a good relationship with the 
government was necessary. Quite often they practised nepotism to obtain government 
privileges in order to sustain their business. Moreover, as newcomers, they found that a 
















An initial objective of this research was to identify the nature of sustainability in family 
firms in the traditional batik industry by exploring how they adjust to changing 
circumstances over time. These changes include family dynamics, market dynamics, and 
political and economic dynamics. The study looks at two ethnic groups who are both active 
in the traditional batik industry in Lasem; however, with different historical backgrounds 
in this trade. The comparison is relevant because it can highlight in a more detailed manner 
how a firm’s sustainability is not only shaped by external forces such as the economic 
climate, political climate or market developments but also by internal forces. By bringing 
in the ethnic-dimension this study offers novel insights into family firm dynamics. 
 
In order to analyse the outcomes, the mixed-embeddedness perspective is employed to 
investigate the ways in which owner-managers have tried to sustain their business. It 
allows an examination at different levels micro, meso and macro, which impact on 
business sustainability. Other authors (Jack and Anderson, 2002; Koning and Dahles, 
2007; Kloosterman, 2010; McKeever et al., 2014) have discussed the usefulness of this 
approach but, as far as is known, it has not yet been used for understanding family firm 
sustainably of different ethnic groups (in the same industry and location) and over time. 
 
Family firms grow and develop in tandem with the dynamics of the environment that 
might affect the sustainability of the firm, as well as the  internal dynamics in the family 
and the firm. Such environmental dynamics generate either a challenging situation or an 
opportunity to be exploited by the owner-manager. In addition, Geus (2011) points out that 
the ability to learn and adapt to the changing environment is a component that influences 
the longevity of a family firm.  
 
The two ethnic groups that I have discussed in the previous chapters have, as outlined, 
different positions and histories in Indonesia. The ethnic Chinese represent Indonesians 
who have descent lines back to mainland China, at times several generations ago. They 
have a long history of having been judged and treated as ‘outsiders’. The Javanese are 
considered a native Indonesian people. Research into ethnicity and entrepreneurship 
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(Koning and Dahles, 2009; Gelderen et al., 2012; Koning and Verver, 2012) has suggested 
that cultural context or embeddedness matters. However, rarely has this been investigated 
for different groups. Most studies focus on one ethnic group, which makes it less clear how 
that would compare to other groups. Therefore, in this chapter I will detail how the ethnic 
Chinese and ethnic Javanese have tried to keep their batik firms going over time and 
whether their ethnic background factors in how they have coped.  
 
This chapter begins with discussing family firm sustainability at the micro level, how a 
family firm’s resources encourage business sustainability by considering the intermingling 
of the family and the firm and how the owner-manager responds to disruptions derived 
from inside the family and the firm. I will subsequently examine family firm resource 
availability, succession and family firm governance. For the meso and macro levels, I will 
discuss the external pressures that have an impact on family firm sustainability; how the 
owner-manager reacts to disruptions from external changes, such as market dynamics, 
political and economic dynamics. 
 
7.2 Availability of Resources 
The ability of a firm to possess and expand their valuable resources creates competitive 
advantage (Acheampong, 2018) and supports survival in the competitive environment 
(Moores, 2009). The current study found that the availability of resources is important for 
both ethnic Chinese and Javanese family firms to ensure business continuation. Even 
though some of the findings are in line with previous research arguing that longevity of a 
business depends on the stock of resources, such as materials, human resources, financial 
resources and other resources (William and Jones, 2010), my research shows that each 
ethnic group emphasised different resource availability. 
 
The ethnic Chinese owner-managers have three main crucial resources, which create 
competitive advantage that help them in sustaining their business. These strengthen their 
position in the market and have been crucial in being a dominant player in the Lasem batik 
business over generations. Firstly, inheriting business assets, including intangible assets 
and tangible assets. The intangible assets, include production and colouring knowledge, 
business management, suppliers and resellers networks, and reputation. Meanwhile, 
tangible assets are land, buildings, financial capital, equipment and raw materials. This 
tangible inheritance from predecessors turns into capital assets in running the business. 
Thus, the majority of ethnic Chinese owner-managers did not have any significant 
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financial difficulty in running batik family firms.  This finding confirms that family assets 
encourage business sustainability (Danes et al., 2009). Secondly, their knowledge of the 
batik business, especially colouring formula. It will be explained further in the next 
section.  
 
Thirdly, family involvement in the batik family firm. Ethnic Chinese owner-managers 
employed family members in the family firm as a source of trust. It becomes important, 
especially when the business is growing, since the family member who is involved has a 
crucial business position in substituting the owner-manager’s role in management and 
marketing functions. When the business is growing, an ethnic Chinese owner-manager 
could not handle everything by him or herself as the business activity becomes wider and 
more complex. He or she needs help in managerial tasks. Besides that, wealth sharing 
between family members becomes another motive to engage family members in a 
Indonesian family firm. It follows Confucian wisdom (Zhao, 2014) that has influenced 
their values and traditions. Ethnic Chinese owner-managers perceived that it would be 
better sharing opportunities with family members rather than sharing with people outside 
the family circle. This finding implies that family values and tradition encourage Chinese 
Indonesian owner-managers to engage family members in the family firm. This indicates 
that family involvement in ethnic Chinese batik family firms is not merely about asking for 
help or support from the family, as demonstrated in previous studies (Klyver, 2007; 
Budhiyanto, 2009; Lee et al., 2016; Revilla et al., 2016); but also, for wealth sharing within 
the family.  In fact, these resources have been helping ethnic Chinese owner-managers to 
sustain their businesses through generations. 
 
Although having some positive impact on business development, family involvement in 
ethnic Chinese family firms might potentially generate tension into family relationship and 
immense conflict that leads to hostility is often unavoidable. However, this conflict does 
not have serious impact on business performance. The business-owner could ask for help 
from other family members to replace the position of the person in conflict with him. 
Although, these results differ from a published study by Olson et al., (2003), conflict might 
threaten business success when the business-owner could not find any other family 
members who are willing to be involved in the business. This indicates that strong ties in 
the family is crucial in ensuring business success. 
  
In comparison, Javanese owner-managers generally only have one resource which is 
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unique to them, namely, a large pool of batik workers they can draw on. This is based on 
having been batik workers themselves before starting their own businesses and therefore 
they have established networks and thus have good access to such labour. Like the ethnic 
Chinese, they also rely on family members in terms of business start-up and daily running.  
Furthermore, in the following sections, I will discuss the importance of resource 
availability.  
 
7.2.1 Social Capital within and beyond the Family 
This section starts with discussing family social capital as a core resource in family firm 
sustainability. In the second part it looks at the use of social capital beyond the family and 
its potential role in family firm sustainability. 
 
Family social capital is social capital invested in the relationship between family members. 
It facilitates access to business resources, such as human capital and financial capital. In an 
ethnic family firm, most of the owner-managers perceive family as the main source of trust 
that drives access to knowledge, market and other business resources. The present findings 
seem to be consistent with another research, which finds trust in the family member as a 
distinctive feature of ethnic Chinese family business (Tan and Fock, 2001). Family is 
therefore used at the level of ownership and management, where trust is considered 
important in terms of finances and business knowledge, and keeps the core business close 
at heart. The Javanese also utilized family members as resources, mainly at the level of 
help, especially in production activities (so more internally used). Family social capital 
means that Javanese owner-managers can overcome financial limitation by using family 
members who are willing to work for less pay, or even unpaid. As a consequence, Javanese 
owner-manager have low production costs that enable them, as newcomers, to compete 
with existing batik family firms. 
 
The reason that ethnic Chinese family firms keep knowledge, management and expertise 
close to the core is a result of their often precarious position in Indonesia where they were 
persecuted and discriminated against (Suryadinata, 1976). Consequently, they were very 
much on their own. However, they also have a unique selling point in the colouring 
technique of traditional batik, which inspires a close-knit family bond to safeguard this 
knowledge. The more individualistic and closed ethnic Chinese family firm seems to be 
mirrored in the architecture of their houses that have vast, tall and thick walls with layered 
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doors surrounding the main house, inherited from their predecessors. In addition, the doors 
are always closed. They are opened only when welcoming guests and buyers. Whereas 
strong ties are often judged as inhibiting business expansion due to lack of access to 
information and resources from a wider network, including extended family networks 
(Kapasi and Galloway, 2016; Brewton et al., 2010; Kowalewski et al., 2010), this study 
suggests that strong family ties within a nuclear family or more close-knit family circle 
(exclusive), such as parents and siblings can positively affect family firm sustainability 
through succession and knowledge transfer. 
 
The Javanese ethnic group also exhibits strong family ties but these tend to be more 
inclusive. This is likely to be related to the Javanese bilateral kinship structure in which 
family lines from both mother and father are equally important (Mulder, 2005). Therefore, 
family social capital invested in the extended family ties is wider in practice. Further, 
habitual living in a group in Javanese ethnic society also promotes such values as 
togetherness and helping each other (Endraswara, 2015). These encourage collective 
actions, especially in sharing knowledge within the Javanese ethnic group, not limited to 
their nuclear family. These norms and values might have been relevant in encouraging the 
rise of many newcomers in the industry from the Javanese ethnic group. Knowledge and 
information spreads faster in the wider network of the Javanese ethnic group and enables 
them to access the aid programmes and exploit the opportunities. Thus, this study suggests 
that strong family ties in a broader family circle positively affects family firm 
sustainability by facilitating access to knowledge and information which is crucial, 
particularly in the start-up of the business. 
 
As argued by Dyer and Mortensen (2005), family firms usually rely on family social 
capital and the above shows that is also the case in this study; however, with a few 
nuanced differences between the two groups. The ability of owner-managers to exploit 
family social capital is important in assuring business sustainability. However, this alone is 
not enough, as I will show later. 
 
Next to family social capital, both ethnic groups have invested social capital in 
relationships outside the family, such as with customers and/or government officials, to 
secure their businesses. How they achieve this, however, differs.  A key ingredient in how 
the ethnic Chinese develop these relationships is guanxi (personalized 
network/connection). As explained in chapter 2, this implies that mutual obligations, 
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assurance and understanding, and reputation and face are important to be maintained 
(Kiong and Kee, 1998). Before 2009, ethnic Chinese owner-managers mainly relied on 
their distributors (resellers) for marketing their batik products. Since 2009, with the 
introduction of batik exhibitions (an important marketing tool for the Javanese owners), 
some Chinese Indonesian owner-managers started to participate in these in order to boost 
sales; however, they kept the relationship with their distributors going. Some ethnic 
Chinese owner-managers succeeded in maintaining quanxi with distributors through 
generations and some distributors act as a source of soft loans. It indicates that quanxi has 
been transferred from one generation to another. Therefore, ethnic Chinese business 
owners have loyal resellers. What is surprising here is that the guanxi is not merely 
enclosed within their own ethnic group, but also with others ethnics. This research differs 
in nuance from Budhiyanto’s 2004 study that found Chinese Indonesian entrepreneurs in 
gold trading in Indonesia only build and take advantage of guanxi with other ethnic 
Chinese entrepreneurs. It is difficult to explain this result; however, it might be related to 
the type of product.  
 
As far as customers are concerned, ethnic Chinese owner-managers develop close 
relationships through guaranteeing a good quality product. They are relatively strict in 
controlling product quality to maintain their customers’ trust. The Javanese use a different 
style by offering extra service to customers (and resellers), such as allowing trade-in 
facilities for resellers, providing discounts, allowing terms of payment and flexibility in the 
way payment is made. These actions indicate the influence of the Javanese cultural 
wisdom of ewuh pakewuh (hesitation) that has been exploited to promote customer loyalty. 
 
Links to government and non-government officials is generally quite important in 
Indonesia to get things done; it also applies in the batik industry. Ethnic Chinese owner-
managers strive to maintain good relationships with the government and were especially 
successful in doing so throughout the Dutch occupation period. However, harassment 
during Old and New Order eras that included some discriminatory regulations encouraged 
the Chinese ethnic groups to distance themselves from the government. They tend to be 
reticent in daily life, including the way they conduct business. Ethnic Chinese owner-
managers started to build relationships with the government again during the Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono regime (2004-2014). They accessed the market by participating in 
the exhibitions and occasionally the local government brought potential customers to their 
workshops to buy Lasem batik as souvenirs when the government had guests. The 
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Javanese owner-managers also compete to build close relationships with the government to 
access their programmes. The Javanese ethnic group has more opportunities to access 
government programmes since the programmes are usually intended to develop and 
empower villagers of whom most are Javanese. These findings show that social capital 
invested in the relationship with the government facilitates access in developing batik 
businesses, whether ethnic Chinese family firms or Javanese family firms. However, the 
social and political dynamics related to the ethnicity issues have affected the Javanese 
more positively in terms of access to resources offered by the government to start the 
business and keep their business running.  
7.2.2 Human Capital: Knowledge and Skills 
In the batik business, human capital is an important resource due to the skills and 
knowledge (as well as art) related to making batik. According to previous studies, human 
capital can lead to high performance  (Lafuente and Rabetino, 2011, Felicio, et al., 2014). 
Below I will discuss the role of skills and knowledge in family firm sustainability of the 
two groups.  
 
This study found that knowledge is particularly important in the batik industry for both 
ethnic Chinese and Javanese owner-managers. In fact, the lack of batik knowledge, 
especially the colouring formula, prevented Javanese batik workers from becoming batik 
owner-managers, until the government provided training programs in the batik process. 
This shows that knowledge is crucial in the early stages of business.  As stated by Moores 
(2009), it is important to learn how to obtain knowledge in order to achieve business 
success.  Learning is defined as a process towards knowledge transfer throughout the 
business. Indeed, the owner-managers’ circumstances determine what knowledge they lack 
and how they obtain the knowledge in order to maintain their batik businesses.  
 
Ethnic Chinese owner-managers mainly get knowledge about the batik business from their 
predecessors, since most of them grow up in the batik family firm where they learn about 
batik production, such as batik patterns or motifs and the colouring technique; business 
management, such as managing batik workers; financial management; maintaining 
networks with customers and suppliers. Parents’ batik firms usually act as a business 
incubator where the learning process is conducted. Living in the batik family firm allows 
ethnic Chinese owner-managers to spontaneously absorb tacit knowledge from 
predecessors, which has been captured through their senses by practising, watching, 
listening and discussing with parents, grandparents, siblings and batik workers in running a 
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batik business. This study demonstrates that living in a batik business family is 
advantageous to ethnic Chinese owner-managers in providing knowledge of running and 
managing a batik business compared with the Javanese owner-managers who do not have 
such a history in gaining knowledge and experience. Javanese owner-managers, however, 
learn how to make batik in the family, since they were or have been living in a batik 
worker’s family. It supports the idea that the learning process in a family firm could be 
done by a process of trial and error, experiments, improvisation and vicarious learning 
(Roume and Louche, 2016).  
 
The most significant information held by the ethnic Chinese is their knowledge of the 
colouring process. Due to the high value of this knowledge, they tend to keep colouring 
knowledge secret, at times even within the family. It will only be shared with the 
designated successor of the family firm. Nevertheless, keeping this essential business 
‘ingredient’ a secret can also threaten business sustainability in the long term, especially 
when unpredictable events happen, such as when the predecessor suddenly dies and has 
not taught the successor about the colouring formula. This research suggests that keeping 
the colouring formula confidential might potentially encourage business to grow, but also 
might threaten the existence of the firm.  
 
Javanese owner-managers, due to their history as batik workers, often for the ethnic 
Chinese businesses, have highly valued skills related to the production (drawing) of batik. 
Lacking all other business skills and knowledge such as managerial knowledge and 
colouring knowledge, as well as financial issues, made the beginning of their 
entrepreneurial journey difficult. Working experience in ethnic Chinese family firms 
evidently is not enough to facilitate a business start-up, since ethnic Chinese owner-
managers apply job specialization, such as nglengkreng, nembok, nerusi and isen-isen as a 
result of which the batik worker develops her skills and competence only in the related 
task. The Javanese family firms were only able to get started because of government and 
non-government programmes aimed at empowering villagers. The present findings seem to 
be consistent with other research, which found that external support, especially 
government, is essential in encouraging business (Brenner, 1998; Mazzarol et al., 1999) 
especially in the start-up phase of new businesses (Budhiyanto, 2009). Government and 
non-government programmes provided information that developed Javanese owner-
managers’ knowledge in the batik business, for instance, business management, colouring 
techniques and formulas. This allowed Javanese batik workers to move from a worker to a 
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business owner. In the last decade, many new Javanese businesses have started up, after 
getting support from government and non-government programs. This research suggests 
that the government plays an important role in encouraging new business start-ups, 
especially when there is asymmetric knowledge in which business knowledge is contained 
only within certain ethnic groups.  
 
Javanese owner-managers also learned about drawing batik patterns on the clothes from 
their family; they were familiar with drawing batik patterns on the clothes since their 
childhood. Brought up in a batik worker’s family made them familiar with batik drawing 
activities from an early age, because the mother usually took batik work home. The 
family’s limited financial situation obliged children to help parents in drawing patterns on 
the clothes to earn more money. This allowed Javanese owner-managers to learn from 
parents either explicit knowledge or tacit knowledge through experience, observation and 
feeling. The family home becomes the incubator for training drawing skill where 
knowledge transfer took place.  
 
In addition, knowledge transfer occurred in the work place. Most Javanese owner-
managers had experience as batik workers in ethnic Chinese batik firms. They learnt to 
duplicate patterns, learnt about good combinations of pattern, and had opportunity to 
improve drawing skill by practising frequently. This suggests that the previous working 
place is another business incubator which enhances production skill that is required in 
assuring business efficiency. These findings seem to be consistent with other research, 
which found that there is a positive correlation between operation skills with business 
sustainability (Vuuren and Botha, 2010; Urban and Naidoo, 2012). However, the transfer 
of knowledge from ethnic Chinese owner-managers to Javanese batik workers has been 
restricted (it did not include knowledge about colouring or managerial knowledge). 
 
Javanese owner-managers who were not raised in a batik worker’s family learned neither 
through a business incubator in the family nor through work experience in an ethnic 
Chinese batik firm. They may have experience as a village government official. Being 
close to the government would enable easy access to government programmes designed to 
encourage villagers, who were mostly batik workers, to become entrepreneurs. These 
programmes allowed villagers to access information related to the batik business and gave 
them the opportunity to start up a batik business. This study shows that possessing power 
as a village administrator enables preferential access to batik business knowledge, leading 
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to opportunities to start up a batik business. This is in contrast to Mazzarol et al. (1999) 
who found that work experience in the government sector in Australia had a negative 
impact on family business start-up.  This inconsistency might be due to the context where 
the study was conducted. It suggests the importance of the context in understanding how 
opportunity encourages business start-up. 
7.2.3 Financial Resources 
Financial capital is significant in ensuring business success. The majority of ethnic Chinese 
owner-managers have not faced any substantial difficulty in accessing financial capital in 
the initial phase of their business. The explanations for this is that most Chinese Indonesian 
owner-managers gained the business through family inheritance, which is the accumulation 
of their predecessors’ wealth, such as lands, buildings, equipment and raw materials. The 
legacy becomes seed capital for the batik firm.  
 
Only a few Chinese Indonesian owner-managers experienced financial difficulty in the 
initial years of their business. It occurred when their predecessors left loans, which were 
bequeathed to their successors along with the batik family firm legacy. To address 
financial difficulty, ethnic Chinese owner-managers rely on family and relatives for 
funding. This succeeds in helping them to survive in difficult times. It indicates that family 
social capital has facilitated to access funding. However, the young generation of ethnic 
Chinese owner-managers tends to utilize bank loans in order to expand their business. This 
began after 2009, when the bank and government-owned enterprises offered many soft 
loans as result of the government’s programmes for developing batik businesses. The 
young ethnic Chinese owner-managers main reason for accessing bank loans is to procure 
privileges from the bank, such as accessing free exhibition stands in prime locations. It 
indicates that ethnic Chinese owner-managers are good at exploiting opportunities in order 
to develop the firm. Notwithstanding, the old generation tends not to take the opportunity 
to get bank loans since they encounter age limitations a constraint in gaining access to 
bank loans. Also, they are no longer passionate about developing the firm due to the 
physical limitations of their age.  
 
As suggested earlier, financial capital has been a major barrier for Javanese owner-
managers in starting up a batik firm. Having mostly been batik workers, they did not have 
any financial resources to make the move from batik worker to becoming an entrepreneur 
without support. It was the government and non-government grants or aid programmes that 
helped them on their way. They were not keen on taking risk, especially in initial business 
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start-up. Later, in order to develop the business, Javanese owner-managers started to utilize 
soft bank loans, which is also a part of the government assistance programme. This 
suggests that financial support from government and non-government organisations is 
necessary when the community has limited financial support.  
 
The lack of financial capital was further alleviated by cost cutting strategies. For instance, 
employing family members, employing themselves in production activity, employing only 
outsource workers, not opening a show room instead using their home as a transaction 
place, producing in limited numbers and producing only clothes and producing low-middle 
class products, to keep a low selling price. This suggests that cost cutting is an appropriate 
strategy in some cases to keep the business sustainable. This finding corroborates the idea 
that strategic planning is essential for the business while operating in a highly dynamic 
environment which affects the business performance (White, 1984; Drago, 1996). 
 
This study shows that financial capital problems could be overcome by accessing family 
social capital, which provides access to loans as well as cheap labour from family members 
and relatives. It confirms that, when financial resource is scarce, they rely on social and 
human capital from family members and friends (Sorenson and Bierman, 2009; 
Budhiyanto, 2009). It also indicates that family members’ involvement in a Javanese 
family firm is a vital resource especially in the start-up of the business, due to limited 
financial resources. These results agree with the findings of other studies in which family 
involvement is crucial in the emergence of the entrepreneurial phase (Klyver, 2007).  
 
7.3 Family Firm Succession  
Family firm succession has its own unique impact on family firm sustainability. Most 
Javanese owner-managers are first generation in the Lasem batik industry who have not yet 
experienced succession. In contrast, ethnic Chinese owner-managers have carried out 
successions through generations. What is surprising is that ethnic Chinese owner-managers 
do not have any specific succession plan to assure this process succeeds. They do not 
prepare the successors in advance. This is contradictory to expectation that succession 
planning is the main key to the success of succession which determines business continuity 
(Mandelbaum, 1995; Santiago, 2000; Perricone et al., 2001; Tatoglu et al., 2008; Klein et 
al., 2013; Filser et al., 2013; Ghee et al., 2015; Bizri, 2016; Daspit etal., 2016). 
 
Most Chinese Indonesian owner-managers only consider succession when they are getting 
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old and begin to feel their physical ability deteriorate and they require their children’s 
assistance. This study indicates that succession was happening accidentally. Although the 
literature suggests that planning succession is crucial for business sustainability (Sharma 
and Dave., 2013), particularly in developing countries (William & Jones, 2010), ethnic 
Chinese family firms in Lasem use alternative practices. They succeeded in managing 
succession through the generations even though they lacked succession planning. There are 
several explanations for this result. Firstly, the strong family values which encourage 
children to commit in obligation to their parents. Secondly, successors do not have any 
other lucrative opportunity other than continuing their parent’s business. Thirdly, 
successors failed in their career or were unable to compete in the big cities. Fourthly, 
predecessors were very flexible in choosing their successors which contributes to its 
success. 
 
Initially, Chinese Indonesian owner-managers followed the patriarchal Chinese tradition in 
choosing the successor; the oldest child or son (Zhao, 2014; Tan and Fock, 2001). These 
results agree with the findings of other studies, which suggest cultural tradition influences 
the decision in selecting the right successor, such as inheritance law, social norms and 
religious doctrine (Gersick et al., 1997). However, failure in getting a successor through 
cultural tradition requires flexibility in choosing a successor to ensure the continuation of 
the family firm. This study suggests that flexibility in the cultural tradition helps in 
assuring business sustainability. The successor would be chosen from nuclear family first; 
however, if there is no nuclear family member willing to continue the business, then they 
move to extended family members. In this case, sustainability of the business is perceived 
more important than merely sticking to the cultural tradition.  
 
In accordance with the present results, previous studies have demonstrated that, when the 
business was not profitable and/or not attractive to a potential successor, it might threaten 
business sustainability. Nevertheless, this study shows that personal attachment to the 
business plays an important role in assuring the business’s sustainability. A successor’s 
attachment to the family business as a personal identity affects their willingness to 
continue to keep the business alive and sustain their parent’s business. This finding 
corroborates the ideas of Geus (2011), who suggests cohesion and identity are the 
components which influence the longevity of the firm. Therefore, emotional attachment to 
the business is a factor that plays an important role to the successor’s inclination to keep 
the batik family firm operational. This shows that the Chinese cultural value of filial piety 
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as the basic family relationship of obedience and willingness to meet parents’ expectations 
is a factor that affects the success of business succession. It represents that family values, 
norms, obligations and expectations contribute to the availability of a successor. As a 
consequence, this research suggests that family social capital, especially strong ties among 




7.4 Family Firm Governance  
There are several issues of family firm governance that affect how the family firm might 
remain sustainable, such as family firm orientation, family firm structure and the 
leadership style of the owner-managers. This is explained as follows. 
7.4.1 Family Firm Orientation 
As a family firm, intermingling of the family and business interests is unavoidable, which 
could potentially either threaten or encourage business sustainability (Stafford et al., 1999; 
Olson et al., 2003; Danes et al., 2009; Bjursell and Backvall, 2011; Sharma and Dave, 
2013). Further, the family circle and the business circle, each has their own norms that 
need to be balanced to achieve business success (Gersick et al., 1997). Therefore, family 
orientation in a family firm plays an important role in determining how the strategy is 
created and how decisions are made in order to sustain the business (Reid et al., 1999; 
Aronoff, 2004). Interestingly, this study found that different ethnic groups applied different 
family firm orientations that affected their business sustainability. It is possible that these 
could be explained by their different cultural backgrounds. 
 
Both ethnic Chinese and Javanese owner-managers present the mixture of business 
governance orientation between family first orientation and business first orientation. 
Chinese Indonesian owner-managers apply a business first orientation when exploiting 
opportunity; however, they have a family first orientation in terms of business survival. 
Business first orientation is presented by having a good understanding about the need to 
exploit opportunity for the business to grow. Ethnic Chinese owner-managers are able to 
see when an opportunity has to be exploited and are willing to take the risk in order to 
develop the business.  
 
However, for ethnic Chinese owner-managers the family is there to keep the business 
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going; this approach or attitude has helped them survive through generations, particularly 
when facing difficult situations. The personal attachment of the ethnic Chinese owner-
managers to the firm commits them to keep the business going. Furthermore, they 
prioritize socio-emotional wealth beyond financial goals. They tend to keep the business 
going even when it is neither promising nor profitable. This study shows that even though 
the business does not have high sales turnover, ethnic Chinese owner-managers still keep 
the business going. This seems to be related to some values such as persistence, patience 
and loyalty; as well as hard-work, discipline and recognition from the community (Bjerke, 
2000).  
 
Further, ethnic Chinese owner-managers are conscious about preserving the reputation of 
their predecessor in the Lasem batik industry and their role in the identity of Lasem batik. 
Thus, they feel an obligation to keep the business reputation in order to maintain their 
family identity. Therefore, ethnic Chinese owner-managers tend to retain what their 
predecessor has done. The perpetuation of a family dynasty becomes the central essence of 
an ethnic Chinese family firm. The family members are emotionally attached to their batik 
firm and to keeping the business running. As a consequence, ethnic Chinese owner-
managers have a long-term vision which focuses on the continuity of the family firm.  This 
ultimately influences any strategy they make. 
 
However, using family workers to sustain the family firm can have a negative side-effect 
when the firm’s profit is used for the family’s needs. This practice usually occurs when a 
family member becomes ill or children are sent to school in the big city, which requires a 
lot of money. It might result in negative business performance. This study is consistent 
with previous studies that demonstrate family disruption could threaten a firm’s 
sustainability (Reid et al., 1999; Stafford et al., 1999; Olson et al., 2003; Iglesias, 2015).  
  
In comparison, Javanese owner-managers tend to adhere to a family first orientation in the 
business; meaning the business is to serve the family (Reid et al., 1999). This is 
understandable, since most of them came from a batik worker family background that is 
economically weak. Starting-up and managing a batik business tends to be for supporting 
their family’s needs. Later, the family orientation shifts to a business first orientation when 
they face low demand or the business is no longer profitable. Closing the business is their 
only option, especially if they already have another source of income or no longer have 
any financial responsibility. This shows that Javanese owner-managers have less emotional 
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attachment to their firm. They perceive the batik business merely as a source of income. 
There might be several reasons for this. Most Javanese owner-managers are newcomers 
who simply took the opportunity offered by the government and/or non-government 
organisations, which promised to improve their family’s economy. Moreover, as 
newcomers they lacked experience in running a business since they were raised in a non-
business family background. This influences their way of thinking, creating business 
strategy, and governing the business. In this case, the application of a business first 
orientation threatens business sustainability when the business is not profitable, they 
already have another source of income (for instance through the jobs of children and 
husbands) and no longer have family funding responsibility.  
 
This study indicates that family firm orientation might shift from family first orientation to 
business first orientation or vice versa when their circumstances change. It suggests that 
family orientation results from the complex interplay between dynamic circumstances and 
cultural background. This orientation influences the way they govern the firm, and their 
passion and commitment in sustaining the business. The family orientation at a particular 
time or event might encourage or threaten the business’s sustainability.  
7.4.2 Family Firm Structure 
Organisation structure demonstrates how a family firm operates. It portrays a task system 
and authority relationships in the organisation, how to coordinate the actions and resources 
to achieve the goals, so that the organisation can operate effectively and efficiently. 
 
Most batik firms in Lasem are family firms, which are owned and managed by members of 
the family.  Usually, they apply a simple organisation structure, where the business is 
single family owned and the owner acts as the manager and has minimum functional layers 
as the owner and manager. Only the Chinese ethnic group experienced multi-family owned 
businesses passed down through generations, where more than one child was willing to 
continue the business. The simple organisation structure means there is no distinction 
between organisation control and the decision-making process; the final decision is made 
by the owner-manager. The advantage of this model allows a direct response to offers of 
opportunity. It shows that the owner-manager model is the optimal governance mode for 
small family firms, where the interest of the owner aligns with the managers and there is 
no distinction between organisational control and the locus of the human resource decision 
process (Zellweger, 2017; Matlay, 2002). 
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This simple organisation structure follows centralized management style. Both ethnic 
groups perform this management style, though they differ in the intensity of authority 
delegation. Chinese Indonesian owner-managers tend to have more centralized authority, 
even though a few of them start to delegate authority to the leader who acts as a middle 
manager. A leader’s task is to assist in handling product quality control. However, Chinese 
Indonesian owner-managers still manage directly the patterns and motifs used by their 
batik workers; thus, the ethnic Chinese owner-managers’ taste and style is represented in 
their products. These practices are consistent with more traditional ideals of work ethic and 
dedication to excellence.  Chinese Indonesian owner-managers ensure their batik products 
meet their standard of quality. This finding suggests that ethnic Chinese batik family firms 
tend to be more conservative in terms of the control and management process. It might be 
one of the factors that affects the ability of ethnic Chinese family firms to remain 
sustainable in dynamic circumstances since it allows the owner-managers to make rapid 
decisions when it is necessary. This might benefit the business, especially in tumultuous 
conditions. This aligns with Zelwegger (2017) who concluded that the optimal governance 
form is the owner-manager constellation.  
 
Javanese owner-managers operate differently in that they tend to give more freedom to 
each batik worker to improvise in drawing patterns and motifs on batik clothes, especially 
when not for pre-order sales. A reasonable explanation is because Javanese owner-
managers have less knowledge than Chinese Indonesian owner-managers and they used to 
be batik workers who were always directed; therefore, they have not used their creativity in 
combining patterns and motifs to produce beautiful batik clothes. Furthermore, Javanese 
owner-managers allow batik workers to copy the product of ethnic Chinese owner-
managers. This practice is possible because outsourced batik workers are usually employed 
by more than one batik family firm.  
 
Overall, a batik family firm’s management style is still informal. To some extent, the 
Javanese young generations tend to be more formal, since they have training from 
government and NGOs. For instance, young owner-managers use  an account book. In 
addition, a few of the Chinese Indonesian owner-managers are beginning to formalize their 
business by having an Individual Business Licence and Obligatory Tax Payer’s 
Registration Number. This suggests that the young generation has high adaptability to 
adjust and respond to change.  
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7.4.3 The Leadership Style 
The style of how an owner-manager leads the business in relation to the employees and 
customers has an effect on how they engage in strategies to exploit opportunities and to 
survive in threatening conditions. Leadership styles affect how an employee engages with 
the business (Sousa and Dierendonck, 2017). This research suggests that each ethnic group 
has their own leadership style relative to their cultural background. 
 
The result of this study indicates that both ethnic Chinese and Javanese owner-managers 
are experienced in shifting the leadership style. They do not stick to one leadership style, 
such as benevolent paternalistic leadership style, authoritarian paternalistic leadership 
style, moral paternalistic leadership style, or servant leadership style. Usually, the owner-
manager adjusts the style to their relationship with employees, depending whether the 
changing circumstances might either threaten the business or provide opportunity. The 
appropriate adjustment of the leadership style is important in order to sustain the business.  
 
Initially, ethnic Chinese owner-managers demonstrated an authoritarian paternalistic 
leadership when they dominated the batik business. The owner-manager was perceived as 
a parent or father who knew the best for the business (Oner, 2012). This pattern represents 
inequality of interpersonal relations power between owner-manager as a leader and 
employee as a follower and where the practice is seen as restrictive, coercive, patronizing 
and adverse to freedom. However, environmental changes encouraged them to make 
adjustments, especially when the Javanese batik firms were rising resulting in tight 
competition in the market. It shows that rising competition forces owner-managers to 
change and make adjustments to their leadership style in order to exist.  
 
Ethnic Chinese owner-managers followed a combination of benevolent, authoritarian and 
moral paternalistic leadership. They built more family-friendly relationships with their 
employees. They started to be concerned about the emotional well-being of employees by 
adopting family-friendly relationships with the employees to help them to survive in a 
highly competitive market. Their leadership style changed after they realized that they 
were threatened by new, rising, Javanese firms, who usually had family relations with the 
batik workers. Therefore, ethnic Chinese owner-managers became more familiar and more 
benevolent towards their batik workers, such as giving a greater variety of lunch, providing 
healthcare reimbursement, arranging employee tours and facilitating soft loans. Ethnic 
Chinese owner-managers seem to discern that “kindness” investment is important in order 
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to maintain human resources. This practice effectively improves the relationship of the 
employees with the firm. It suggests that ethnic Chinese owner-managers tend to invest in 
social capital with employees. They believe that investment in kindness is important in 
retaining employees to keep them loyal, instead of trapped in a wages’ competition. These 
results confirm the findings of other studies that suggest leadership capabilities might 
determine long-term survival of the firm (William and Jones, 2010).  
 
In terms of knowledge transfer, ethnic Chinese owner-managers follow a supportive and 
instructional leadership style. They focus on family control of knowledge. Chinese 
Indonesian owner-managers tend to be closed and reluctant to share batik business 
knowledge with others, particularly employees, especially about the colouring. The batik 
business knowledge is restricted to family members who are expected to continue their 
batik business. In order to keep batik business knowledge secret, Chinese Indonesian 
owner-managers conduct job specialization for batik workers to restrict knowledge 
transfer. This practice limited the knowledge of batik workers to only one particular task 
which was delegated as her job. This prevented employees gaining a comprehensive 
knowledge about the batik business and inhibited batik workers from starting their own 
business. Further, Chinese Indonesian owner-managers mix the colouring formula by 
themselves and store colouring ingredients in a secret place, with an initial code on the 
plastic bag. This indicates that Chinese Indonesian owner-managers perceive the colouring 
formula to be essential to their batik business and needs to be kept secret.  
 
On the other hand, Javanese owner-managers are likely to follow a servant leadership 
management style, which is underpinning service to others (Oner, 2012). It represents the 
moral of serving people in order to mobilize their performance. It seems possible that these 
results are due to Javanese cultural norms, which drive the servant leadership style. Rukun 
(social peace and harmony) is a Javanese norm which underlies the relationship between 
people in society (Wolf, 1992). It needs compromise and sacrifice to generate cooperation 
and minimize conflicts. This cultural norm encourages Javanese owner-managers to 
perform a servant leadership style.   They frequently listen to batik workers and build an 
emotional bond with them. One possible reason is that they have had experience as a batik 
worker and therefore understand them better.  Acquiescence is a basic cultural component 
of Javanese society which also promotes the servant leadership style. The results of this 
study will now be compared to the findings of previous work where the humbleness of the 
servant leader affects their leadership effectiveness (Sousa and Dierendonck, 2017), which 
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contributes to business success.  These findings suggest that servant leadership helps 
Javanese owner-managers in managing batik workers by making them loyal to the firm.  
 
Furthermore, Javanese owner-managers are following openness and contribution 
leadership style behaviour in a knowledge sharing activity approach. They are more likely 
to be open to change in adjusting to changing circumstances. The family becomes a 
facilitator of informality and open environment in sharing knowledge. Sharing wealth 
value in Javanese culture also has contributed to spreading information and knowledge. 
Habitual group living of ethnic Javanese promotes knowledge transfer. This is proven by 
the increased number of Javanese batik firms which is in line with collectivism of Javanese 
cultural norms. New Javanese firms start up immediately after knowledge exchange is 
spread widely. It is somewhat surprising that cultural norms were noted in this condition as 
an important factor in spreading knowledge which in turn encourages new business start-
up. This study confirms that leadership styles depend on situational distinction of their 
environment (Cunningham et al., 2016). This study suggests that the leadership style is 
dynamic and heavily relates to the cultural background of the leader.  
 
7.5 Market, Political and Economic Dynamics 
Family firms do not live in a socio-economic and political vacuum, but rather in the actual 
time and place in the specific context. As a consequence, sustainability of family firms is 
closely related to their adaptive capabilities to the complex dynamic setting. The 
embeddedness of the family firm into their external environment (meso and macro levels) 
is a factor to consider in explaining how family firms might remain sustainable. Therefore, 
this section examines business sustainability by analyzing the appropriate response of the 
owner-manager to the meso level (market dynamics) and macro level (economic and 
political climate) due to the fact that market dynamics is a product of economic and 
institutional forces.  
 
There are three issues of market dynamics that owner-managers have to respond to in order 
to sustain the business. These are changing fashion trends, technological developments and 
market competition. I will discuss these one by one. 
 
 Firstly, fashion trend. This is an important influencer in the dynamics of the traditional 
batik market, since batik is a fashion product. When batik becomes a trendsetter in fashion, 
demand rises and vice versa. Both ethnic Chinese and Javanese owner-managers exploit 
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the opportunity differently within their particular contexts.  
 
Most Javanese owner-managers started-up their own batik business when batik became 
fashionable. They look at the lucrative aspect of the batik business. Moreover, government 
and non-government agencies have a positive intention to develop the batik industry to 
help the local economy. Javanese owner-managers respond to the situation by actively 
competing to access the support programmes. They even engage in nepotism in order to 
get the opportunity to participate in those programmes. Therefore, Javanese owner-
managers tend to be heavily reliant on the support of external bodies. Accessing the 
programmes seems to be a good way to succeed in starting and sustaining the business for 
Javanese owner-managers. This suggests that institutional support (government and non-
government bodies) has significant impact on the sustainability of Javanese family firms. 
However, the high dependency on institutional support might also threaten a family firm’s 
sustainability in the long run, since the aid programmes cannot be everlasting.  
 
In contrast, ethnic Chinese owner-managers experienced more ups and downs in the batik 
market. They were aware that batik is a fashion product that is influenced by current 
trends. There were two points in time when batik became a trendsetter in fashion. Firstly, 
during the 19th century when the Dutch government, which occupied Indonesia at that 
time, provided privileges to ethnic Chinese owner-managers for exporting and importing 
(see chapter 4 for details). The rising demand for batik and the opportunity offered by the 
government were responded positively by increasing production, expanding markets, and 
adopting the cap (stamp) method to shorten production time. This demonstrates that ethnic 
Chinese owner-managers successfully took advantage of the situation.  Secondly, after 
UNESCO legitimized batik as an Indonesian intangible cultural heritage of humanity on 2 
October 2009, the government moved to develop the batik industry in Indonesia. Some 
programmes and regulations were established to boost demand for batik resulting in batik 
becoming fashionable again. Ethnic Chinese owner-managers responded by increasing 
production capacity, innovating new products by adapting batik to modern men’s and 
women’s fashion and producing ready-to-wear clothing in order to adjust to customers’ 
preference for clothes that were easy and simple to wear. Ethnic Chinese owner-managers 
actively participated in exhibitions, especially in Jakarta, to increase their sales. 
Furthermore, they set aside business profit to invest in profitable investments, such as 
property. This represents Chinese cultural wisdom in which social status is shown through 
wealth and material things, thus materialistic and accumulative (Bjerke, 2000). Therefore, 
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they accumulate business profits by investment. This also suggests that ethnic Chinese 
owner-managers practise good financial management (Bjerke, 2000) which helps them in 
sustaining their business. Ethnic Chinese owner-managers coped with decreasing demand 
when batik was out of fashion by reducing production.  
 
Secondly, technology development. Javanese owner-managers responded positively to 
advances in technology development for producing batik by participating in training 
programmes. However, they could not immediately adopt the new methods because of the 
expensive machinery needed and the difficulty of the process for making silk-screened 
batik and cold wax-screened batik. Meanwhile, most Chinese Indonesian owner-managers 
were reluctant to adapt to the new technology. They maintained hand-drawn batik as the 
special characteristic of Lasem batik which had passed through generations. Nonetheless, a 
few owner-managers from both the Javanese and Chinese ethnic groups tried to sell printed 
batik by ordering from batik firms in other batik centres because it was cheaper than 
traditional batik. Unfortunately, printed batik did not get a good response from the market; 
therefore, Chinese Indonesian owner-managers decided not to sell it. Only a few Javanese 
owner-managers continued to provide printed batik as one of their product variants.  
 
This study has been unable to demonstrate that neglecting innovation, especially in 
production technology development, might promote constraints for business development 
(Velvin et al., 2016). In this case, the owner-managers’ reluctance to adopt new methods 
actually succeeded in keeping their businesses operational because they offered an 
authentic product which had an established, robust, niche market. Consequently, they were 
able to keep their businesses sustainable by building on a strong positioning in the niche 
market.  
 
This research suggests that the majority of Chinese Indonesian owner-managers followed 
an avoidance strategy by persisting with unchanged production methods to retain the 
firm’s identity. It shows that they believe the family firm is a valuable legacy which should 
be retained, including the product’s features and the method of production. This also 
indicates that ethnic Chinese owner-managers have a strong emotional attachment to the 
business, so that they keep doing what their predecessors have done. 
 
The other technological development affecting the industry is in telecommunication 
technology. The Black Berry application on the mobile phone helps Javanese batik owner-
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managers with communication and marketing through Black Berry Messenger (BBM). It is 
mainly the young generation who adopt this new technology. Although BBM facilitates 
business transactions, ethnic Chinese owner-managers use it mainly for communication 
rather than for trade. This is because their massive stock makes the process too complex. 
The ethnic Chinese owner-managers prefer customers to come and select the clothes they 
like rather than taking pictures of all the batik clothes. They use BBM to inform their 
customers when they have a new collection.  
 
Thirdly, competitive environment. In a highly competitive environment, both ethnic 
Chinese and Javanese owner-managers may employ aggressive responses to address 
competition. The competition is for skilled batik workers and for buyers. Javanese owner-
managers benefit from their family networks and by living in the same area as the batik 
workers. It is common in small villages in Indonesia that members of the village are inter-
related. Therefore, it is easy for Javanese owner-managers to get batik workers by 
exploiting the kinship system, either their nuclear or extended family. This suggests that 
Javanese cultural values impact on how they conduct strategies to sustain their business, 
such as ewuh pakewuh (hesitation), togetherness, helping each other, and rukun. This 
demonstrates that cultural values can be exploited to ensure business sustainability. 
 
Javanese owner-managers conducted several strategies in order to assure the availability of 
batik workers, such as offering higher wages and exploiting their family relationships 
within the village. This indicates that Javanese cultural wisdom plays a substantial role in 
leveraging family members (expanded to kinship ties) to be involved in the firm to secure 
the availability of batik workers. Social peace and harmony are important norms in 
Javanese society (Wolf, 1992; Efferin and Hartono, 2015; Wiryomartono, 2016) that 
ensures batik workers do not refuse their family members who ask for help (Fatmawati, 
2014), engenders respect in the social hierarchy (Geertz, 1956) and promotes the 
willingness of family members to be involved in the business. This means that Javanese 
owner-managers have a high dependency on their family in running the business. 
Furthermore, habitual group living (Endraswara, 2015) also encourages togetherness and a 
willingness to help each other which is necessary in Javanese society. Therefore, these 
cultural values help Javanese owner-managers in sustaining their business, especially in 
initial start-up years.  
 
In contrast, as the founders of the Lasem batik industry, ethnic Chinese owner-managers 
 198 
tried to keep their batik workers loyal, as mentioned in the previous section, by treating 
them well, providing a more varied menu for their lunch, arranging a holiday tour at the 
end of the year, providing a medical allowance, and offering a soft loan scheme. In 
addition, they also, opened a workshop in the village where their batik workers live and 
gave bonuses as rewards. Ethnic Chinese owner-managers also increased wages, up to a 
certain limit when their batik worker was attracted and lured by higher wages from other 
batik owner-managers. This was a strategy to encourage the batik worker not move to 
another firm.  This study proposes that flexibility together with creative strategies, are 
necessary to survive in times of high competition. Meanwhile, for the newcomers, 
exploiting kinship ties to recruit assistance, particularly in the initial years, is an 
indispensable resource for surviving tough competition.  
 
Competition in the Lasem batik industry is intense, both within the ethnic groups and 
between the ethnic groups. In their efforts to attract buyers they conduct several strategies. 
As newcomers, the Javanese owner-managers pursue a low price strategy as their most 
powerful strategy in penetrating the market. On the other hand, they have resources that 
support cutting expenses. They disregard the profit, concentrating only on how to sell the 
product, sometimes subsidizing when required. They do not account for their self-labour 
costs. In addition, Javanese owner-managers apply flexible practices when bargaining, 
such as offering further reductions for large orders. They also offer several flexible types 
of payment systems, such as consignment, paying by instalment and pay later. They tend to 
ignore the high risk of not being paid by the customers. Moreover, they provide a flexible 
returns policy to their reseller, where the buyer may exchange the batik clothes for 
different colours and motifs when the clothes are not saleable. This is not normal business 
practice in Indonesia. Therefore, Javanese owner-managers are courageous in taking the 
risk by offering a flexible returns policy to their reseller in order to help them sustain their 
business in tight competition. 
 
Javanese owner-managers vigorously market their product through exhibitions, door-to-
door selling and attracting potential customers by using Black Berry Messenger. These 
tactics suggest that, as newcomers, the Javanese owner-managers create strategies to 
penetrate the market. In certain situations, they even sacrifice profit and take high risks to 
keep the business going. However, in the long run, this might potentially threaten business 
sustainability, especially if they do not have sufficient financial capital. 
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Conversely, ethnic Chinese owner-managers, as the founders of the Lasem batik industry, 
heavily emphasize maintaining product quality (such as neatness and colour durability) to 
continue their predecessors’ practices. They have the advantages of being established in 
the Lasem batik industry, which places them in a strong marketing position. This suggests 
that exploiting a strong position in the market might sustain the business in a period of 
tight competition. In addition, the ability to recognize market competition and the 
willingness to take risks is important in order to make an appropriate strategy based on 
prevailing circumstances. 
 
The intense competition in the traditional Lasem batik industry causes unavoidable conflict 
with competitors. Interestingly, this study shows that different ethnic backgrounds have 
different reactions to the conflict. The cultural values seem to underpin the strategy of 
choices. Ethnic Chinese owner-managers prefer more direct or frontal conflicts. It indicates 
the independence of Chinese owner-managers in running their business. The frontal 
conflict potentially obstructs cooperation between batik family firms. Ethnic Chinese 
owner-managers rarely cooperate with other batik family firms.  However, to some extent 
the old generation of ethnic Chinese owner-manager is willing to cooperate with the young 
generation of ethnic Chinese owner-manager when it is beneficial for both sides.  
 
In contrast, Javanese owner-managers tend to avoid conflict and choose to gossip instead. 
This shows the Javanese values of social harmony impact on how they manage conflict. It 
allows Javanese owner-managers to cooperate with their competitors if that would help 
them in developing the business. This suggests that avoiding conflict might encourage 
business sustainability. Furthermore, this indicates that cultural values determine how the 
owner-manager manages conflict that, in turn, might potentially harm or encourage 
business sustainability. 
 
At the macro level, this study suggests that the dynamics of economic and political 
conditions from the Dutch Colonial time until reformation periods impacted on family firm 
sustainability. An appropriate response was required for each situation in order to keep the 
business going (Stafford et al, 1999). Family firms have to adapt to the changing 
environment such as market, economic, political and cultural conditions (Suddaby, 2010). 
The family firm is deeply embedded within their local community where they operate the 
business and live with the family (Colli, 2011). Ethnic Chinese and Javanese owner-
managers have different responses to changes at the macro level (economy and political 
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climate). This suggests that the government’s different treatment of the ethnic groups, and 
different historical backgrounds, impact on their strategy to sustain the business.  
 
Ethnic Chinese family firms have existed through generations and survived some crucial 
political changes (which are explained in detail in chapter 4). In this study, over the 
participants’ life-business experiences, there are three political regimes that threatened the 
business sustainability of their family batik firm. These are, the Japanese occupation 
(1942-1945), Old Order regime (1945-1966) and New Order regime (1966-1998). During 
the Japanese occupation, ethnic Chinese owner-managers closed their businesses and used 
the remaining business profit for living. Throughout the discriminatory treatments of the 
Old and New order regimes (1945-1998), ethnic Chinese owner-managers persisted in 
keeping the family firm, even though at times, they had to stop the business during chaotic 
conditions, such as in the purge of the Indonesian communist party in 1965/1966. The 
ethnic Chinese owner-managers responded submissively to the discrimination. Acceptance 
of the government regulations was their strategy for conserving the business, such as 
changing the Chinese business name into an Indonesian name. However, they used 
subterfuge to keep their family firm name by applying a stamp on the batik clothes with 
their predecessor’s name using Chinese characters. To access the government programmes, 
the business owner would use his Javanese wife’s name. This suggests that ethnic Chinese 
owner-managers were flexible and innovative in responding to difficult conditions by 
accepting discrimination and adjusting the way they ran their business.  In addition, 
although the New Order regime (1966-1998) restricted the choice of employment for the 
ethnic Chinese,  it resulted in  Chinese Indonesian owner-managers refining their business 
skill, acquired over generations to ensure business sustainability. This indicates that ethnic 
background context of ethnic has consequences for business sustainability. 
 
Conversely, there were two political changes that prospered ethnic Chinese business 
development. Firstly, a policy of community stratification in the Dutch colonial period 
(19th century). Chinese Indonesian owner-managers eagerly exploited that opportunity 
through several strategies, such as increasing production, taking advantage of export and 
import privileges and expanding their market. Secondly, government regulation that 
promoted the batik business after batik was legitimized by UNESCO in 2009. Chinese 
Indonesian owner-managers aggressively took the opportunity to increase production 
capacity; marketing low-middle class products; maintaining the family firm’s reputation 
through quality products and using exclusive designs; maintaining a good relationship with 
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government to get access to the government’s programmes; registering with the Lasem 
batik cooperative to obtain information about government programmes; and actively 
exploited government programs.  
 
The Javanese owner-managers, however, did not have any political changes that threatened 
business sustainability. Instead, the government encouraged their business development, 
especially under the Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s (SBY) regime (2004-2014). Javanese 
owner-managers responded positively to the government programmes. They started their 
own business, participated actively in government programmes, exploited nepotism to get 
access to government programmes and networked with government and non-government 
bodies. 
 
The macro level of economic dynamics also impacts on a family firm’s business 
sustainability. While good economic conditions encourage market growth, conversely, 
Indonesian economic crises that began with the Asian economic crisis from 1997 to 1999, 
together with political turbulence at the end of the Soeharto era, threatened business 
sustainability. The Lasem batik industry was in decline until it was reinvigorated under the 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono government (2004-2014). Both ethnic Chinese and Javanese 
owner-managers responded differently to the macro dynamics. The Chinese Indonesian 
owner-managers tended to be more optimistic that the situation would recover in the long 
run and would prosper again; they believed that God would make a way. This indicates 
that religion or superstition supported them in dealing with a difficult situation (Bjerke, 
2000). Therefore, they applied several strategies to keep their business going. For instance, 
minimizing expenditure such as, stopping production temporarily and dismissing batik 
workers, and stockpiling unsold product which they perceived as investment. In order to 
provide their family’s needs, they obtained income through business diversification and 
pawning batik products to get a loan for living expenses. This study suggests that cultural 
values and their contextual background had a profound influence on the owner-managers 
in the way they sustained their business in difficult times. They stopped temporarily only 
when necessary due to lack of demand. Conversely, Javanese owner-managers stopped 
their business and one of them closed permanently when they faced economic crisis, 
because they perceived the family firms as financial source for the family. 
 
7.6 Critical Factors for Business Survival 
This research has found six critical factors that are considered essential for survival of 
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batik businesses. Firstly, the owner-manager capability, including awareness of the 
changing circumstances at micro level (the family and the firm), meso level (the market 
dynamics) and macro level (political and economic events). As owner-managers, they have 
to be able to identify the changes at these levels and how these potentially generate 
opportunities or problems and subsequently how they should respond by developing an 
appropriate strategy. Flexibility is crucial in developing a coping strategy and/or respond to 
an opportunity but this must be understood within the confines the local family context 
(ethnic culture) and how that plays role in how owner-managers develop their strategy and 
take action. Both ethnic groups make use of their ethnic (family) values. Ethnic Chinese 
owner-managers perform guanxi with their distributors or resellers, some of whom have 
been related to the family business over generations. They act as a source of soft loan or 
are effective in helping firms pass through difficult situations. Meanwhile, Javanese 
owner-managers relied on such notions and practices as, ewuh pakewuh (hesitation), 
togetherness, harmony and helping each other in order to ensure batik worker availability 
during in initial business start-up and the periods of tight competition. 
 
Secondly, a unique resource availability of traditional batik firms lies in knowledge, 
specifically knowledge on the colouring formula; this knowledge is core to business 
survival (and growth). Having such knowledge made it possible for ethnic Chinese firms to 
survive over generations and is their key to success over their competitors. Lack of such 
colouring knowledge, made it very difficult for Javanese businesses to start their batik 
business. It shows that specialist knowledge can take a prominent role in batik business. 
Furthermore, family social capital is another unique resource that affects family firm 
sustainability. It application has been different among the ethnic groups. Ethnic Chinese 
owner-manager generate family social capital in close relationship within a limited 
network that is rooted in strong family ties; this is imbued with high trust and shared 
understanding. It implies that there are obligations and expectations that promote a strong 
business culture which support in their case competitive advantage (business secrets as 
well as willingness of potential successor to continue the business). Meanwhile, among 
Javanese owner-managers family social capital is at times more compromised to go 
beyond the business and therefore in fact creates vulnerability.  
 
Thirdly, family firm orientation. Owner-manager’s vision is substantial in giving direction 
to the business and co-determines success of the family firm; in family firms there is 
always an intermingling of family and business interests that either threaten or encourage 
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business sustainability. This research shows that both ethnic groups grapple with this 
interrelatedness but in different ways. The ethnic Chinese owner-managers applied 
business first orientation when exploiting opportunities; the combination of values such as 
persistence, patience, loyalty, hard-works, discipline, recognition and preserving reputation 
keep the business going (but not always with a profit). Ethnic Chinese owner-managers 
have high personal attachment to the business. Javanese owner-managers however, 
perform a family first orientation in the initial business start-up; this means that the 
business is to serve family needs. Javanese owner-managers thus seem to have a low 
personal attachment to the firm. They discern batik business merely perceived for 
supporting family needs. These outcomes relate to differences in cultural notions and 
social practices among the two groups and thus indirectly impact on processes of business 
sustainability.  
 
Fourth, a centralized management style and a modest organizational structure have been 
affecting the ability of both ethnic Chinese and Javanese family firms to remain sustainable 
in dynamic circumstances. It allows fast decision making since the owner is the manager 
and there are short lines of communication (often family related). Quick response and an 
appropriate strategy in addressing either opportunities or problems might be conducted. 
However, the ethnic groups are different in how they practice the delegation of authority. 
Ethnic Chinese owner-managers are more conservative in terms of control and 
management than Javanese owner-managers. This generates product positioning for ethnic 
Chinese batik firm as a competitive advantage; this assists market success. 
 
Fifth, independence while running the business (no strings attached). The case of the ethnic 
Chinese family firms shows that the independence in running the batik business has been a 
crucial factors that enabled them to survive across very dynamic circumstances over time. 
Discriminatory experiences influenced and reshaped how they conduct their family life and 
family firm; they had to manage on their own and rely on their own communities which 
created independence, flexibility and an ability to recover quickly. It suggests that 
independency resulted from their life experiences, which although were of a sever nature 
had a positive effect on family firm sustainability. As consequence, dependency of external 
support (government and or non-governmental organizations) might threaten business 
sustainability as was seen to be the case among the Javanese family firms. 
 
Sixth, maintaining good relationships with the government can be very beneficial due to 
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access to resources but it might also create a danger. The government is an external body 
that can have a significance impact on the family firm through their policies as well. It 
might either encourage or threaten the business, which depends on who are favoured by the 
policies. Both ethnic groups show that maintaining good relationship with the government 
is essential in developing the business. It provides access to the market through free 
exhibition spaces which is where they will recruit potential customers. In addition the 
Javanese group received financial support in the form of aid or grants intended to enhance 
the economy and empower villagers (which mostly are Javanese); it also however can 
create vulnerability the moment the support stops. 
 
7.7 Conclusion  
This study shows the importance of mixed-embeddedness perspectives to acquire an in-
depth understanding of business sustainability in terms of growth and survival. It allows 
more comprehensive analysis of the complexity and dynamics of family firms in multiple 
settings at micro, meso and macro levels, by considering that the ups and downs of family 
firms are closely related to the context. At the micro level, there are three big issues that 
have a crucial impact on the sustainability of the family firm, namely the availability of 
resources, succession and family firm governance. Meanwhile, the appropriate responses 
of the owner-managers to the dynamics at the meso level, notably fashion trend, 
technology development and competitive environment, and the macro level such as 
economic and political climate equally play a role in family firm sustainability.   
 
At the micro level, this research indicates that resource availability such as knowledge, 
social capital and financial capital is important in determining the business sustainability of 
both ethnic Chinese and Javanese family firms. However, each ethnic group has its own 
unique resource combination and local and cultural embeddedness. This plays out 
differently for each group in which they try to sustain their businesses in the following 
ways. 
 
The following patterns emerged, firstly, knowledge is a core resource in the batik industry, 
especially the colouring formula. This special knowledge engenders strength for ethnic 
Chinese owner-managers in dominating the Lasem traditional batik industry over 
generations. Therefore, they keep the colouring formula confidential. This inhibits 
competitors and newcomers, as this research shows for the Javanese businesses that 
entered the area, since they lack this knowledge. The fact that the ethnic Chinese owner-
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managers keep the colouring formulas a secret could, however, also threaten sustainability, 
especially when something unexpected happens to the predecessor and the knowledge has 
not been transferred.   
 
Secondly, succession. This study revealed that ethnic Chinese owner-managers have 
successfully passed the business down through generations without any specific succession 
planning. This suggests that the Chinese cultural value of filial piety, such as willingness to 
meet parents’ expectations and the strong ties in family relationships, is a factor that affects 
business succession. Thus, culture and family values determine the availability of 
successors. On the other hand, Javanese owner-managers have not yet experienced 
succession. It can be suggested that children might be willing to continue the business as 
long as the family firm remains profitable, because the family firm is operated to support 
the family’s needs.    
 
Thirdly, emotional attachment. The emotional attachment of the ethnic Chinese owner-
managers to the firm and the family is also important for business sustainability and 
influences how the owner-manager governs the firm. Batik owner-managers are willing to 
do anything to keep the business going, even sacrificing profit, especially in difficult 
situations, and exploiting the opportunity to develop the business in order to keep the 
firm’s reputation.  The ethnic Chinese owner-managers have strong personal attachment to 
their family firm. Meanwhile, personal attachment to the firm did not present in Javanese 
owner-managers. A possible explanation is that successive ethnic Chinese owner-managers 
have been running their batik business through generations, thus their emotional ties to the 
business grow in line with the development of their personal (family) lives. Further, the 
ethnic Chinese ethnic group had no other option than to run the business for a living during 
the New Order era (1966-1998). Moreover, ethnic Chinese owner-managers perceived the 
family firm as something to be passed to the next generation for the continuity of the 
family dynasty as a family identity. Therefore, the ethnic Chinese owner-manager merges 
himself or herself into the business.  
 
At the meso level, ethnic Chinese and Javanese owner-managers responded differently to 
market dynamics, such as fashion changes, technology development and competitive 
environment. When batik becomes fashionable, ethnic Chinese owner-managers exploit 
the opportunity by increasing product capacity, expanding market coverage, creating 
product innovation, actively participating in exhibitions, and investing profit in profitable 
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investments. On the other hand, Javanese owner-managers engage in nepotism to obtain 
privilege from the government in order to access grants and aid programmes. When new 
technology in batik making was introduced, ethnic Chinese owner-managers employed an 
avoidance strategy by not adopting it. They maintained traditional methods as performed 
over generations to keep the firm’s identity. Javanese owner-managers, however, as 
newcomers tended to try the new methods learned in the government programmes; but 
they did not continue with the new technology when the product was not in the market’s 
interest.  Further, in a competitive environment, as newcomers, Javanese owner-managers 
applied a low price strategy, offered several flexible payment systems, provided a flexible 
returns policy to resellers. On the other hand, ethnic Chinese owner-managers, as the 
founders of the Lasem batik industry, employed a product quality strategy and exploited 
strong positioning in the market.  
 
The market dynamics are, to a certain extent, a product of economic, institutional and 
political forces. Ethnic Chinese owner-managers are more independent in responding to 
the market dynamics because of their discriminatory past experienced during the Old and 
New Order regimes (1945-1998), whereas Javanese owner-managers rely more on external 
support, government support in particular. Due to their close relationships with 
government officials, it is easier for the Javanese owner-managers to access government 
grants and aid programmes than for the ethnic Chinese owner-managers.  
 
At the macro level, there were several political and economic events that impacted on 
business sustainability, either encouraging or threatening the family firm. Although ethnic 
Chinese owner-managers have been reasonably successful in sustaining their businesses, 
they had to deal with several tough periods, such as discrimination from the government 
regimes and economic crises. Their experience in facing difficult conditions forced them to 
be more independent, flexible and resilient. Javanese owner-managers benefited from 
favourable government policies.  This created high dependency for Javanese owner-
managers on government support, which in the long term, or when this support collapses, 
could threaten business sustainability. Regime changes in Indonesia often coincide with 
changes in policies so this is an insecure resource to rely on.  Thus, while on the one hand 
government support has been beneficial for the Javanese owner-managers to get their 
businesses up and running, on the other hand it could be a liability if such government 
support stops or changes. Being able to respond flexibly and have access to a variety of 
options/resources in case of macro changes, which are often beyond the control of small 
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businesses, is therefore important. This study indicates that the flexibility of the owner-
managers to the changing circumstances by exploiting their resources (supported by and in 
conjunction with certain cultural values) is deemed important. This is in line with an 
appropriate strategy in the adaptation process to external pressure, such as alignment 
strategy and avoidance strategies. 
 
In conclusion, this study suggests that a combination of contextual background, the 
settings and the unique resources relevant to each ethnic group have an impact on their 
strategies while responding to the changing circumstances at the micro, meso, and macro 
levels. In addition, both cultural and family values profoundly influence owner-managers 
in keeping their business going. Lastly, the policies of various regimes have impacted on 
business sustainability, therefore an appropriate strategy in changing circumstances is very 
crucial in determining business sustainability. 
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The aim of this research was to provide a more detailed and contextual understanding 
about the nature of family business sustainability, both in terms of growth and survival. To 
achieve this, the traditional batik industry in Lasem, Indonesia, was selected to explore 
what factors affect business sustainability and how these family businesses adjust to 
changing circumstances. This study incorporated a mixed-embeddedness perspective by 
investigating changes at different levels and in different contexts: the micro level (the 
family and the firm), meso level (the market and institutional environment), and macro 
level (economic and political climate).   The ups and downs of the family firm over time 
have been overlooked in family business sustainability research to date, which inspired this 
research in the first place. In addition, this research is one of the first to examine family 
firm sustainability for two different ethnic groups; both have their own history in Lasem 
and in the traditional batik industry, notably the ethnic Chinese and the Javanese. 
 
In order to achieve the aim, I have outlined several objectives in undertaking this study. 
Firstly, to critically review and analyze literature and theories on family firm sustainability. 
The majority of studies on business sustainability examine the macro-economic level, 
which draws attention to responsible behaviour socially and environmentally. To offer a 
more comprehensive understanding of family firm sustainability, this research also 
explored the micro and meso levels. Previous studies in business sustainability examine 
sustainability either by looking at the ability of the firm to pass through difficult conditions 
and situations or by examining the growth of the business. This study, by taking a longer-
term view, was able to explore both the ups and downs of businesses and how they coped. 
In addition, this study shows that local context (culture) has an impact on how these family 
firms develop their coping strategy and respond to opportunities. This suggests the 
importance of mixed-embeddedness in studying business sustainability, where the business 
and the life history, contexts and settings as the background of the family firm owner-
managers become crucial in determining the response to changes in circumstances that 
either potentially encourage or threaten business sustainability. The second objective was 
to develop an in-depth understanding of which factors affect business sustainability using 
the example of the traditional batik industry in Lasem in Indonesia. This was investigated 
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by comparing two ethnic groups that are active in the industry in Lasem; the long-
established ethnic Chinese family businesses and the more recent businesses established by 
the Javanese. Chapters 5 and 6 provide the in-depth details of each group while in chapter 
7 the comparative focus reveals, for each group, the importance of unique endowments 
(related to specific cultural notions, social practices, access to resources and position 
within Indonesian society) in setting up, running, and maintaining their business. The third 
objective was to develop an in-depth understanding of how family firms respond to 
changing circumstances in order to sustain the business, in particular, through the example 
of the traditional batik industry in Lasem, Indonesia. The in-depth details of each group 
were presented in chapters 5 and 6. The fourth objective was to develop theoretical 
thinking and research on family firm sustainability which will be addressed in more detail 
below where contributions to knowledge are summarized. The final objective was to offer 
advice on how Indonesian family firms might prepare and respond to changing 
circumstances in order to support their business sustainability; these are revealed in the 
recommendation section below. 
 
This research demonstrates the embeddedness of family firms in their micro, meso and 
macro levels have consequences for business development and business survival and for 
business survival over generations. Therefore, how the owner-manager responds to 
changes in the micro, meso and macro circumstances is deemed important in keeping the 
business going. The results of this study suggest some key findings that impact on business 
sustainability. Firstly, at the micro level, the unique resource availability (knowledge, 
social capital and financial capital) owned by each ethnic group, which refers to the 
contexts (such as family background and ethnic culture) in which they are embedded; 
knowledge possession (especially colouring formula); flexibility in responding to the 
changing circumstances; succession; and emotional attachment to the firm and the family.  
 
Secondly, at the meso level, changes in the market dynamic impact on business 
sustainability. Each ethnic group delivers different responses to the market dynamics 
(fashion trend, technology development and competitive environment) in regard to their 
context. This must be positioned against the macro level (political and economic) 
dynamics which have impacted each of the two groups differently.   
 
Thirdly, at the macro level several political and economic events either encouraged or 
threatened business sustainability. The ethnic groups have responded differently to the 
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political and economic events and they subsequently employed different strategies due to 
being embedded differently in Indonesian society.  
 
Ethnic Chinese owner-managers demonstrate their success in sustaining their businesses 
over generations. During the Dutch colonial time they received privileges to run their 
businesses, which ensured success. Meanwhile, the ethnic Javanese at that time were 
merely batik workers. Ethnic Chinese owner-managers, however, proved more resilient in 
coping with difficult conditions, such as discriminatory treatment from the government 
(Old and New Order regimes, 1945-1998) and the economic crisis, compared to Javanese 
owner-managers who started batik businesses when the Indonesian government gave 
intensives through batik industry support programs aimed at enhancing village economies 
of villagers. The life experiences of ethnic Chinese owner-managers in facing difficult 
conditions reshaped the way they lived and ran their businesses. It forced them to be more 
independent, flexible and to recover quickly. On the other hand, Javanese owner-managers 
benefitted more from government policies and started their own businesses during the New 
Order regimes (1966-1998). It show that government policies have an impact either in 
developing or in disrupting batik businesses; this relates to who is favoured by these 
programs and policies.  
 
Such government support is thus closely linked to the sustainability of batik businesses 
through the creation of ‘a market’ for batik (use of batik style dress by government 
officials and on special days) as well as through programs, such as free training programs 
on batik production and assistance in marketing by supporting the transport of the product 
to be marketed to domestic or overseas exhibitions and give grant funding. They also offer 
support by creating free exhibition stands to showcase batik to potential customers, both 
from Indonesia and abroad. 
 
Javanese owner-managers displayed great dependency on the government support, when 
faced with difficult conditions during the economic crisis: one of them closed the business 
permanently, while the others chose to economize. Having a high dependency on 
government support, threatens business sustainability in the long run, especially when the 
regime changes which is inevitably followed by a change of policies (and thus the end of 
support). This research indicates that close relationships with government officials is 
required in order to exploit these opportunities. An appropriate business strategy as a 
response to changing circumstances is important for business sustainability, rather than 
relying on the regime’s policies.  
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To sum up, this study suggests that each ethnic group is embedded differently and has 
found ways to cope with challenges to their businesses by relying on their unique resources 
for developing their strategy to respond to the changing circumstances at the micro, meso 
and macro levels. Lastly, the importance of the flexibility of the owner-managers to their 
changing circumstances by taking advantage of their cultural and family values, and 
resources. This is in parallel with choosing an appropriate strategy in adapting to external 
pressures to ensure business sustainability. 
 
8.2 The Contribution of The Study  
This study generated an original contribution to research on the development of family 
firm sustainability in several important areas. Before addressing these in detail below, a 
core contribution of this study has been the identification of several key factors that are 
critical for the survival of batik businesses. These are: owner-manager capability, including 
an awareness to changing circumstances (seeing and acting); unique resource availability 
that specific ethnic groups might have and can use to their advantage, such as knowledge 
(unique colouring formula used in traditional batik); the interlinkages between family 
capital, financial capital and family involvement (offering a large pool of potential 
resources to access); family firm orientation (vision and values); centralized management 
style in a modest organizational structure (short lines of communication); a good level of 
independence (no too many strings attached unless reciprocal) while running the business; 
and having good relationships with the government (in order to have access to their 
resources). 
 
This contributions of this study are as follows. 
 
Firstly, most business sustainability studies are heavily focused on the macro-economic 
level, which examines environmental or social elements for sustainable development 
(Hogevold and Svensson, 2012; Wells, 2016; Roume and Louche 2016; Dyllick and Muff, 
2016; Ferro et al., 2017; Galo et al, 2018). Therefore, this study contributes to the paucity 
of research in business sustainability at the micro economic level, which looks at how the 
firm could be sustained over periods of time. This research found that study at the micro 
level is important since the availability of resources, the success of succession, family firm 
governance and how the family firm responds to the changing circumstances have impact 
on the family business’s sustainability.   
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Secondly, this research also offers a more comprehensive approach to studying business 
sustainability by looking at both the growth and survival process, while most studies to 
date partially examine business sustainability by focusing on either survival (Heynes et al., 
2011; Winard et al., 2014; Glover and Ray, 2015) or on growth (Olson et al., 2003; Urban 
and Naidoo, 2012; Vu et al, 2017). This research suggests that it is important to study 
sustainability more holistically by looking at the ability to develop and survive the 
business, since business sustainability means the capability of the business to exist over 
time. This study suggests that to make a business sustainable, family firm owner-managers 
have to create an appropriate strategy in response to difficult conditions.  Their survival 
coping strategy is crucial to ensure the business’s survival. In addition, family business 
owner-managers also have to create an appropriate strategy to exploit opportunities to 
sustain business growth. The ability to develop the business determines the business’s 
sustainability over a period of time. 
 
Thirdly, the study of business sustainability often neglects the environmental impacts 
(Astrachan, 2010), such as the general condition of the business; potential competitors; 
industry growth and economic cycles over time; the political climate and technological 
development. Accordingly, to fill this gap, this research investigates business sustainability 
in its proper historical, social, and economic environment context, i.e.  Lasem batik as a 
traditional batik industry and its development over time in confluence with political and 
economic changes in Indonesia in general and with regard to industry in particular. The 
study of family firms over time offers insight into the context of where they are embedded. 
An historical perspective gives an overview of the changing contexts and settings over 
time, and the various responses that might threaten or reassure business sustainability. 
Therefore, this study presents the ups and downs of the family firm in order to depict the 
way they sustain the business and survive in difficult conditions and develop the business 
when there is an opportunity. 
 
Fourthly, this study uses an interpretivist position, as it believes in the value of 
understanding the meaning-making processes of research participants. This offers some 
important insights into business sustainability using a more contextual approach by 
exploring the factors that impact on business sustainability and how the family firm 
responds to the changing circumstances in order to sustain the business. Family firm 
sustainability is the relationship between the business, the family, the settings and the 
contexts. This study, through close observation and in-depth interviews, discovered how 
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family firms sustain their business. For instance, it examined how they exploit their 
available unique resources, how they achieve succession to ensure business continuity and 
how they respond to changing circumstances. This level of understanding is often missing 
in other family firm sustainability studies. 
 
Fifth is the comparison between ethnic groups which shows that each has their own unique 
resources and strategies to respond to the changing circumstances in order to keep the 
business going. It suggests that the contexts and settings have impact on business 
sustainability. This study employs a life-business history approach. This approach explores 
the business owners’ life history in conjunction with the historical evolution of the 
business (Koning and Dahles, 2009). The benefits of using life-business histories as a 
method is that it brings an in-depth understanding as to how family businesses remain 
sustainable and/or adapt to changing circumstances; it provides a more detailed perspective 
on how the family firm responds to the changing circumstances he or she may have been 
confronted with over time. Most other research only studies sustainability in a particular 
time period, such as Olson et al. (2003), Heynes et al. (2011) and Urban and Naido (2012). 
 
Sixth is an on-going discussion on the different ways of ‘doing’ business among ethnic 
Chinese entrepreneurs in Indonesia and Southeast Asia versus local entrepreneurs to which 
this research might contribute. This research found that there is a unique feature in the 
ethnic Chinese way in doing business, in particular how they focus on the business at all 
times. The ethnic Chinese case practised a business first orientation when exploiting the 
opportunities, though they apply a family first orientation when concerned with business 
survival. Conversely, the Javanese local entrepreneurs placed family first in the business. 
They started and managed the business to support the family’s life necessities. 
 
The seventh aspect focuses on the two types of family firms and the different positions are 
considered as a good portrayal to explain that settings and contexts are very important in 
understanding the responses of family firms to the changing circumstances that might have 
an impact on their business sustainability. This research compares these two ethnic groups 
to explore how they have responded to the changing circumstances. Even though quite a 
few of the more meso and macro circumstance have been the same, the two groups have 
experienced them differently and have been challenged differently. This has led to the 
following insights: the ethnic Chinese owner-managers are more resilient, relying on their 
own resources and business experience; while the Javanese owner-managers are more 
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dependent on external support which, in the long run, might threaten business 
sustainability. 
 
Finally, no previous study has investigated family firm sustainability by considering a wide 
range of factors that might affect business sustainability. This study analyzes business 
sustainability in changing circumstances at every level (micro, meso and macro). In other 
words, business sustainability is the outcome of an appropriate response to changing 
circumstance in the complex and interrelated system where the firm is embedded. Hence, 
this study proposes the significance of incorporating an embedded perspective that allows 
for an analysis of changes at different levels and in different contexts: the micro level (the 
family and the firm), meso level (the market, institutional environment), and macro level 
(economic and political climate) in investigating business sustainability. 
 
8.3 Limitations and Further Research 
Although this research has presented a comprehensive understanding of family business 
sustainability, it did so in a rather unique and specific industry: traditional batik. This 
raises the question whether a particular business sector has impact on business 
sustainability. This has not been investigated as the focus was on one sector only and thus 
offers scope for further research to be able to determine a potential relationship between 
sector or industry and firm sustainably. 
 
To date, the study of family business sustainability is predominantly in a western context 
(Danes et al., 2008; Olson et al., 2003; Heynes et al., 2011; Hogevold and Svensson, 2012; 
Staughton and Ludema, 2012). Whereas this study contributed to this lacuna, more 
research in non-Western contexts is needed to be able to judge any specific impact this 
might have on family firm sustainability, for instance the level of economic development, 
political climate and stability, processes of urbanization and industrialization, and so on.  
 
This research comprehends business sustainability in family firms through a social and 
economic lens. I neglected the environmental issue since it is not as yet a big issue in 
traditional batik in Lasem, Indonesia. The government does not take much interest in 
regulating waste disposal even though waste significantly pollutes the environment. 
Therefore, the business owner-managers ignore the natural environment aspects in running 
their business. Further research needs to incorporate natural environment issues in 
understanding business sustainability through time, especially in the batik industry, since 
the waste from the colouring process is polluting the rivers and could threaten the 
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surrounding environment. Therefore, future research could be conducted to include 
sustainability, not only of the business, but also in terms of its impact on the environment. 
 
Further, the issue of business failure should be mentioned. As it is difficult to get access to 
unsuccessful family firms (due to the fact that this information is not being shared or a 
reluctance to discuss it because of shame) this study heavily relied on the surviving family 
businesses, which is especially the case for the ethnic Chinese family firms. It thus might 
have painted an overtly positive image. Including failure experiences in research on family 
firm sustainability might provide a more detailed understanding of the ups and downs of 
family firms, particularly if after a failure there is a restart and how this is resourced and 
managed. This warrants further research. A related issue concerns family firm conflict and 
how these impact on firm sustainability. As talking about such conflicts can be culturally 
sensitive, other research methods might be developed to unpack these dimensions; we can 
think of arts-based approaches as other ways of investigating sensitive topics in family 
firm research. 
 
Finally, while this research study suggests that life-business histories are an important and 
additional approach to capturing family firm sustainability in greater detail, it also has 
limitations. Since the life-business history approach explores the business owner’s life 
history in conjunction with their business development, it heavily relies on the memory of 
the participant where the ability in recalling events, occurrences and incidents is sometimes 
blurred over time and potentially re-storied in a more positive light. Although these 
‘memory’ matters are acknowledged in this methodology, there is an opportunity to 
advance this approach by using additional sources such as the inclusion of secondary 
sources, for instance mass media information, newspaper clippings, government 
documents and business reports. Also interviewing other family members could enrich the 
data further, particularly as they might have different recollections of the events thus 
allowing the research to further complexify its outcomes. 
 
8.4 Recommendations  
This study found that financial support from government or non-government programmes 
succeeded in encouraging the start-up and development of businesses by the Javanese 
entrepreneurs. Although businesses were successfully started in the batik sector, it also 
created, as shown, a strong dependency on such government support which can ultimately 
threaten business sustainability. Therefore, it would be relevant if such government support 
were accompanied by empowering programmes that foster independence. Advice to the 
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government would therefore be to also provide a system to nurture business mentoring 
until newcomers are considered ready to conduct the various business tasks alone within 
certain time limits.  
 
Furthermore, based on the research, it seems relevant in both cases that family firms 
prepare better in terms of succession and develop succession plans. Leaving this to chance, 
as was shown, could be detrimental to business survival. Advice to family firms would 
include to actively involving potential successors into the business and its management as 
early as possible. This might encourage successor’s interest in batik business; they can also 
help it grow which will create a feeling of ownership and interest in taking over. The more 
successful the batik business is, as research points out, the greater the interest of the next 
generation in continuing the business. The closeness of the emotional relationship between 
children and parents can work two ways and awareness raising (for instance via family 
firm organisations or batik NGOs) of the positives and negatives that the closeness of these 
bonds might generate, is important in order to work towards succession planning and 
business sustainability.  
 
In addition, based on the findings, it became clear that certain business ‘secrets’ should be 
shared with the next generation before this knowledge is lost. For instance, the unique 
colouring formula, which is closely tied to the survival of Lasem batik and its cultural 
heritage. This hints at offering the family firms the advice of creating awareness of the 
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Appendixes 
Appendix 1 Participant Information Sheet 
 
 
Department of Business and Management 
Faculty of Business 
Oxford Brookes University, Wheatley  
OX33 1HX, United Kingdom 
 







Change and adaptation of family firms in the batik industry in Lasem, Indonesia. 
 
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide whether or not to take part, it is 
important for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. Please take time to 
read the following information carefully. 
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
 
The ability to survive and grow is important to sustain family firms. This study will explore the ways in 
which family firms in the traditional batik industry in Indonesia have responded to changing circumstances 
such as the Asian economic crisis in the late 1990s, the global crisis of the mid-2000s, the UNESCO 
declaration in 2009 in batik as an Indonesian cultural heritage product.   
  
This study will run approximately eight weeks during which interviews and observation of daily business 
activities will take place. 
 
Why have I been invited to participate? 
 
We are interested in hearing about your business experiences and your life experience related to running a 
business in the batik industry. 
 
We are inviting you because you might fit the following criteria: 
• You are a traditional batik business owner or manager. 
• You have experience of running a business for 1 to 5 years. 
• You are aged above 20 years. 
•  
Do I have to take part? 
 
It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you do decide to take part you will be given this 
information sheet to keep and be asked to sign a consent form. If you decide to take part you are still free to 
withdraw at any time and without giving a reason. 
 
What will happen to me if I take part? 
 
After reading this information sheet, we will discuss any queries that you might have about the study. If you 
then agree to participate, you will be asked to sign a consent form.  
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On an agreed day, we will meet for an interview session. Between us we will choose a convenient time and 
place to have the interview. The length or duration of the interview session can vary, depending on your 
convenience. The interview will be conducted in an informal way.  
You are free to stop the interview session at any moment.  
The interview consists of sharing business and life experiences and we can decide between us to meet several 
times for a short session, rather than one long session, if that is your preference.  
 
The researcher will also make a visit to conduct an observation to view daily activities that will be noted in a 
diary. With your approval, pictures will be taken during the interview and/or observation. These materials are 
in support of the interview. 
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
 
You will contribute in furthering our understanding of the topic. In particular the view from business owners 
in Indonesia is relevant because of the special status of the batik industry, the importance of family 
businesses to economic and social development and the need to conduct research from a non-western 
perspective.  
 
Will what I say in this study be kept confidential? 
 
All information collected about you will be kept strictly confidential (subject to legal limitations). Access to 
the data will be by the researcher working on this study only. The data will be securely stored in a computer 
which will be password protected. The codes, files and identifying information will be kept in separately 
locked filing cabinets. 
 
Data generated by the study must be maintained in accordance with the University’s policy on academic 
integrity. The data generated in the course of the research must be kept securely in paper or electronic form 
for a period of ten years after the completion of a research project. All data will be de-identified. It will be 
referred to by pseudonym in any publication arising from the research. 
 
What should I do if I want to take part? 
 
If you would like to take part in this study, please contact Lely Kristinawati Budhiyanto at the address, phone 
number or email address given below. 
 
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
 
The results of this research will be used in the thesis that I will write for my PhD degree. Further, the results 
also will be published in research journals and conference papers. If you wish to obtain a copy of the 
published research you can contact the researcher at the address, phone number or email address given below 
following completion of the study.  
 
Who is organising and funding the research? 
 
I am conducting the research as a PhD research student at Department of Business and Management, Faculty 
of Business, Oxford Brookes University under the supervision of Dr Juliette Koning and Dr David Bowen. 
This research is self-funded.   
 
Who has reviewed the study? 
 



























If you have any concerns about the way in which the study has been conducted, you should contact the Chair 
of the University Research Ethics Committee on ethics@brookes.ac.uk. 
 






Dr David Bowen 
Reader and Head of 
Doctoral Programmes 
Oxford School of 
Hospitality Management, 
Faculty of Business 
Oxford Brookes University 
F118, Headington Campus 
Oxford, OX3 0BP 
dbowen@brookes.ac.uk 
Phone: +441865483426 
Dr Juliette Koning 
Director of Studies 
Department of Business and 
Management, Faculty of 
Business 
Oxford Brookes University 
N201, Wheatley Campus 
Oxford, OX33 1H 
j.koning@brookes.ac.uk 
Phone: +441865485613 
Lely Kristinawati Budhiyanto 
PhD research student 
Department of Business 
Management  
Faculty of business 
Oxford Brookes University  
College Close 10 










Appendix 2 Consent Form for Participation in an Interview 
 
Research project: 
Change and adaptation of family firms in the batik industry in Lasem, Indonesia 
 
Lely Kristinawati Budhiyanto  Email: lely.budhiyanto-2012@brookes.ac.uk 
PhD research student 
College Close 10  
Department of Business and Management 
Faculty of Business 




 Please initial 
box 
 
I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet for the above study and 




I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time, 
without giving reason. 
 
 






 Please initial 
box 
Yes            No 
    
   



















I agree to the interview being audio recorded 
 
 
I agree to the use of de-identified quotes in publications 
 
 
I agree to being observed 
 
 




Appendix 3 Interview Question 
Project title: Family Firm Sustainability: An Ethnographic Study of  Change and Adaptation in 
Traditional Batik Industry in Lasem, Indonesia 
 
Participant’s personal information: 
1. Name      : 
2. Age (date of birth)    : 
3. Birth order     : 
4. Educational background   : 
5. Age at business start-up   : 
6. Marital status     : 
7. Number of children    : 
8. Ethnic identity    : 
9. Spouse’s name    : 
10. Educational background spouse  : 
11. Ethnic identity spouse    : 
12. Role of spouse in the business  : 
13. Employment spouse    : 
14. Employment history parents   : 
Participant’s business information: 
1. Business type     : 
2. Number of employees    : 
3. Type of employees (job roles)  : 
4. The ownership of the business  : 
5. Number of stores (if applicable)  : 
6. Type of products    : 
7. The involvement of family   : 
Business start-up stage (origin of the current business) 
1. When did you start your business? 
2. What is your previous job? Could you please describe in as much detail as possible. 
3. What motivated your decision to change your job? Could you please explain it? 
4. Why did you decide to start a traditional batik businessand not another kind of 
businesses? Could you tell me more about that? 
5. Was there anybody who inspired you to start up your batik business? 
6. Tell me about how you started your batik business. 
7. Was there anybody who helped you to start up your business? 
8. What obstacles did you face while starting your business? How have you dealt with 
that? 
9. Was there anybody in particular who helped you to overcome the problems during 
your initial business? 
10. How did you get start-up capital for your business? Could you please describe it? 
 
Overall topic guide 
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MACRO: Major events 
1. What major external events impacted on your business sustainability [for example 
Dutch Occupation, Independence; Japanese occupation; introduction of printing 
machines 1970s; Asian economic crisis late 1990s; Interim presidency Gus Dur 
2000s; UNESCO 2009; global crisis 2008] 
 
MESO: Market & institutional setting 
1. What particular market developments have impacted on your business development 
and business plans? Can you give as many examples as possible? 
 
2. What is the institutional role that impacted on your business? (local government, 
national government, banking, traditional batik cooperative, association of batik 
admirers )  
 
MICRO: family & business (compare ethnic Chinese and ethnic Javanese) 
1. Family dynamics (generations, transfer knowledge, role of family member, family 
leadership, gender dynamics) 
 
2. Business dynamics  
 
a. When did your business start to grow and take off?  
b. Why do you think this happened? 
c. What did you do when you started to make profits (reinvesting?) 



























Appendix 4 Open Coding  
 
Ethnic Chinese owner-managers Javanese owner-managers 
Forerunner in batik Lasem industry Newcomer 
Intention in doing batik business Intention in doing batik business 
Learning process Learning process 
Source of knowledge Source of knowledge 
Business Incubator – batik business Business Incubator – batik making 
Keep doing the predecessor’s have done Tacit knowledge 
Tacit knowledge Tight competition 
Tight competition Competition in batik workers  
Competition in batik workers  Exploit family networks (kinship ties) 
Rising salary  Living in the same area with batik worker as 
competitive advantage 
Treated them well Ewuh pakewuh (hesitate), togetherness, helping each 
other, and rukun rukun (social peace and harmony) 
Provide more varied menu for their lunch Exploit cultural value 
Enact holiday tour in the end of the year Family involvement 
Give medical allowance Production activity role 
Provide soft loan scheme Source of help 
Open a workshop in the village where their batik 
workers lived 
Take over the business 
Give bonus as rewards Start new business 
Family involvement First generation  
Substitution role Inherit from ethnic Chinese partner 
Source of trust Intangible asset 
Share wealth Government training 
Well-know product Single owned and managed 
Take over the business Previous working experienced  
Start new business Wages system 
Inheritance Workshop batik worker 
Tangible asset Outsource batik worker 
Intangible asset Lack of colouring knowledge  
Product specialty No colouring knowledge – inhibit business start up 
Gender role in the business Gender role in the business 
Government training Take advantage of its proximity to batik workers 
house  
Single or multiple owned and managed Ewuh pakewuh (hesitate) 
Previous working experienced Nepotism 
Wages system Pleasant treatment in doing business 
Workshop batik worker Government privilege 
Outsource batik worker External support 
 Job specialization – limited batik knowledge 
The important of colouring formula Power possession 
Keep colouring formula secretly Cost cutting strategies to cope with limited financial 
capital 
guanxi (personalized network/connection) Business first orientation 
Product quality Family first orientation 
Job specialization – managing batik worker Business not promises or less profitable 
Family and relatives funding Family life disruptions 
Business succession Freedom for batik worker performing improvisation 
in drawing patterns and motifs 
Willingness to continue Copy competitor product 
Obligation as a child Servant leadership 
Strong family value Sharing wealth by transfer knowledge 
Unable to compete in big cities Fashion trend 
No other lucrative opportunity than continuing 
parent’s family firm 
Compete actively to get supporting programs 
Flexibility in choosing successor  Nepotism 
Personal attachment to the firm Dependency to external support 
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 Open to new production method 
 Reluctant to adapt – following the forerunner 
Personal identity Telecommunication technology development 
Family value Economical communication tools 
Family expectation Adapted to new telecommunication technology 
Business first orientation Product promotion 
Family first orientation New way in business transaction 
Business not promises or less profitable Facilitate in approaching customers 
Personal characteristics Competitive environment 
Reputation Batik worker competition 
Emotionally engage to the firm Exploit family networks (kinship ties) 
Long-term orientation vision Living in the same area with batik worker as 
competitive advantage 
Family life disruptions Ewuh pakewuh (hesitate), togetherness, helping each 
other, and rukun rukun (social peace and harmony) 
Centralized authority Exploit cultural value 
Kindness investment Increasing wages 
Family control the knowledge Market competition 
Instructional leadership Low price strategy 
Fashion trend Cutting expenditure expenses 
Compete actively to get supporting programs Neglected the profit 
Increasing production capacity Subsidized 
Expanded marked area Flexibility in bargaining process 
Adopted cap (stamp) tool to shortened production 
time 
Discount for large order 
Ready to wear clothing Flexibility in payment system 
Participate actively in exhibition Consignment system 
Investment Instalment system 
Production technology development Pay later 
Reluctant to adapt new production technology Ignore the high risk 
Product authenticity Flexible return policy 
Niche market Actively marketing through exhibition 
Strong emotional attachment Door-to-door selling 
Keep predecessor’s have done Attaining potential customer by using Black Berry 
Messenger 
Telecommunication technology development Conflict with competitor 
Economical communication tools Avoid vulgar conflict 
Adapted to new telecommunication technology Gossiping 
Product promotion Social harmony 
New way in business transaction Cooperation with the competitors 
Facilitate in approaching customers Coping competitor strategy  
Competitive environment Political regime encourage business development 
Batik worker competition Exploit the opportunity 
Increasing wages Start new business 
Treated them well Exploit nepotism  
Provide more varied menu for their lunch Maintaining good relationship with the government 
and non government organization  
 Actively getting access to government program 
Enact holiday tour in the end of the year Coping with economic crisis 
Give medical allowance Close the business temporary 
Provide soft loan scheme Close the business permanently 
Open a workshop in the village where their batik 
workers lived 
 
Give bonus as rewards  
Production quality  
Become forerunner is advantage in the market 
competition 
 
Strong positioning  
Recognizing market competition  
Willingness to taking risk  
Conflict with competitor  
Direct or frontal conflict  
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No cooperation with competitors  
On and off during unstable economic and political 
dynamics 
 
Political regime threaten business sustainability  
Discrimination treatments  
Permissive  
Following the regulation  
Keep their identity  
Coping strategy to get access to government program  
Adjustment to the way in running the business  
Political regime encourage business development  
Exploit the opportunity  
Increasing production capacity  
Take advantage from government privilege  
Expanding market area  
Targeting low-middle customers  
Actively getting access to government program  
Maintaining family firm reputation  
Maintaining good relationship with the government 
to get access to government’s program 
 
Registered in cooperative  
Coping with economic crisis  
Optimistic  
Believe in God  
Business is something to be inherited through 
generation 
 
Coping strategies  
Stop production temporarily  
Dismiss batik workers  
Unsold product as investment  
Rely on other income to survive  
Pawning batik product to relatives  


























Appendix 5 Coding Categorizing for Chinese Indonesian Owner-managers 
 
Micro Level Meso Level Macro level 
Resource availability Market dynamics Economic and Political 
dynamics 
Family involvement Fashion trend On and off during unstable 
economic and political 
dynamics 
Substitution role Compete actively to get 
supporting programs 
Political regime threaten 
business sustainability 
 Increasing production capacity Discrimination treatments 
Source of trust Expanded marked area Permissive 
Source of help Adopted cap (stamp) tool to 
shortened production time 
Following the regulation 
Share wealth Ready to wear clothing Keep their identity 
Gender role in the business Participate actively in exhibition Coping strategy to get access to 
government program 
Reputation Investment Adjustment to the way in 
running the business 




Political regime encourage 
business development 
Networks with government Reluctant to adapt new 
production technology 
Exploit the opportunity 
Networks with competitor Product authenticity Increasing production capacity 
Tacit knowledge Niche market Take advantage from 
government privilege 
Learning process Strong emotional attachment Expanding market area 
Government training Keep predecessor’s have done Targeting low-middle 
customers 
Previous working experienced Copy the former strategy Actively getting access to 
government program 
Business incubator Telecommunication 
technology development 
Maintaining family firm 
reputation 




Maintaining good relationship 
with the government to get 
access to government’s 
program 
Take over the business Adapted to new 
telecommunication technology 
Registered in cooperative 
Start new business Product promotion  
Inheritance New way in business transaction Coping with economic crisis 
Tangible asset Facilitate in approaching 
customers 
Optimistic 
Intangible asset Competitive environment Believe in God 
Product specialty Batik worker competition Business is something to be 
inherited through generation 
Wages system Increasing wages Coping strategies 
Workshop batik worker Treated them well Stop production temporarily 
Outsource batik worker Provide more varied menu for 
their lunch 
Dismiss batik workers 
The important of colouring 
formula 
Enact holiday tour in the end of 
the year 
Unsold product as investment 





Provide soft loan scheme Pawning batik product to 
relatives 
Product quality Open a workshop in the village 
where their batik workers lived 
Close the business temporary 
Government privilege -Dutch 
colonialism era  
Give bonus as rewards Close the business permanently 
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Job specialization – managing 
batik worker 
Market competition  
Financial capital Become forerunner is advantage 
in the market competition 
 
Family and relatives funding Cutting expenditure expenses  
Succession Strong positioning  
Business succession Recognizing market competition  
Willingness to continue Willingness to taking risk  
Obligation as a child Conflict with competitor  
Strong family value Direct or frontal conflict  
Unable to compete in big cities No cooperation with competitors  
No other lucrative opportunity 
than continuing parent’s family 
firm 
  
Flexibility in choosing successor    
Personal attachment to the firm   
Personal identity   
Family value   
Family expectation   
Family Firm Governance   
Business first orientation   
Family first orientation   
Business not promises or less 
profitable 
  
Reputation   
Emotionally engage to the firm   
Long-term orientation vision   
Family life disruptions   
Centralized authority   
Freedom for batik worker 
performing improvisation in 
drawing patterns and motifs 
  
Copy competitor product   
Kindness investment   
Family control the knowledge   



















Appendix 6 Coding Categorizing for Javanese Owner-managers 
 
Micro Level Meso Level Macro level 
Resource availability Market dynamics Economic and Political 
dynamics 
Family involvement Fashion trend Political regime encourage 
business development 
Production activity role Compete actively to get 
supporting programs 
Start new business 
Source of help Nepotism Exploit the opportunity 
 Dependency to external support Actively getting access to 
government program 
Gender role in the business Production technology 
development 
 
 Open to new production method Maintaining good relationship 
with the government to get 
access to government’s 
program 
Networks with customer or 
resellers 
Reluctant to adapt – following 
the forerunner 
Registered in cooperative 
Networks with government Telecommunication 
technology development 
Exploit nepotism  
Networks with competitor Economical communication 
tools 
Coping with economic crisis 
Tacit knowledge Adapted to new 
telecommunication technology 
Close the business temporary 
Learning process Product promotion Close the business permanently 
Government and or non 
government training 
New way in business transaction  
Previous working experienced Facilitate in approaching 
customers 
 
Business incubator Competitive environment  
Single owned and managed Batik worker competition  
Take over the business Exploit family networks (kinship 
ties) 
 
Start new business Living in the same area with 
batik worker as competitive 
advantage 
 
First generation Ewuh pakewuh (hesitate), 
togetherness, helping each other, 
and rukun rukun (social peace 
and harmony) 
 
 Exploit cultural value  
Intangible asset Increasing wages  
Wages system Market competition  
Workshop batik worker Low price strategy  
Outsource batik worker Cutting expenditure expenses  
Lack of colouring knowledge Neglected the profit  
No colouring knowledge – 
inhibit business start up 
Subsidized  
Take advantage of its proximity 
to batik workers house  
Flexibility in bargaining process  
Ewuh pakewuh (hesitate) Discount for large order  
guanxi (personalized 
network/connection) 
Flexibility in payment system  
Nepotism Consignment system  
Pleasant treatment in doing 
business 
Instalment system  
 Pay later  
Government privilege Ignore the high risk  
Job specialization – limited batik Flexible return policy  
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knowledge 
External support Actively marketing through 
exhibition 
 
Power possession  Door-to-door selling  
Financial capital Attaining potential customer by 
using Black Berry Messenger 
 
Cost cutting strategies to cope 
with limited financial capital 
  
Family Firm Governance Conflict with competitor  
Business first orientation   
Family first orientation Avoid vulgar conflict  
Business not promises or less 
profitable 
Gossiping  
Family life disruptions Social harmony  
Freedom for batik worker 
performing improvisation in 
drawing patterns and motifs 
Cooperation with the 
competitors 
 
Copy competitor product Coping competitor strategy   
Servant leadership   














































Appendix 7 Visual data of Batik Production Process and Batik Products 
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